For Sascha.

Preface

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Content

List of abbreviations

B90 / Greens Alliance 90 / The Greens (political party)

CDU Christian Democratic Union of Germany (political party

CSU Social Union in Bavaria e. V (political party)

DIK German Islamic Conference

DITIB Diyanet İşleri TürkİslamBirliği: Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion e.V.

EKiBB Evangelical Church in Berlin Brandenburg (until 2004, afterwards EKBO

GG Basic German Law (somewhat equivalent to a constitution)

ISIS "The Islamic State in Iraq and in (Greater) Syria"

IGMG Islamic Community Millî Görüş

MJD Muslim Youth in Germany

PEGIDA Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West

(s) peace be upon him

SOAS The School of Oriental and African Studies

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany (political party)

TB Participating observation

ZMD Central Council of Muslims in Germany

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Transcription and phonetic values of Arabic letters

ʾ	=	"explosive sound" - spoken before every intoned vowel as before the a in "aching"
th	=	unvoiced english th as in "thing"
j	=	voiced dsch
ḥ	=	sharp h pronounced at the back of the throat as in "Ha!"
kh	=	ch as in Grman "Bach", in some original quotations also inscribed with ẖ
dh	=	voiced English th as in "the"
z	=	French z
sh	=	sh
ṣ	=	dull, voiceless s as in "song"
ḍ	=	dull, unvoiced d as in "ding"
ṭ	=	dull, voiceless t as in "tennis"
ẓ	=	dull, voiced s as in "zombie"
ʿ	=	pressed sound, which creates the vowel with pressure in the throat like the "aaaah" at the dentist
gh	=	English palate r as in "grief"
q	=	hard k
w	=	English w
y	=	English y
ā, ī, ū	=	long vowels
		For some words that are common and frequently used in English, a transcription has been omitted for the sake of better legibility, as in Mohammed (Muḥammad), Hijab (Ḥijāb), Q'uran (Qurʾān) or Hajj (Ḥaj).

1. Introduction

1.1. Prologue

A few years ago, I studied Islamic Law at the University of Damascus. I was fascinated by the cityscape, particularly the many Muslim women and their hijab-fashion.[1] Before arriving, I had never thought of hijabs as being particularly influential, but my time in the city, spent with fellow students and women on the bus, taught me better. The clothing worn by Muslim women in Damascus proved to be just as imbued with symbols and codes as that of the people in my home-city of Berlin. Fashion, I realised for the first time, is not a unique product of the "Western Modernity". However, at first I was at a loss to decode the multitude of symbols I was observing. And so, for the rest of my one year stay, I worked on understanding Damascene fashion, that is fashion in a non-European, and in particular in a religious context.

Back in Germany, as part of my Masters' thesis and in preparation for the dissertation this book is based on, I noticed changes in the sartorial forms of expression in the Berlin Muslim community. At least, that appeared to be the case, as compared with my observations in 2003 at the beginning of my Islamic studies degree, when I was working part-time as a waitress in an Arabic restaurant. While it continued to be the case that Muslim modes of fashion were referred

1 An exact list of this clothing can be found starting in Chapter 5.2.1 on page 118.

to in pejorative terms, the fashions themselves were undergoing a sartorial integration process. Unnoticed, or so it seemed to be, by the media and indeed by the population that understood itself as belonging to the majority in society. By this I mean that in particular young, German speaking Muslim women were integrating a variety of cultural influences into their clothing, and therefore also into their lives.

In this text, therefore, integration is reinterpreted as the practice of cultural exchange that affects not just one specific group within a society, but rather describes a human approach encompassing how to deal with different influences. Or, to phrase it another way: integration is not viewed here as tantamount to assimilation, but instead is understood as a conversation between influences from various cultures. Which is why I consider the hijab worn by Muslim women to be a type of integrative calling card. Travel to other German and European states has shown that my observations appear to reflect a cross-border phenomenon. Here, I use qualitative research to follow these developments; this book is a presentation of my results.

Sigrid Nökel (2004, pp. 303-304) sketched out the boundaries of my research: I will describe the sartorial practices of women that, as Nökel puts it, can only be understood as a whole: as micro-politics practised by (young) women. Their fashion choices, thought of as sovereign decisions, function as a middle-ground between strong cultural influences, and as micro-politics aimed at gaining recognition from various reference populations within their social realities. However, as a result of prevailing discourse, this explanation is dismissed as too banal for a mass phenomenon. Most studies combine intellectual and legal discourse and assign all sorts of symbols and meanings to the hijab as part of supposedly rational, culturally neutral arguments. In these evaluations, the hijab is confronted with allegations of excessive and of course also strange religiosity in an otherwise secular state. However, habitual practices cannot be explained by simple logic, and attempts at rational explanation or political and legal simplification

are doomed to fail. Only when the non-Muslim dominant society[2] is willing to engage in dialogue can recognition and acceptance of Muslim-specific types of self-presentation be accepted. In turn, however, this acceptance is required for successful integration into the society as a whole. And this is where my research can help.

The importance of the work at hand lies in acceptance of migration research in the German-speaking world as normal, not as a "special field of research". By connecting the research to fashion, which can be considered more mainstream, old stereotypes, such as that of the "poor oppressed foreign woman" can be broken down. Fashion within a religious context is a field that receives little attention; in the German speaking world, it has received no attention.

I am aware that the integration debate across Germany probably does not need yet another contribution which treats migrants and Muslims as identical. However, or perhaps because of this, this work is to be viewed as a critical contribution to the integration debate. A heavily discussed practice will be observed based on its daily implementation, a perspective that until now has, with a few exceptions, been missing from the headscarf debate.

This work is a research document at the intersection of European ethnology and Islamic studies, and will contribute to current migration research. The goal of this book is to step away from the repeated attempts to explain why someone might freely choose to wear a headscarf, and instead to focus on the way in which the headscarf is worn. This approach intends to provide a new perspective on a practice that is often stigmatised. I will be examining the relationship between the Islamic religion and fashionable clothing. Fashionable clothing, in this case, refers not just to the haute couture presented in Paris, or the clothing that can be found in so called "women's magazines". Instead, I define sartorial fashions as a holistic approach to body-centred practices. After all, even people who themselves say

2 The concept of a nationally homogeneous culture, which must be seen as a construct, was summarised by Birgit Rommelspacher (1998) using the term "dominant culture". The expansion of this term to "dominant society" offers a critique of the term "majority society".

they have no interest in fashion get up in the morning and decide what they are going to wear.

This introduction discusses the current state of research, the questions asked in this work and the working hypotheses. I will then move on to discuss the methods used within the research. Once the methods have been explained, the main section of the work will connect the theory to the empirical evidence collected. This main section is divided into five individual chapters for each of five topics related to the backgrounds and conditions involved in the production and consumption of hijabi fashion, in order to highlight the sartorial forms of expression used by Muslim women in all their complexity and diversity. These five topics are representation, production, consumption, self-positioning and regulation. My inspiration for this approach was the *Circuit of Culture* which was developed in the realm of cultural studies by Stuart Hall, and which I used to apply a structure to the answer of how Muslim fashion is constructed (cf. Section 1.5). The goal is less the exact description of various forms of Muslim clothing; instead, I aim to use my observations of a supposedly "foreign" style to discover more about fashion and migration in general. Which is why I have not created a typology and then verified its classification with many interview partners, but rather spent more time and energy explaining, against the background of existing knowledge, what defines the fashion styles of these women and how their significance can be classified contextually.

1.2. Research Problems

Realisations that came to me during my masters' thesis (Kanitz 2010) form the basis of this work. My masters' thesis concluded that the way in which women clothe themselves in the capital city of Syria acts as a public calling card, a way of providing information about their person to their environment. One of the reasons I gave for this was the limited options available for communication between

women and men who did not know each other, and the practice, still prevalent, of finding a potential spouse through friends and relatives. Within this framework, information communicated via the clothing is extremely important. I observed that women used clothing to describe themselves, their ideas about life and their degree of connection to religion. The clothing created an extremely sophisticated impression communicated by the wearer to her environment.

After migration, the ability of people in the environment to read these sophisticated sartorial messages is lost, that is to say the migrant/s find themselves in a situation in which the number of readers has been drastically reduced. Not only that, the context shift involved in migration exposes the women to stereotyping processes. In addition, Muslim women in the global west discover that the headscarf is politicised. Due to the focus on negative issues and the recontextualisation of the headscarf it brings with it, the women are, in political debates, subject to collective classification and external ascription. For example, the clothing style of a successful, religiously educated Damascene woman is often associated with lower-class clothing in Germany. Due to media positioning and stereotyping, headscarves are therefore not viewed as part of a sartorial calling card for the woman's own clothing style, but instead predominantly as a symbol of a supposedly oppressive and misogynistic religion.

In the past few decades, it has become clear that the European Union needs immigration, and has even welcomed it. However, when confronted with "the other", ideas about European identity must be constructed anew, primarily through demarcation and via selective memories. Fears regarding the purity of European or national cultures have been reproduced many times in debates on national, cultural or religious borders, belying the fact that the EU has been heterogeneous for a long time, and will continue to become more heterogeneous as time goes on. These debates present an image of two camps: on the one side are the "Europeans" and on the other side the "new-comers". This is why perceptions of individual people are often formed in regards to national, religious or ethnic backgrounds (Göle 2008, p. 10) and why women wearing the headscarf continually find themselves

explaining that actually, they are from Berlin, not Turkey.

As this was going on, various works have further explored why it is that Muslim women wish to wear the headscarf. Despite these explanations, the hijab continues to have negative associations. This work, then, intends to create a broader understanding for the idea that even clothing worn by religious Muslim women often represents a sartorial expression of cultural belonging. However, as a general rule, no-one makes an effort to read the details contained within modest[3] clothing. It is a generally accepted opinion that clothing is used by all subcultural movements in Germany as an important means of demarcation and visibility. Skinheads, for example, mostly wear or wore bomber jackets, adherents to the hip-hop scene wear baggy pants, etc. Muslim women, on the other hand, are not assumed to have this sense of fashionable diversity, as they supposedly are not part of the "modern" world. But just like every other clothing style, Islamic fashion represents a calling card which women use to represent their personality and perform various identity constructions. This is where this work begins, by examining the many implications contained within the title of the book, and conceiving of and understanding the headscarf in a sartorial context. It also deconstructs the idea of identities as monolithic and unchanging blocks. The goal is a shift in perspective, to prove that the clothing styles worn by Muslim women are, above all, exactly that: clothing styles. Religion is one aspect of them, true, but only one. Other aspects include the background of the wearer, her social position and her stage of life. As fashion sets the accepted standards for social aesthetics, the development of unique Muslim fashion is understood in this work as a socio-political statement of perceived exclusion and a response to same, instead of viewing it as a tool for demarcation.

3 "Modest" is the term commonly used in English to describe this clothing and, in my opinion, the most accurate description without religious connotation for hijabi clothing.

1.3. Thesis and Questions

1.3.1. Questions

The main focus of this investigation was, above all, understanding how clothing develops when ideas regarding religiously appropriate clothing do not match ideas of appropriate clothing as held by the majority society. To understand this better, I have made a distinction between people who themselves immigrated, and women who are only ascribed a migration background. In this research, I specifically examine the question of how these Muslim women select their clothing. The answer is relatively simple, but nonetheless during my research, as I encountered questions as to what exactly I was researching, I found that upon answering the questioner reacted with surprise: yes, I found myself saying, even Muslim women follow fashion.

In order to understand the perceptions and ideas of the women I studied, intensive analysis of various theoretical approaches was required in addition to the actual research. Equipped with this preliminary information, the goal was to investigate the perspective of Muslim women in Germany on the headscarf as an element of their daily clothing practices. The central question of this work is thus:

> Can an observation of fashion be used to make a statement regarding the integration efforts of Muslim women?

The leading research questions arising from this are as follows:

- What are the fashion practices of Muslim women in Germany?
- What is the difference in sartorial practice between migrant women and non-migrant women? The former term refers women who have their own migration experience, and the latter to women who come from families with a migration experience but have no long-term migration experience of their own.
- Can a potential difference between these two groups be used to make a statement on “western” society?

Other questions that informed this work included, for example: which characteristics do Muslim women use to recognise kindred sartorial spirits? Do clothing styles change immediately after immigration, and if so, how? What changes can be observed over time? How do women experience the inability of their environment to read the coding expressed by their clothing, as people cannot, but in many cases also do not want, to read said coding? Do they experience an effect on their daily routines, and if yes: how do they deal with this?

1.3.2. Theses

At the beginning of my research I posited a few theses that I in part refuted and in part expanded to include new theses over the course of my research. The starting thesis for this work, which was the result of my previous research project in Syria, states that fashion is a creative instrument for social positioning even in the context of Islamic countries.

The hijab is a calling card: Muslim women select their clothing, just like other people, as a calling card. So-called Muslim clothing is much more than just religiously Muslim. It integrates social and religious influences as well as personal interests, in particular the interest in fashion or clothing that an individual considers beautiful. Muslim women portray their personality via their clothing, as well as their past and their visions for the future.

The hijab serves to cover shame: Muslim clothing refers not just to the headscarf, but to the entire outfit. Taking away a piece of this clothing violates shame boundaries; it is as if a "western" man was denied the right to wear trousers.

Integration is already here: Fashion styles develop within a community and anyone who has been part of a group has experience with adjusting

sartorial communication styles to match the ideas of aesthetics and ethics projected from external sources. Through migration, women are confronted with new aesthetic contexts. They meet the requirements of these contexts by adjusting the information they transmit sartorially. They are forced to develop a new fashion language, to find mixed forms that adequately reflect both their national past as well as their social position, and that also allow them to reliably categorise certain clothing styles. For example in accordance with nationality, with social class or with personal status.

From this thesis we can deduce that the sartorial development of young Muslim women born in Germany must be read as showing that the requirement to integrate, long demanded from them, has already been achieved, as their style requires much more understanding of social connections than simple fashion taste demands. We can therefore presume that the entire negatively connotated headscarf debate serves only to secure positions within society and confirm social hierarchies. According to literary scholar and fashion researcher Gertrud Lehnert (2013), imitation is a key characteristic of fashion management. The performance of gender norms, preferences and social status is associated with symbolic and cultural capital. Compliance or purposeful non-compliance with same is a signal not just of aesthetic competence, but also of education[4]. Reading fashion is therefore a form of cultural competence (ibid., p. 18). This includes, consciously or unconsciously, analysis of legal structures and of dominant discourses on ideas and meanings, of applied knowledge on clothing practices and reflection on knowledge regarding historical fashion worn by a person's parents, which is often studied via pictures (Hall 2004a, p. 68).

Disparaging discourses serve to secure privileges: Talking about migration in Germany usually implies a hierarchical perspective, which places "foreign" countries on one end of a spectrum and "modern" societies on the other. This results in a politically hegemonial belief system that positions migrants as strangers on the edges of society.

4 In German, Bildung

In this discourse, those in the centre of society appear, in contrast to those who have just arrived and are on the edges, to be superior, modern and progressive. If this belief is followed to the logical conclusion, we must conclude that hegemonial ascription regarding the headscarf takes place primarily not due to a lack of competence on the part of the ascribing party, or because they are not able to understand the various intergenerational and social interpretations and negotiations, but instead because these ascriptions are "supposed" to be made. To put it clearly: on the one hand, the headscarf and all its implications cannot be read, on the other, many non-Muslims do not want to be able to read it. It is apparently easier for the majority of people to view it as a symbol of the oppression of women by a medieval religion, which represents a threat to a German identity supposed to be unique and in need of protection.[5]

The issues covered briefly here are the basis of the arguments made in this work. Deconstruction of common immigration stereotypes is necessary to facilitate a new examination of hijabi clothing.

1.4. Current State of Research

1.4.1. Hijabi fashion - over researched?

Over the last few years, the headscarf worn by Muslim women has been subject to a great deal of media discourse within Germany and Europe. One example is the "Affaire du Foulard", that is the debate on banning the hijab in French schools, which lasted from 1989 to 2004, or a similar debate on banning teachers from wearing the hijab in Germany, from 1998 to 2006, as well as the ban on the burqa (full

5 Of course, this view does not represent reality. Despite this, for example at demonstrations held by the Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes ((PEGIDA)) in December of 2014, participants spoke of a social *we*. This is a view that is called into question critically in this work by use of the term *dominant society*.

body veil) in public, initially introduced in Belgium in April of 2010, and then in France in September of the same year. In 2014, several judgements in Germany also banned the hijab outside of public service professions (e.g. Römer 2014). The arguments were very intense, in particular in regards to the tone in the media. According to Nilüfer Göle, the issue of the hijab has been subject to public discussion ever since the second generation of Muslim women with an immigration background have made Islam visible within Europe. The apprehensive and fearful reactions indicate, at best, that Europeans are uncertain as to what "secular modern" can mean (Göle 2008, p. 20).

Research carried out before the 1980s/90s emphasises nationality in particular. As such, the hijab was not a central focus of the research. In the middle of the 1990s, according to Schröter, Muslim women began bringing up the issue of the hijab themselves when interviewed (Schröter 2002, p. 242). It is around this time that Ursula Mihciyazgan (1993), published her first very instructive works, which, however, due to their publication date, are rarely referenced today.

Post 1990s literature on the hijab can be roughly divided into two categories: Discourse analyses, which usually observe Islam and, in a secondary role, the hijab within a macrosocial context, and empirical investigations that attempt to produce concrete statements by means of intensive research. However, there is still barely any literature focusing on Islamic fashion trends, and in general there is a big gap in the research when it comes to examining the connections between fashion and religion. The idea that Muslim women's clothing is dictated by religious requirements is only now changing, and that slowly. This assumption has unfortunately lead many people to believe that clothing worn by Muslim women is incompatible with fashion ideals. And this completely ignores the fact that there is a great degree of diversity in the clothing of even those women who are very religious (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 133).

Most works that mention the hijab are either focusing on Muslim women as a social group, or are examining the issue of women's clothing as part of a work on a different subject, such as Islam or Muslim groups within Germany. As recently as 2010, in regards to

the hijab, or the selection of clothing by Muslim women, the main question being asked was why women were wearing hijabs at all. In the following, I intend to present the previous answers to these questions, in order to show how this work offers a different perspective than simply the answer to this question of "why", which has already been answered in great detail.

1.4.2. Why do they wear that thing anyway?

Discourse analyses, in particular popular-science publications, approached the issues of Islam and the hijab primarily from a normative premise, in which the norms and views of the author were often identical to the values propagated within the text. In this way, investigations on the influence of the community of origin on migrants within Europe have been, since 1990, described in a polarizing manner based on the radicalization of Muslim groups. Their trans-local connections were generally considered problematic, as in the case of Milli Görüş or Muslim Brotherhood splinter groups. Some examples can be found in Gilles Kepel (1994), Ursula Spuler-Stegemann (1998) or Bassam Tibi (2002), or for example Necla Kelek (2005). This literature was characterized by oft-used formulas that file all discourse relating to Islam under a single heading, and work with ideas like "the bogeyman" or "Islamophobia", which only serve to problematize the issues. The dynamics and plurality of the actual circumstances are, in these instances, often completely ignored; in particular, Muslim women are assigned the role of passive victims.

However, there were some other perspectives to be found within the discourse-analytical works. For example, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2004) carried out research on the cause of the problematizing view of Islam. Her analysis of the perception of Islam as seen through its heated media portrayal is very precise. Christina von Braun and Bettina Mathes used a similar approach, describing the double moral standards surrounding the hijab (von Braun and Mathes 2007). Using examples of gender hierarchy, understanding of tradition, religious

symbols and economic order, they carried out a detailed and nuanced analysis of the various meanings the hijab can have. However, although these authors were, in principle, less biased towards Islam, the descriptions, in particular those written by von Braun and Mathes, were not nuanced enough to avoid monocausal language.

Other works, for example the description by Rolf Schieder, focused on the religious dilemma within the liberal state: on the one hand, Germany considers itself to be a secular state, which must act neutrally towards all religions. On the other, the Christian world view must retain its exemplary function, which pushes other religious groups towards radicalization. Rolf Schieder calls for a general civil-religious approach to solve the dilemma between Christian tradition and the laical state (Schieder 2000). Nilüfer Göle (2008) discussed Schieder's ideas using Turkey as an example. Göle suggested Turkey as a role model of a secular state, and explored the potential of using it as a prototype. To do this, she examined various issues, from how the country deals with terrorism to globalization and even the redefinition of the European cultural identity.

Heide Oestreich (2004, p. 145), too, examined political systems, in particular legal discourse, and viewed wearing the hijab as a type of counter-identity. She writes that ascription as a migrant-other comprises a type of discrimination that cannot be overcome. The wearer thus initiates a counter-discourse, expressed, due to lack of other forms of representation, via body politics. In this case, the hijab gives the women in question a voice. At the same time, writes Oestreich, the emphasis on deviation acts as a critique of the dominant culture, of the way those in the dominant culture interact with one another and on the exclusion of those perceived as outsiders. "To remove it would be to return to voicelessness." (ibid., p. 146). The women thus transform what used to be the religion of migrant workers to a stylized "high Islam"[6], which discards the rules from old-country

6 The difference between high and low Islam has been discussed in particular by Ursula Mihciyazgan. She concludes "that the Islam practised by 'simple' Muslims day to day is different from that represented by official Islamic teachings." (Mihciyazgan 1994a, p. 197) Similarly, in my descriptions I differentiate

traditions as culturally determined, and therefore allows Islam to adapt to the receiving society, as it is compatible with the secular identity concepts of the western world (Oestreich 2004, p. 146). To simplify, going without gummy bears, which are considered haram as they contain gelatine, in combination with the hijab, which helps build trust with their parents, allows the women to interact casually with male classmates during extraordinary activities, as the parents have a greater reassurance that their daughter will behave correctly (ibid., p. 143). This comprehensive but more journalistic analysis was expanded on by Julia von Blumenthal (2009) from a purely legal perspective on the hijab debate and its effects on jurisprudence within Germany's federal provincial structure.

Contextual works, in particular comparisons between the hijab debate in France and Germany, are another category of discourse analysis that must be mentioned here. Schirin Amir-Moazami (2007) provided the most detailed treatment of this subject. According to Moazami, the hijab is not just an expression of the Muslim faith, but also a symbol for a growing socialization process and "interpretive arguments regarding Muslim discourse and way of life" (ibid., p. 31) in western societies. They are, for example, embedded in traditional expectations and do not under any circumstances represent only a freely floating and freely chosen religious identity. On the other hand, she also argues that the women are not attempting to communicate an "identity", but rather to forge a deeper connection to God and cultivate their own spirituality (ibid., p. 173).

The essay collection of Berghahn and Rostock (2009) builds on this perspective. In their book, the editors present an extensive collection of current discursive works regarding the state of the hijab debate in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. Also included are current contributions on some aspects of Germany's position between

between Muslim and Islamic, although both words can be seen as grammatically identical. "Muslim" refers, in the following, to the practices of Muslim men and women, while "Islamic" refers to everything connected to official Islamic teachings.

multiculturalism and hegemonic perceptions of entitlement to German tradition.

Empirical investigations can be divided into qualitative and quantitative studies. In my opinion, these methods are complementary. They focus more on women who wear the hijab than on the hijab in a macrosocial context. The largest and most recent quantitative studies, which cannot be understood as representative from a social-scientific perspective, were carried out on the one hand by von Jessen and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (2006). On behalf of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the authors analysed the strong similarity between the aspirations of German and Turkish women, based on a survey conducted with interview partners from Turkey. They conclude that the German majority society is largely completely puzzled as to the motive of women who wear the hijab. Karakaşoğlu and Boos-Nünning (2005), on the other hand, investigate data on a broad spectrum of issues within the life of young women by studying five different groups of migrant women.

Previous qualitative research also focused, for the most part, on the second generation, that is Muslim women, usually with a Turkish background, and their methods of creating their own cultural identity using the hijab - not "on the margins of society", but rather as part of the search for their own place amongst Muslim perceptions of identity. Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner (1999) published a series of case studies on the changed circumstances of Muslim women within the globalized modern society. Shortly afterwards, Gritt Klinkhammer (2000) also published a case study. Additional works were then brought out by Nökel (2002) and Höglinger (2002). In each of the listed works, the hijab and the reasons for wearing it are interpreted in a complex and contextual manner. The results of these studies, as already suspected in the case of Jessen, often contradict the public's perception of Muslim women (Höglinger 2014). This is because the hijab is often a tool adopted independently as a way out of the subaltern. Young women who have grown up in the global west experience, in particular during adolescence, a strong conflict with the society that, on the

one hand, they belong to, but which also regularly subjects them to discrimination and stigmatisation (Göle 2008, p. 19; see also Bendixsen 2013).

A reason to wear the hijab is to allow themselves to participate in mixed gender public life, by taking a piece of the "Harem", which can be translated only inadequately in English as "sanctuary" with them and wearing it (Nökel 2004, p. 284). Abu Lughod used the excellent idea of a "mobile home" to describe this concept (Abu-Lughod 2002, p. 785). Nökel (2002, p. 89) shows clearly that the women are able to silence critics of their life-style using Islamic arguments. Werner Schiffauer (2002), on the other hand, determined that this power to speak can only exist for Muslim women when referring to the Quranic revelations. They present their embodied expression with their clothing, so as not to put up with the accusation that they have been assimilated into western society. By referring to feminist interpretations of the Quran, they are able to emphatically represent positions critical of society (Oestreich 2004, p. 152). Nökel (2002, p. 96), Karakaşoğlu and Boos-Nünning (2005, p. 27) come to similar conclusions in their interviews: for Muslim women, the hijab is an initiation rite that wins them esteem within the Muslim community, as it represents a type of asceticism and the rejection of bodily needs (see also Oestreich 2004, p. 140).

1.4.3. Positioning and Limitations

Discourse analyzes, such as those published by von Braun or Beck-Gernsheim, make it clear that the headscarf is to be examined in a much more differentiated manner than than previously attempted, but restrict themselves to theoretical observations, that is they do not carry out any research. Qualitative investigations, in comparison, focus on the conflict experienced as problematic by adolescent women who have been assigned Turkish migratory backgrounds. These women see in Islam a basis for their independent ethical and aesthetic behaviour and continue to evoke it as a personal and conscious decision. In doing

so, they define their own position within society while at the same time drawing the line between themselves and both earlier generations and ascriptions from within the dominant society (Göle 2008, p. 20).

The comprehensive literature on the issue of the hijab is dominated by questions of "why", as well as legal perspectives, Islamic studies perspectives, questions of motivation, etc. There are no theoretical research approaches from a fashion perspective, no sartorial biographies, at least not within the German speaking literature. It is only in the last few years that works have begun to appear that focus on the specific issue of fashion within Islam. These works began with a special edition of *Fashion Theory* magazine from Tarlo and Moors (2007), which focused on fashion outside of Europe. Tarlo also published a monograph with case studies on three women in Great Britain (Tarlo 2010). This was further developed with an essay collection published in 2013 featuring research on Muslim fashion in the global west (Moors and Tarlo 2013). In the same year, Herding (2013) published observations on the development of a Muslim consumer culture within Europe.

The works listed above once again present a new perspective on Islamic fashion. Although it is often the case that orthodox requirements for women's fashion demand that the clothing in question is capable of adequately hiding the body, so that, in the optimal case, body contours are not visible, the women themselves place more value on ensuring that their attitude is "correct" when wearing the clothing. To them, the accusation that Muslim clothing represents subjugation to men is immaterial. The large majority of Muslim women want, primarily, to use their hijabi clothing to subject themselves to God, not to men (see also Schulz 2007, p. 267). Clothing helps them to achieve an attitude of religious submission; religion is not simply expressed through their clothing.

The question as to the many reasons that women might wear the hijab ought to be sufficiently answered in the existing literature. This work is one of the first that more specifically examines how this clothing is obtained, what it means to the individual woman, and, in particular, which conclusions can be drawn from these observations

in regards to migration and in particular fashion theory.

1.5. The *Circuit of Culture* or: Chapter Summaries

The title of my work in is "The Hijab as a Calling Card: Forms of Style and Expression in Young Muslim Women in Berlin. A Qualitative Case Study", which begs a number of questions. For example, what is a hijab? Or what are forms of style? However, those are the easy questions posed by the title. It also raises much more difficult questions, such as how do we define a Muslim woman? In order to research not just women and their fashion choices, but instead to examine these questions theoretically, the main part of the work is structured in accordance with the *Circuit of Culture*, which was developed among others by Stuart Hall as part of the framework of British cultural studies. In accordance with methods that, among other things, were used to analyse the walkman, cultural phenomenon are viewed as a result of media production and circulation and can only be understood as a whole (Du Gay et al. 1997). The Culture Circuit, or Circuit of Culture, is one of the most integrative methods for analysing an object conveyed via media discourse (Hepp 2004, p. 163).

As the hijab is not just a piece of cloth, but also represents a product conveyed via media, I analyse it as such. In the book, I will divide the theory section into the five elements to be analysed as seen above. The chapters are as follows:

- *Representations* provides an initial summary of the discourses that project exclusionary ascriptions to hijabs, and their origins. It also asks how identity ascriptions influence sartorial forms of expression.
- *Production of Meaning* considers fashion theory and connects it to the creation of Muslim fashion in magazines, blogs, etc.
- *Consumption of Islamic Fashion* examines consumption practices of women who wear a hijab, and the integration of the hijab into everyday life (cf. ibid., p. 161).
- *Self-positioning* asks how hijab fashion is used on a daily basis, and allows the young women themselves to report on their daily



clothing situations.

- *Regulatory Dimensions* investigates legal and political aspects of the hijab, and the daily influence environment has on the young women in question.

I hope, with this type of analysis, to approach the hijab not just through examination of discourses, but also to incorporate "production cultures and adoption processes", in order to achieve a more nuanced examination of Islamic religious practices, as the hijab is a significant part of female Islamic tradition (Hepp 2004, pp. 162-163). Chapter 3, in particular, describes the much discussed and therefore hyper-visual aspects of discourse surrounding the hijab. In contrast, concrete processes surrounding production of meaning often fade into the background. Which is why I devote a whole chapter both to the legal discourse and to forms of consumption and production. The second part of this work consists of a recapitulatory analysis which is

informed by the initial theoretical work. The theories developed as part of researching this book are discussed in detail, and combined to form the final theoretical considerations. But first, a discussion of methods.

2. Method

2.1. Basic Premises for Qualitative Research

According to Herbert Blumer (1954), people act in the world by furnishing it with meaning and then behaving accordingly. Sometimes these actions are based merely on the expectation of a specific meaning. Meanings become visible only through the process of interaction, and never outside of it. Situations in which people interact serve as negotiations between parties regarding the meanings they expect from one another. If their ideas regarding this meaning differ, then conflict may break out (Dellwing and Prus 2012, p. 21). This also means, however, that things do not have any meaning at all outside of human interaction. The world is not full of meaning that must first be discovered, but rather many small, concrete actions in context provide an object with substance. In other contexts, it may be interpreted very differently. This work, then, assumes that interpretation is a complex, social feat performed by people (Dellwing and Prus 2012, p. 20; Kaschuba 1999, p. 210). The meanings associated with people themselves are linguistically usually described via identities or personalities. These identities are partially a joint creation, but sometimes they are also ascribed to people, demoting them to objects. For this reason, later in this work I will propose that identity is more of an imposition than something to strive for (p. 78, in chapter 3.4) Nonetheless, the "anticipation of the interpretation of others provides

the context in which we carry out our actions [...]" (Dellwing and Prus 2012, p. 31). Therefore, actions take place on the one hand based on the assumption of a normative definition of a situation within a specific group. On the other hand, people represent themselves within the framework of the identity construction ascribed to them, which is "intertwined with assumptions regarding sex, appearance, language spoken, etc" (ibid., p. 37). However, it is mainly learned perspectives and perceptions that influence these representations (Appadurai 1996, p. 48).

We can therefore conclude that a person's status is also not pre-existing, for example structurally, but instead is negotiated and/or reproduced actively in every situation by the people present (Dellwing and Prus 2012, p. 25). It is not structures, but rather activities that must be used as the starting point for understanding a person's behaviour, and in particular to make it clear that there is no pre-existing structuring truth behind the praxis. Even opinions are never preconceived and then simply presented at crucial moments; instead, opinions only emerge over the course of an interaction, in a manner that is unique and extremely difficult to reproduce. When viewed in this manner, it is clear that opinions cannot be observed without their context (ibid., p. 30). Which is why, later in this chapter, there is a section that contextualises this work and in which I introduce myself as the author.

We can posit, therefore, that actions represent proposed meanings. The emergence of these proposals is particularly interesting. What is relevant, according to the basic foundations of qualitative research, is how meaning is generated within interactions. The actual meaning, that is the substance and evaluation of same, are not nearly as important in comparison (ibid., p. 27). In my case, therefore, I cannot emphasize enough that the goal of my research is not to understand why women wear the headscarf, but rather how Muslim fashion is created from this piece of cloth. The goal of qualitative research must be to measure this generation of meaning, to present it based on real facts and finally to develop appropriate explanations and prognoses (Holweg 2005, p. 36). I decided against a quantitative

empirical social-research method, and did not attempt to use a statistically significant number of interview partners or analyses to create quantitatively representative data. Instead, the methods I used aimed to "thickly" describe a section of reality (cf. Geertz 1983). To do this, I used method triangulations, as "in the investigation of a phenomenon [fewer] cases are often more meaningful than the use of one method for many cases" (Flick 2000, p. 260). Therefore, to collect empirical knowledge, work is done on individual cases by studying them over time, along with varied and extensive data material (Amann and Hirschauer 1997, p. 16).

2.2. Summary of Methods in this Work

In accordance with the premise of qualitative research, the goal of this book is to be able to understand the meaning assigned to the sartorial objects by the women I researched. To this aim, the methodical section of this work is laid out as qualitative ethnographic social research. The validity of the conclusions is based on the tangible and the characteristic. However, my goal is not to include the largest population possible, or even a representative percent of same, as would be the case with quantitative research approaches. The research in this book uses subject-centred methods, for example qualitative interviews and participatory observation (TB), based on the assumption that more information on the dynamics of ascription of meaning from objects and subjects can be gained from dialogue and long-term observation than from a questionnaire that is filled out anonymously (Hauser-Schäublin 2008). The latter is the medium of choice when the goal is to analyse the statistical significance of the results gained from qualitative methods.

One important foundation for carrying out ethnographical research is early literature from qualitative empirical social research, e.g. in English James Spradley (1979) and the founders of the Grounded Theory method, Glaser and Strauss (1967), as well as Uwe Flick (1991)

and Phillip Mayring (2002) in German. Bettina Beer's anthology offers a more modern and systematic discussion of ethnological research techniques in (Beer 2008a).

I also used additional methodological concepts in my research as an expansion on the foundational literature named above. Arjun Appadurai (2002), for example, brought about changes to research praxis by noting that awareness regarding the structure of the field of research must be the starting point for every research paper. And of course, the methodology of European ethnology has experienced a paradigm shift over the past few years, moving towards a transnational approach. The "multi-sited ethnography" methods developed by George Marcus (1995) envision allowing more room for plural realities within research praxis. The existing connections, which transcend national borders and are created by local, medial and communicative interactions, can only be adequately served with multi-sited research design. In doing so, it is the "objects, conflicts and histories" which serve as points of reference within the biography of a person, and that may be used to reveal the manifold connections (ibid., pp. 106 sq.). For this reason, I accompanied the research partners in various day to day situations, for example viewing photo albums or going clothes shopping. In cases where it was not possible to travel beyond national borders, I asked the interview partners to take photos and bring them back with them. When handing over the photos, as a general rule, they provided a variety of anecdotes connected to the fashion portrayed. It is true that I had only a few interview partners, but conversation was initiated repeatedly, partly in set interview situations, partly in open dialogue in which the progress of the development of the thesis was also discussed with the women, both in Arabic and German.

The following segment provides a more detailed description of the exact techniques used in ethnographic field research. I will list the methods I used, describe the operationalisation and the research process, and finally critically examine the problems of projection and structure within these methods.

2.2.1. Interviews

The first source used for the research in this book is the qualitative interview. The basic goal of an ethnological interview is to understand the common knowledge of the person being investigated. This knowledge consists of implicit, learned knowledge, as well as the ability to move through daily life successfully and largely without conflict. In addition, the goal is to learn to understand action strategies and interpretative patterns. Accessing the perspective of the actors allows the researchers to record their understanding of reality and their subjective interpretations (Schlehe 2008, p. 121). The interpretative connections recorded in the interviews may differ greatly from those of the researcher. Achieving clarity on these points is one advantage of qualitative research (Helfferich 2005, pp. 19 sq.). Another goal of qualitative interviews is to discover as much as possible about the interviewee. To do this, the interviewer creates a concurrence of closeness and distance. The closeness is required to create a trusting relationship, the environment which makes an informative conversation possible. The distance, on the other hand, prevents the researcher, who is part of the situation, from forgetting the larger picture, which can happen during PO. Which is why an interview must be clearly distinguished, including for the interviewees, from the open briefings which are regularly carried out as part of participatory observation (Schlehe 2008, p. 125).

There are two main types of qualitative interviews, the narrative interview and the subject-based interview. The narrative conversational form, developed by Fritz Schütze (1983) and described, for example, by Mayring (2010), aims above all to allow the interview partner to reflect on aspects of their life. The lack of a question and answer format gives the interviewee a chance to offer information that the interviewer did not ask for. The subject-centred interview, on the other hand, as described by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983), facilitates entering into a conversation, as the interview situation is supported by a guideline or a questionnaire. In most cases, as in my research, a mix of both interview techniques is used depending on the

situation.

As the goal of this research was not to create a text but rather to generate a process of understanding, a mixed format, the "problem centred interview" proved to be very helpful. This type of interview was described, for example, by Witzel (1985). It combines the advantages of both types of interview. Based on dialogue and centred on a problem, the thread of conversation is in the hands of the interviewee, and careful, topic-centred sorting is carried out, if at all, using a guideline that the interviewer consults (cf. also Klinkhammer 2000, p. 111). Uwe Flick (1995) described a very similar type of interview as an episodic interview, in which the initial invitation to speak is repeated or adjusted occasionally if a topic appears to be finished after several inquiries (cf. also Helfferich 2005, p. 14). The selected interview type, the problem centred interview, aims, just like the narrative interview, to induce a state of reflection in the interview partner. I chose this type of conversation in order to allow the women to tell their own stories, and to put forth their own interpretations regarding their clothing, in order to avoid adding another piece of research *about* Muslim women and their headscarves to the existing canon.

The interview techniques and interview rules came from suggestions made by Ursula Boos-Nünning (1986):

- Creation of a trusting atmosphere
- Strengthen the memory and communication readiness of the interviewees
- Gentle questioning, do not ask questions too quickly or erratically
- Leave room for narrative connections
- Do not ask suggestive questions
- Repeat and modify the invitation to speak
- Ask about motives
- Do not get into a dispute regarding expertise
- Favour colloquial language (cf. also Mayring 2010, pp. 67 sq.; and Klinkhammer 2000, pp. 115 sq.)

Under consideration of "sartorial praxis", the idea is to record actions carried out by the interviewees on a routine basis or even only once, that they themselves understand to be an act of fashion (cf. Klinkhammer 2000, p. 112). From a methodological theoretical perspective, I am interested in the coping strategies when it comes to Muslim women's fashion in a society in which they do not belong to the dominant culture. The goal is to discover these strategies together with the interview partners. This includes, on the one hand, a diachronic perspective, that is I discovered how the interviewee described her own sartorial socialisation. On the other hand, I also included a synchronic perspective, that is how the person classifies socialization of their fashion today, or which sartorial groups she feels she belongs to and how she views her own place in society. It seemed to me that the most important thing was to show how the various dimensions and practices were connected to one another (cf. ibid., pp. 113-115).

Unlike the predominant social research paradigm of ethno-methodological indifference, in which the relevance system of the researcher is held back, I concentrated on applying strategies for building trust with my interview partners in order to create a "working alliance", as for many women the subject of the headscarf is fraught, as it is so often discussed negatively (Helfferich 2005, p. 31). This approach proved to be necessary, as an invitation to speak about the headscarf that was too open lead above all to information on the discrimination the women had experienced. My field and interview experiences were marked by the consistent application of closeness and distance, in which equal and mutual communication was implemented during the entire course of the research, and approaching understanding of my research partner's practises. Rolf Lindner (1981, p. 65) dealt extensively with this problem in his essay "Die Angst des Forschers vor dem Feld" (the researcher's fear of the field).

Equipped with an already broad base of academic information on Islamic life in Syria and in Berlin, strict concentration on the subject of the hijab and fashion was possible without too much drift into related issues such as integration and assimilation demands from the

dominant society; this was done by using a very specific invitation to speak (cf. Witzel 1985). I also used strategies for generating understanding within the interviews, such as follow-up questions and clarification. When asking follow-up questions to improve my understanding, I sometimes offered interpretations that we then discussed. The guideline, there in case I needed it for the interviews, was loosely structured and was usually only viewed toward the end of the discussion to ensure that I had not forgotten anything.Occasionally, in particular in interviews in which I was meeting the interview partner for a second or third time, I proposed a variety of perspectives on the problem that arose from my research, and asked her for her opinion (cf. Helfferich 2005, p. 24).

I recorded the interviews with a tape recorder and transcribed them afterwards from the tape. If this was not possible, I wrote a transcription from memory immediately after the interview. These parts of the interviews must be viewed as reconstructed conversations and can be recognised as such via the narrative language used. The completed interview texts, as I evaluated them in their transcribed form, can be seen as the result of a joint work process (ibid., p. 31). Those interpretations introduced by the interview partners themselves were the interpretations I was most likely to make use of when developing theses. In some cases, I went beyond what was said in these interpretations and included additional aspects, which I could assume, based on my field research, were connected to the experiences of the interview partner (ibid., p. 37).

2.2.2. Participatory Observation

PO is a special feature of ethnology and cultural anthropology, and is often an essential tool for qualitative research methods. It is not the same as pure observation, which is its own form of data collection (Amann and Hirschauer 1997, p. 16). PO is, against the backdrop of additional tools, a way to explore research questions in a relevant context and is also suitable for testing the consistency of preliminary

considerations in the field. These initial explorations often show that some questions are more relevant than others, and usually these are not the questions that the researcher came up with while sitting at their desk. Repeated direct participation in events by the researcher is useful not the least because, as has been discovered, the human brain has a high error rate when it comes to correctly reporting memories (Beer 2008b, p. 177). Long-term participation in the daily activities of those being researched also opens up the possibility of getting closer to the field of research and getting to know potential interview partners. In some cases, the observation can be advantageous for data collection, in particular if the researcher does not have full mastery of the language of those being interviewed (Hauser-Schäublin 2008, p. 48).[7] In addition, participation that goes above and beyond pure observation allows the researcher to speak directly to the actors, to speak about difficulties with understanding and, through dialogue, to achieve better knowledge of the situation and the attitude of the actors.

Finally, participatory observation of social interaction is useful within the data material for understanding the perspectives and self-representations of the observed persons in various situations. Which is why following the actors as they went about their daily life was also an important part of my field research. Bendixsen (2013, p. 49), who has also written about the hijab, determined that certain concepts or representations of daily life are commented on, confirmed, rejected or intensified when actors talk to one another. These representations can thus be understood differently than would be possible from interviews alone.

A prerequisite for successful participatory observation is that the researcher takes part in interactions within the group to be studied in cycles over the longer-term, creating social relationships with the people in the group in order to find out as much as possible about their general situation in life and specific daily rituals. Amann and

7 This is what I used for my observations in the clothing store, not for Arabic, but for Turkish.

Hirschauer (1997, p. 17) have noted that PO is, also and in particular, marked by a systematic loss of control regarding the conditions of the cognitive process during the time spent in the field. They emphasize that in order to guarantee that this takes place, methodological constraints must be excluded in order to allow for diverse observations and experiences. Which is why the relevant literature recommends using a field diary instead of survey instruments. The diary is used to record observed experiences and findings after the event.

I found the cyclical work processes that I used to implement PO to be particularly productive. In line with suggestions from James Spradley (1980), PO cannot be understood as a linear process. Instead, it consists of a repeating cycle of data collection, followed by data notation and evaluation and then analysis which brings forth new questions that can in turn be answered by collecting data. I therefore returned again and again to my desk to fill in theoretical gaps. This work then often opened up new questions for which I had to consult my existing research or, if the material I had already collected did not contain the answer, had to be posed during the next period of field research (cf. ibid., p. 29). During participation, I usually took on a gradually more passive role (Hauser-Schäublin 2008, p. 38). Remaining passive is not always easy, particularly when one is easy to recognize as a foreign body within the group. In the best-case scenario, this "foreignness" draws attention and curiosity which can be used to begin conversations. Either way, the effect of the researcher's presence on the behaviour of the subjects must be taken into account when evaluating the data. As an example, Anne Sofie Roald wrote that in response to her question as to why women wear the headscarf, the subjects gave very different answers based on their perception of the person asking the questions (Roald 2001, p. 257).

The technique of participatory observation is often connected, in Germany, to the Polish social-anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942). He was in Australia when the First World War broke out, and, a subject of Austria, was unable to return to Europe. However, he was allowed to continue his research and later used his notes from

this time period to publish a study of the inhabitants of Papua New Guinea (Kohl 1990). From this experience he developed his manifesto on anthropological methods, which forms the basis of current methods: get out of the office and into the field. Even though it was developed earlier, this technique did not have a name until given one in 1924 by sociologist Eduard C. Lindemann. However, he used participatory observer to refer to a member of the group being studied that the researcher used as an informant. Finally, in Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s there arose a tradition of urban sociology in which scientists, driven by the idea of discovery, attempted to get close to their field of research by participating in daily life. Prominent examples include the study by Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1967 [1925]) and their data collection research technique, based on reporting (Amann and Hirschauer 1997, p. 9). In ethnological literature, the term was first introduced by Florence Kluckhohn in 1940 (Spittler 2001, p. 2).

2.2.3. Photography as a method

The photos used in this work are an integral part of the literary field of ethnography, and must therefore be viewed as a part of the work itself. However, given the background of colonial research history, use of images of a minority within Germany must be viewed critically. All too often, anthropologists authored one-sided documentation on colonial subjects and emphasized them using photo series' (Harper 2000, p. 407). One very old critique regarding visual sociology is therefore that the researchers are usually "powerful and established", and portray less powerful, colonised subjects (Harper 1994, p. 408). As part of this research, I have taken the liberty of photographing and portraying strangers, with their permission.

And there are other critical notes to take into account when discussing the images. For example, they do not represent an objective record of reality, but rather a highly subjective "reality" filtered, selected and structured by me (Harper 2000, p. 406). Clifford and Marcus (1986), within the framework of the sociological crisis of

representation, stated that photos, just as with any recording from reality, are in fact subjectively coloured representations, and not objective documents. Thus, my selection of the motif and staging of the fashion images must be seen as my perception of Muslim fashion in Berlin and in other cities. The photographs are to be considered as an extension of my own eyes, and represent Muslim clothing as I see it and wish to portray it (Petermann 1995, p. 228). The subjects are usually women as they move around the city of Berlin. I selected women whose outfits appeared to me to be particularly successful. This means, of course, that my ideas regarding what is fashionable or what should be fashionable had a strong influence on the photographs.

As fashion is, above all, a visual cultural product, I did feel it was necessary to use images. They serve, first and foremost, as visual aids - an image carries many more messages than words can. On the one hand, they intensify our view of fashion, and on the other they permit new interpretations which can then be discussed. I also used photography during my research to expand a continually updating theory. I had originally planned to use photography as part of a dialogue designed to gain comprehensive knowledge, that is to use the images to discuss Muslim fashion in Berlin with my interview partners. The goal was to confront post-modern critiques regarding research processes and to remove supposed objectivity from the images by setting free the subjectivity of others who would interpret the images differently than I did. Unfortunately, this did not work for all interviews and I could only carry it out when it seemed expedient. Instead of being a systematic part of the interviews, this method was largely used from time to time during informal conversations. The photos taken by my interview partners at my request show clearly that fashionable developments move in a specific direction, even above and beyond modest fashion in Germany. The “photo-directed lure” for interpretations of fashions helped me to become the student, and to learn about my interview partner’s fashion with them as the teacher (Harper 2000, p. 415).

The images themselves are subject to an arbitrary factor that arose as a pragmatic part of the research. I only spoke to women

when I felt able to, as I was only able to ask Muslim women for their photo, and thus ask them to trust their image to a stranger, when I was in a specific mood. This trust, considering the times we live in and the internet, is hardly a matter of course for anyone, let alone Muslim women, and particularly not those wearing the headscarf. Which is why, as a way of building trust, I eventually began taking photos only of their clothing, but not their faces. If a face is visible in the image, it has been replaced by another face using computer technology. The faces, therefore, with a few exceptions, have been electronically modified. This was a difficult decision, because on the one hand of course, the personal rights of these women must be respected and protected, but on the other hand I wanted to portray them as individuals. Pixelating their faces would not just take away an important part of their personality, it would also immediately place them in the context of scandals and criminality, which is why I decided to replace the faces with a photograph of a different face.

On the other hand, the gallery of photographs I selected is anything but arbitrary. I selected women who wore colours as described by my interview partners; I photographed styles that I observed during my field research in the clothing shop; I admired outfits that were similar to those I had seen on the internet. I searched on the streets of Berlin for sartorial designs similar to those I had seen represented as fashionable clothing for Muslim women on the internet. When I found them, I asked the women if I could photograph them and use the picture in this work. My selection of images for this work is therefore not just the product of my own personal ideas, but also represents what I found over the course of this work.

The images were almost all taken in daylight, as I usually saw and spoke to women as I made my way through the city. Many of the images were taken near libraries. This is important inasmuch as the catwalk quality of libraries has already been mentioned in other research (Greiner 2013). They are an excellent place to discover what is currently in fashion.

As already established, photography contains a great deal of concentrated data that says much more than I could with a written

description. The images can therefore be seen as fragmented collections of text. Which is why I will not add any comprehensive explanations to the images, but rather let them speak for themselves as text. The image and the word are classified equally, instead of overloading each other as duplicates. The goal is to intensify the effect of both types of text, instead of replacing one with the other (Harper 2000, p. 404).

2.2.4. Artefacts

My research methods also included the collection and then analysis of artefacts. For this work, I collected articles from magazines and books, both online and off, particularly those that focused on Muslim fashion from a non-scientific perspective. The daily and weekly papers, especially, had more and more articles on the issue over the past few years. I also analysed internet pieces, such as blogs and comments, that dealt with modest fashion.

I also collected flyers and other advertising material for clothing stores and headscarf hairdressers, which provide valuable visual information. Due to a short stay in the UK during my research, in which I lived with a Muslim family and accompanied one of the daughters as she went shopping for clothing, I was able to find comparable examples from Britain. This included various catalogues from British designers. I used this collection within the framework of analysing my field research for comparison with my observations, and some of the images are used in this work.

The Turkish fashion magazine *Âlâ* has an important role amongst the artefacts collected for this book. For a time, it was also sold in Germany. However, during my research, sales were stopped due to lack of profits, so that it was only with a great deal of luck that I was able to find a stack of the magazines to use in my analysis. Comparing them to German fashion magazines showed not just a great deal of similarity when it came to the presentation of the consumer products, but also a great deal of similarity in the products themselves, in terms of colour and brand.

2.2.5. Methodological critique

As already mentioned, photographs must be considered particularly problematic, because on the one hand they are pre-constructed, and on the other hand they emphasize power relationships. If images are rejected by post-modern criticism, however, this must apply not just to the visual representation, but also the written representation, that is to the entire work. Should I then, in aid of a balance of power in the relationship between members of the dominant German society and minorities in Germany, conclude that as a member of the white German middle-class, I should simply not write about minorities at all? Certainly. However, this work was not created to document minorities, to put them on display or reproduce them, but rather - in open dialogue with the protagonists - to liberate an object heavily discussed as part of the integration debate, the headscarf, from the discursive speciality research field of migration and to place it in a discourse within the dominant society: the discourse of sartorial fashion.

Criticism regarding ethnography itself is usually aimed at the lack of verifiability of data production. The most important research instrument is the person doing the research, who is responsible for creating the source of the analysis. The complaint is that data production processes, which are often criticised, cannot be subjected to scientific controls, as the research situation cannot be reproduced. It is also not considered representative (Ganseforth 2004, p. 93). In addition, there is criticism that the researcher is inclined to relate the foreign to their own experiences, instead of viewing cultural connections in context. This is very important, because, as already mentioned, ideas regarding our own experiences are also always constructions. Perspectives are necessarily always ensnared in political structures as well as social and historical contexts. Which is why it is essential that the research is subjected to critical examination: the motives for the research, the effect the images have on others, and the effect the others have on the researcher must be questioned in order to evaluate the subjectivity of the observer and to actively work against dominant thought patterns.

It thus follows that personal subjectivity not only cannot be avoided, but that dealing with it is an important prerequisite for the research. The subjectivity involved in ethnographic research, often criticised, is thus used as a strength in this work, as the subjectivity of researcher and subjects is not ignored, but rather made methodologically useful.

> "As [the field researcher] can only ever perceive the surrounding reality very selectively, what they see and what they miss is dependent largely on their training, their prior knowledge, their biases and of course also their personality." (Ganseforth 2004, p. 93)

Ethnography, that is the process of writing or describing, can therefore never deliver a direct reproduction of the people under investigation and their lives, but rather must be viewed as the result of interpretations made by the researchers. The categories of presentation belong to the culture that is being written for, which is why the created text must remain a compromise, as the unknown is described using familiar words.

This is why the concept of "thick description" as supported by Clifford Geertz (1983, p. 93) redefined the concept of culture. Cultures must be understood as an intertwined system of symbols and meanings. These systems are generated via interpretations of experiences, and are expressed in subjective constructions for meaningfully explaining life (ibid., p. 21). Only once they have been described in detail can the compromise of describing something strange using the researcher's own words be effective. Based on these ideas, Gerd Spittler developed the "thick participation" method, a combination of observation and conversation which I used in this research (Spittler 2001, p. 1). Just like Geertz, he believes that observations are never objective, but rather always selective and subjective. In exchange, observation is more than just seeing and hearing, it also includes feeling, both physically and mentally, and is therefore able to reproduce the experience very well (ibid., p. 19).

2.3. (Female) researcher in the field

My positioning as a subject in the field is strongly influenced by my own "migration experience": it is important to note that even though I never changed location, I did change nationalities shortly after starting school. I began my life as a citizen of the GDR, and am now a member of the FRG. Even today, I commonly encounter random moments in which I am exposed as "being from the East", usually based on idiosyncrasies in my grammar or choice of words.

After working for many years as a waitress in an Arabic-language restaurant, together with a degree in Islamic Studies and a one year stay in Syria, I not only speak both German and English, I also speak fluent Arabic. In addition, I am familiar with, at the least, the Syrian and Lebanese way of life. Due to my experience as a student in Damascus, I was able to contribute insights into living life as a minority during conversations with my interviewees. Of course, I am aware that the experiences I have described can hardly be compared with the minority experiences of my conversational partners, due to the difference in the balance of power and the limited time I spent in these situations. Despite my identification with my interviewees, I am and always will be a white, protestant, middle-class German. Nevertheless, the occasional switch to Arabic, the use of appropriate polite phrases and my familiarity with certain concepts and images created a trusting conversational situation even with people that I had only known for a short time. This is no doubt also due to the fact that as a woman, I was granted a different sort of access than, for example, would have been given to a man.

These advantages could not be used in the many spontaneous interviews[8], which became particularly fraught once I asked for a photo: after all, in 30 seconds I could hardly portray my motivations or my self-image, and the women often reacted with mistrust, as there are too many examples of text media misusing images of Muslim

8 A spontaneous interview usually happens without any preparation and is documented using notes in the field diary.

women. I dealt with this mistrust in part by using key words and concepts[9] that Muslim women consider important regarding the use of their images, and sometimes I even pulled out my laptop to show them some of my research. Often, however, it was enough to simply explain how I intended to take the photo, or to show photos I had already taken of women's clothing but not their face.

In these interviews, I was able to make use of additional common ground through our joint interest in fashion: the women were happy to speak about that part of their life, even though they often added judgements about the clothing worn by other women to the conversation. Biographical developments and daily practices could be divined from talking about fashion, because the subject often becomes a guiding thread in a biographical narration. Quite often, political and social opinions were included when talking about the subject. However, I always pointed out that I was not really interested in how religious the interviewee was, stating multiple times that I was interested above all in the fashionable aspects of the clothing.

2.4. Data Collection

2.4.1. Samples

The selection of a sample, that is who is to be questioned, is related to the question as to which group within a society the results are ultimately intended to be valid for. This is more difficult to answer than it seems (Helfferich 2005, p. 172). As already stated, qualitative research searches for an individual's construction of meaning, that is for what is unique. It is not about distribution statements or generalisations. Instead, this type of research is primarily designed to define patterns or specific characteristics that are often hard to

9 For example, that I planned to take halal photos, that is that I would ensure their face was not visible, etc.

recognize from without. In most cases, it is not the number of interviews, but how intensively the interviews are analysed that is important. For example "[...] in the realm of objective hermeneutics, it is assumed that the basic latent structures of meaning can in fact be defined using an individual case" (ibid., p. 153). Of course, it is valid to ask to what extent the sample in question represents a typical pattern. Generally speaking, the assumption is that a "mid-sized" sample for a qualitative interview should be between six and 30 interviews (ibid., p. 153). The variable number of interview partners is based on the depth and length of the interviews in question.

I found the women I interviewed using a "phone-tree", in which I asked former work colleagues whether their wives would be interested in being interviewed, or I asked acquaintances directly if I could interview them. In addition, I asked women I met during spontaneous interviews and as part of my field research if I could carry out more extensive interviews with them. The interview location was picked by the person being interviewed, a way to build trust with the goal of ensuring that the interview partner felt as comfortable as possible. In doing this, I accepted any disadvantages arising from the interview situation.

I used a three-step process to collect the data. First, I selected interview partners using demographic criteria, asking women for interviews based on my interests, that is I selected those women who wore the headscarf and had an active (individual) or familial migration background from Arabic-speaking countries. In doing so, I only selected women for the sample who were in their mid-20s or older, with the assumption that by that age, most women have found their own style and any large breaks in the clothing biography have already taken place. Interviews that lasted for several hours were limited regionally, and carried out only with women who, at the time of the interview, centred their life in Berlin. This was above all for pragmatic reasons. Concentrating on Arabic-speaking women was also a pragmatic consideration. On the one hand, there is already a great deal of research on Turkish speaking women (e.g. Klinkhammer 2000; Höglinger 2002; Nökel 2002), on the other, of the

major languages spoken amongst Muslim women, Arabic is the one I speak the best. As such, all interviews were carried out in Arabic, which I then transcribed into German. The German interview text was then translated into English for the publication of this work.

The problem-centred interviews were carried out based on inner representativeness. I split my interview partners into two groups: women with immigration experience, and women who are viewed as migrants based on their appearance, that is their parents or grandparents were the ones who immigrated to Germany. Both the core of the field, as derived from my preliminary investigations, appeared to be appropriately represented, as well as anomalous representatives, that is women who had expressed a specific interest in fashion and those who claimed to not be interested in it at all.

After the interviews were finished, I checked again to see which constellations were not represented in the sample, in order to limit the statements to a specific scope of application. Sampling was carried out throughout the process based on the Grounded Theory methodology, in order to achieve conceptual representativity (Strübing 2014, pp. 31 sq.). I followed the principle of saturation (Helfferich 2005, pp. 174 sq.). I assumed that, if additional interviews did not reveal any new realisations and information, the knowledge I had hoped to gain through the interviews had been gained. As only a few individual cases were questioned very intensively, I made use of even more intensive evaluation processes (ibid., p. 155).

The biographic perspectives are not intended to represent all women, but instead are examples of experiences with fashion and the head scarf, which are in turn used to draw conclusions about western society as a whole, and therefore add to the understanding of fashionable clothing.

2.4.2. Data Collection

Concentrated data collection took place in around 6 months between November 2011 and May 2012. Additional individual conversations

also take place before and afterwards, from around the summer of 2011 to the summer of 2013.

During this period, I carried out six multi-hour problem-centred interviews with six women, three with their own migration experience and three without, which provided me with a great deal of detailed data. I also accompanied four of the six women as they went about their daily lives, and we spoke about many different subjects, including my latest revelations and research ideas. For example, I accompanied an interview partner as she bought appropriate clothing for her application photos[10], helped another with her daily grocery shopping, a third as she picked up her children and went to libraries with another to do research. In this manner, I collected information regarding Muslim clothing in various situations, and as we moved through the streets of Berlin.

Furthermore, between December 2011 and February of 2012 I carried out field research in a small clothing store in Neukölln[11] by helping with sales, stocking the shelves and helping customers. I also carried out many spontaneous interviews with the women I took photos of. I had additional conversations, in person, via telephone and written, with headscarf-wearers outside my sample, for example friends from Syria who had since moved to Turkey due to the political situation in Syria, or acquaintances that I got to know during my stay in Damascus and that had since returned to the UK, South Africa and Germany.

In summer of 2013, I took a break from researching and returned to my desk in order to analyse the data I had collected. Since then, I have been in occasional contact via social media with my interview partners regarding developments in their lives and my work on this book.

10 Many German companies still require that applicants submit a headshot with their resume.

11 An area of Berlin in which many migrants, particularly Turkish families, live.

2.4.3. Documentation

Here some notes on the quotes used in this work:

- All names have been changed.
- Information on locations not in Berlin was not included.
- I translated the interviews conducted in a foreign language from Arabic myself, and then analysed them in German.[12]
- To improve readability, and also to protect the dignity of the interviewees, I corrected, to the best of my ability, grammatical errors, repeated words and filler words as I transcribed the interviews for reproduction here.
- Ellipsis in the interview quotes are marked as follows: (...)
- (-) short pause.
- (–) longer pause (more than three seconds).
- (!) particular emphasis in pronunciation
- (laugh) interview partner laughs.
- (laughs) both laugh.
- Comments from the author are placed in square brackets, [like this].
- Words pronounced incomprehensibly are marked as follows: [?].

2.5. Evaluation and Analysis

In ethnography, analysis and putting the work to paper are not viewed as a separate part of ethnographic research, but rather these tasks begin during preliminary field research as the research problems and questions are asked and clarified. In doing so, data collection is guided by thoughts on generating theory (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p. 174). The first step for analysis is always to carefully read the collected material in order to get familiar with it. Another goal is to

12 All interviews were then translated into English by the translator.

search for repeating patterns and to check whether something stands out from the frame of reference– that is makes no "sense" in light of the initial research ideas. Some of my ideas are already present in early field notes and analytical memos (Strübing 2014, pp. 33-35). These are conceptual notes, also used as part of the methodology of Grounded Theory, which I rediscovered as part of my evaluation. Sometimes it was even the interview partners themselves that used concepts that I was unfamiliar with until that point, and who had an invaluable part to play in checking my theories (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p. 178).

All this was followed by many months of theoretical research, and the analysis and the writing process for this work were additional steps in the analysis process. I converted the material collected into a standardized format during and after the research. I processed my field research by preparing and transcribing the research material. I typed up various forms of media, including audio files and hand-written notes, which I then analysed based on various research questions. The theoretical research was subject-based and done in cyclical phases in which I switched between reading and writing.

For the analysis itself, therefore, I used a mix of inductive and deductive approaches. In 1954, Blumer had already stated that it can be helpful to develop concepts and, before they are definitive and become part of the theory, to note them as sensitising ideas and make use them, as they can sensitise the researcher to phenomenon and "provide line of sight" (Blumer 1954, p. 7). In addition, based on the Grounded Theory methodology, I derived additional theses directly from the material. In order to consolidate these theses conceptually, I worked through several theoretical discourses, including fashion and migration theory, so that I could then, during the cyclical research process, analyse the data with a methodological basis and, where the data was not productive enough, go back into the field in order to address any remaining open questions. The goal was to systematically analyse the sartorial biographies of the women and to conceptualise them using theoretical background knowledge.

The basic technique for the analysis itself was a frequency analysis

borrowed from the quantitative procedure and applied to the research questions (Lamnek 2005, p. 505). To do this, I worked with a computer-supported category system and indexed the keywords sentence by sentence with coding. The second analysis technique was the intensity analysis of the contents, that is how strongly certain subjects were represented. As I had developed one or two analytical concepts, it was extremely helpful to use this in order to establish connections between them and to add new ones. Glaser and Strauss (1967) call this the "constant comparative method". For example, I related the migration history of the women to the intensity of the discriminatory experiences they told me about.

The additional perspectives gained from this triangulation of methods were helpful in strengthening the concepts I had worked out for my theoretical considerations, as I was able to compare them to other datasets. This included, on the one hand, previous field research phases, but on the other also the few published works on the subject of Muslim fashion, in particular those published by Tarlo and Moors (Tarlo and Moors 2007; Moors and Tarlo 2013).

I developed a number of theses during my field research, as well as during the theoretical research in the well-studied fields of fashion and migration (this research was partially carried out parallel to my field research). Some of these were later discarded, but others proved very productive for theoretical observations. I spoke about most of them with my various interview partners during the course of my field research. Meaning I regularly applied communicative validation by connecting my results to the views expressed by my interview partners. I asked them about their ideas regarding these theses, and their views were then used, among other things, to turn vague ideas into concrete descriptions of life, which can be viewed in the theses discussion starting in Chapter 8. If a thesis was not rejected as being completely absurd, I searched my existing material for further signs that proved the thesis to be true.

Here I must once again point out that the directions and tendencies I discovered when it comes to types of religious fashion do not describe all possible types of Islamic fashion, but rather those forms that can

be derived from the material I had access to (cf. Klinkhammer 2000, p. 120).

Part I.

Background and conditions of production and consumption of hijab fashion

3. Forms and Conflicts of Representation in a Minority Situation

> "Repräsentation ist nicht einfach eine unschuldige Praxis, sondern die systematische Unsichtbarmachung der Repräsentierten" (Spivak 1988, p. 292) .

This initial theoretical chapter is written in the spirit of this quote, and is to be understood as a historical look at migrant forms of representation within Germany. It begins with an examination of two important terms, that is hegemonic discourse and what it means for hijabi women in Germany. As the chapter continues, I move on from this micro perspective to locate the development of current migration and border discussions in a historic context in the beginnings of capitalism, and therefore colonialism, which in turn connects to orientalism. From there, I illustrate the causes of the shift in the designation of the actors over the past few years. By shift I mean the move from a discourse that focused on guest workers and foreigners to a discourse that seems to concentrate solely on Muslims. The chapter ends with the question as to what these developments mean for people who identify with the Muslim faith and were born in Germany or have immigrated to the country.

As already noted, analysis of the discourse is an important aspect when observing hijabi clothing. Power and power structures are conveyed within discourse by connecting a variety of social spheres and providing them with the guise of normality (cf. Foucault 2000

[1978]). In turn, these practices reproduce prestige, whereby they ostracize other practices, for example Muslim clothing practices. Rommelspacher summarizes it best: "Discourses are regimes of the truth expressed in opinions, norms, values, mediums and texts, and then finally consolidated and materialized in social practices." (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 76)[13] That is, discourses are complex social processes that serve production of meaning, and their characteristic feature is direction of conflicts surrounding difference. The discursive hegemony can be defined as a "practice of continuous (re)articulation of discursive elements" (Karakayalı 2010, p. 179). The term hegemony, in this case, is that as defined by the Italian philosopher Gramsci. According to him, a hegemony is a social order in which a specific ideology and a specific concept of reality is dominant due to consensus, not due to force (Gramsci 1992, p. 718). Gramsci describes force as part of the political society of a state, whether imposed by the police, the army or the administrative apparatus, whereas consensus is manufactured as part of free associations within civil society, for example in families, schools or trade unions (cf. Said 2009 [1978], p. 16). When Gramsci was writing, the discursively constructed consensus was that the reign of the elite secured the stability of the state. If the elite were made up of the part of the population representing the majority of people within a country, then the systemic ideology could be implemented peacefully. If that was not the case, "wird jedes Regime Gewalt anwenden um die gesellschaftlichen Gruppen zu disziplinieren, die sich weigern sich dem Konsens unterzuordnen" (Kuchler 2006, p. 117).[14] Today, we no longer have a rule of the elite. Instead, more subtle methods of exercising power have taken over, including the power to contribute significantly to discourse, and the power of defining who can be considered a national subject and who cannot. The discursive consensus in Germany often seems to be that hijabi clothing does not belong here, and it is therefore legitimate to treat those who wear the hijab unequally under the law, for example to deny them a job

13 Translated from the German.
14 Translated from the German.

based on the head scarf, or to simply ban the various types of hijabi clothing.

Muslim fashion is therefore an excellent example of this discursive process. Women's magazines celebrate international influences on clothing as fashion. Not, however, if the wearer is a Muslim woman wearing the hijab. Women wearing the hijab are regularly confronted, in public, with the need to justify their decision, and they attempt to free themselves from this need using the "micropolitics of self-representation", for example via a particularly carefully selected combination of clothing, which, unfortunately, is rarely if ever noticed by the public media (Nökel 2004, p. 287). This issue was very present in the interviews I conducted. Whenever the conversation turned to the public perception of Muslim women's clothing practices, my interview partners took on a justifying stance, expressed with a specific tone of voice and way of speaking used to discuss their clothing. I found the fact that they addressed statements to an invisible audience to be particularly telling. For example, based on the tone and the choice of words, I could tell that the sentence "Just get it already people" from within the following quote was not addressed to me.

> "We are living in a time in which you can't follow Islam one hundred percent, not the way it used to be, but I try to do it as much as I can. But it's my own choice. *'Just get it already people'*, do you understand? I'm just over it. I was on a train once, and a man looked at me and said 'Wow, you must have a sad life', and I said: 'Why would you think that?' 'Well, the way you look.' 'Ok, how do I look?' 'You know, veiled like that!' I said: 'How veiled am I really? It's just a head covering.' 'Right, but I bet you don't get any say at home.' I said: 'You know what, to put it bluntly I just don't need, really don't need to keep having this conversation with you.' (Hurriya 2011)"

My interview partners use this and other similar dialogues to reject the stereotype of the 'poor oppressed immigrant' which can be traced back to the negative representation of Muslim women in the public perception (Höglinger 2002, p. 114). As there is no lobby for head scarves, Muslim women must fight for the power of representation using micropolitics, that is either individually or, only occasionally and

spontaneously, in collective actions, but do not develop organizational structures. Even today, there are no women's associations that cover more than one region or denomination that are fighting for social acceptance when it comes to the hijab. This may be because the decision to wear a hijab can be seen as the individual decision of the woman in question, or at least it is judged as such by these women (Nökel 2004, p. 286).

The micropolitical fight for representation takes place on two levels: on the one hand, the women position themselves opposite male dominated views, represented for example by the "Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland" (Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD)).[15] This organization became much more important after the 9/11 attacks and the attack on Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 and has, ever since, as a representative of collective interests, been making statements regarding religious practices and also women's clothing. Given its structure, it seems to work as a mouthpiece for all Muslims in Germany. However, the views of the representatives on the Central Council are not always in harmony with one another. Not only that, these representatives are often male, or at least view women's clothing practices from a male point of view. When compared to this power of professional persuasion, the views spread by hijabi women as micropolitics seem to be subjective, personal sensitivities. Non-Muslims therefore often fail to see the sovereign self-staging, but instead only see ideas of Muslim indoctrination and deception spread by discourse surrounding the hijab (cf. ibid., 295 and 304 sq.).

The second level is the non-Muslim public in the form of newspapers and reports on TV and the internet. Again and again, Muslim women and the clothing they wear are used as grounds for public debate. Not just that: often, the Islamic religion itself is the topic.

15 The ZMD is an umbrella organization that currently represents 28 Muslim umbrella organizations but also includes individual members. It was founded in 1987 and represents around 300 mosque communities, both Sunni and Shia, as well as civil organizations with Muslim migrants from many different countries: from Pakistan and Bosnia to Morocco (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V 2005).

When the former German President Wulff announced in the summer of 2010 that Islam was part of Germany (Schlegel 2010), there was a series of protests against the statement. As if in answer, a more recent President, Gauck, took the opportunity to distance himself from this idea (Medick 2012). And as the political and intellectual Europe has been recreated through changed border and migration politics, a completely new threat scenario was established as of mid-2015 in which the religion Islam, and in particular its most visible representatives, the hijabis, are caught in the cross-fire.

Many members of the dominant society appear to find it difficult to view Muslims in general, and the hijab and its various forms specifically, as a legitimate part of society. This refers both to people I talked to during the course of my research as well as various personalities in newspapers and on social media. All sorts of reasons are used to justify this view, starting with the strangeness of the supposed 'other' culture, including alleged oppression suffered by hijabi women, and right up to concrete accusations that Muslims in Germany are simply not willing to integrate. There is a particular reason behind this vehement distancing from the religion of Islam in general and the practice of wearing the head-scarf specifically. To understand it, it is useful to examine a few historic developments. The colonial strategy described long ago by Edward Said (2009 [1978]) in "Orientalism" is to construct the self via a reflection, via the 'others', and to use their perceived otherness to legitimize colonial politics. Differences, however, should not be essentialized, but instead must be presented in historical context.

Said's descriptions have lost none of their currency, as can be seen from the medial performance of the political and intellectual "Europe". In current discourse, the complex causes and interconnections that have led to the current migration flows are almost completely ignored. Instead, discourse is concentrated on the fear of foreign infiltration as felt by German society. This fear is aimed at Muslim women again and again in the form of daily racism, and is used to construct a self-perception of superiority. We must question this "scientifically imparted image as a component of societally constructed instrumental

rationality" (Ha 2003, p. 61)[16].

Not only that, over the last few decades, there has been a shift in the identificatory labels of the parties in the discourse surrounding border and migration politics. Instead of referring to guest workers and immigrants, the debate increasingly focuses on Muslims. However, the classic orientalism critique cannot adequately explain this shift in immigration stereotypes on its own (cf. Attia 2010, p. 120). Instead, current migration and integration politics must be viewed in a historic context. The next chapter will serve as a basis for analysis in this work, which is intended to allow for a different view of hijabi clothing. In my opinion, it is not enough to simply present the fashion implications demonstrated by the clothing. It is also important to understand the foundations of the current exclusionary views in order to understand Muslim clothing and its various forms.

In the next section 3.1, therefore, I will examine the critique of orientalism and neo-colonial strategies.

3.1. Orientalismus und Kolonialismus

> "The critic must attempt to fully realize and take responsibility for the unspoken, unrepresented pasts that haunt the historical present" (Bhabha 1994, p. 12).

Edward Said published his ground-breaking work "Orientalism" at the end of the 1970s, which postulated that the geographical "Orient" and "Occident" were in fact a single collective idea. This idea represents a unique story, a specific tradition of thought, which was created in and for the West (Said 2009 [1978], p. 13). In this story, the Orient is not an accurately described entity, but rather has been more or less imagined by the west. However, it is not a pure fiction but rather "an integral part of European *material* civilization and culture.

16 Translated from the German.

Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse" (emphasis from original text, ibid., p. 10). Said identifies the expansion of Europe during the colonial period as the starting point for these developments on Oriental modes of thought. Or, as Rodríguez put it: "Europe's expansion involved not just the exploitation and appropriation of work, resources and land, but also a political and cultural subjugation of the people colonised" (Rodríguez 2003, p. 19).

According to Said, four elements formed and continue to form Orientalist modes of thought in discourse. The first and most notable is a "Them – Us" dualism, which, through constant degradation of the other, up to and including open racism, makes it clear that there is a noticeable difference between the two groups (Said 2009 [1978], p. 127). This degradation is implemented using the second element: classification, that is the scientific ranking and typification of people based on the racial, ethnic or cultural character traits assigned to them. This classification is transferred in discourses scientifically justified by the dominant economic and intellectual mainstream (ibid., p. 145). The third element is an attempt to capture the culture of the 'other' from the outside, to empathize with it and identify it as "organically and internally coherent" (ibid., p. 142). This is expressed via the fourth element, the attempt to describe even countries very far apart, such as Tunisia and Afghanistan, as well as their societies and members, or cultural artefacts, in a unified and representative manner. One characteristic of this type of description, according to Said, is that it fails to mention the processual quality of development of a particular event. That is, there is no description of historical development, and the text focuses instead only on the current state of society (ibid., p. 15).

The point of Orientalist views, says Said, is solely to define the geopolitical and cultural counterpart of the "Orient", that is the "Occident", as superior. These days, it is much more common to use

the term "western world".[17] Both describe the European and North American imaginative space, developed as part of Christian-Occidental history, which identifies the 'modern', with its 'achievements' such as democracy, capitalism and enlightenment as the high point of its own development. Fernando Coronil described it as follows: "Beispielsweise wird der Westen häufig mit Europa, mit den Vereinigten Staaten mit uns oder mit jener rätselhaften Entität des modernen Selbst gleichgesetzt," while, for example, the problematic term the third world is "die bevorzugte Heimat des Anderen" (Coronil 2013 (2002), p. 469). At the same time, the modern is regularly and erroneously equated with the high point of human development (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 20).

The self-image of the 'western' inhabitant is that of the white, male citizen, who has the power through his own efforts to exercise self-determined influence on his environment. This idea is firmly established, for example, in Max Weber's essay "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", which attempts to explain the genesis of capitalism by way of Protestant and indeed specifically European history (Weber 1920). In keeping with this self-image, Weber completely fails to note that the riches of capitalism could only be gained on the basis of colonialism, that is based on the exploitation and eradication of entire peoples (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 26). I will return to this point in a moment. Suppression of this fact is carried out systematically based on the four elements listed above. Said describes a true suspension of thought which is based in Orientalism and serves to maintain the fictional construction of reality (Said 2009 [1978], p. 57).

Said's important critique of imperial rule was continued by Fernando Coronil's expansion of this approach in his critique of Occidentalism. He writes that there is not just one Orientalism, which employs discourse to create the idea of the Orient, but that in fact said discourse is essential to constructing the idea of the 'west' (Coronil 2013 (2002),

17 In the following, this imaginative space will be labelled critically as the global west, or written as 'western' in single quotation marks.

p. 472). Just like Said, Coronil defines this type of discourse as a set of strategies: the world is divided into discrete units, and differences in population are transformed into hierarchies. The history of these populations, which are in fact connected, are separated within the discourse, and the representations created are neutralised and naturalised. Finally, asymmetric power relationships are reproduced (ibid., p. 475). These power asymmetries are not unusual, however they are incredibly efficacious as they are supported by capitalism. Coronil writes: "Ethnozentrische Hierarchisierung kultureller Differenz ist gewiss kein westliches Privileg. Hervorzuheben ist vielmehr die Tatsache, dass dieses Privileg eng mit der Entfaltung globaler Macht zusammenhängt" (ibid., p. 474).

In his critique of Occidentalism, Coronil describes three strategies, three modes, in which representations of the non-western other are neutralised. On the one hand, the modern self is never called into question, its constitution is never challenged, but rather it is presumed as given (ibid., p. 480). The other is dissolved within it. A second mode consists of the "incorporation of the other into the self", in which the role of the other in the development of the modern world is pushed so far into the background as to be invisible (ibid., p. 480). The third mode does take non-western populations into account, in some cases even questioning western cultural appropriations, but in such a way that the perceived difference between the cultures is strengthened and formalized (ibid., p. 489). Coronil points out that whether the differences are exaggerated or levelled in fact makes no difference. All three forms of representation have a colonizing effect, not caused by pure description of diversity, that is the production of difference, but in the particular type of difference created (ibid., p. 496).

Of course, the various populations and their development within capitalism cannot be observed separately, and indeed capitalism itself is not a pure product of the European modern. Coronil unfolds this theory, which works against suspension of thought and ahistoric perceptions, among other things based on the example of sugar from an investigation carried out by Sidney Mintz (1987), although he also criticises Mintz for his appropriating representation of the non-western

other. Coronil's basic assumption is that without colonialism, capitalist society could not have developed as it has. The boost money from the colonial sugar trade provided to the European economy remains unequalled, but this money was not earned in Europe, but rather during a much earlier time (15th century) under extremely violent conditions in the English South Indian colonies. The money was then used to boost slave trade for the colonies, and then transformed into capital for the means of production in the 'mother land'. Therefore, it is the money that was first generated by sugar that provided the basis for capitalist expansion. In turn, taxation was used to support imperial states and was essential to their growth and development. It was only as part of this development, that is with the money from the sugar which was generated in the colonies, that the social actors who participated in later merchandise management were created; this money was used to purchase their status symbols. European colonial rulers did not spring up fully formed, but instead, significantly influenced by colonial interdependencies, in fact arose from same (cf. Coronil 2013 (2002), p. 485). Colonial goods are thus elements of a continuing interaction above and beyond cultural and territorial borders. This interaction, in turn, represents a reciprocal production or goods and societies (ibid., p. 488).

But even capitalist forms of production are not a European invention; conditions of sugar production on the plantations provided the model for the organisation of labour that would later play a role within capitalism. This in particular shows clearly that European history and development, as exemplified by capitalism, cannot be considered a simple closed-circuit transformation of working processes within Europe, but that this history must be considered transnationally in the historical context of colonial rule (ibid., p. 483). The relevance of sugar is simply a handy example from Great Britain. Similar mechanisms can also be found in the development of other European powers.

The fact that the Oriental (and Occidental) tradition of thought coincides with an imperative to legitimize own rule over the rest of the world can be clearly seen in the production of knowledge and images

of the 'other'. As just described, these are, among other things, the result of processes for shaping history that have been modified again and again over the last two centuries but have similar content: the construction of the concept of multiple societies in a world that appears to have suddenly gotten larger. And within that, the justification of differences, inequalities and hierarchies within and between these societies (Conrad and Randeria 2013, p. 41). And even though most people understand that the modern nation-states of France, Germany or Great Britain must have emerged in their current form at some point, they attribute this largely to a change to the form of the state and the government, not to the emergence of a national actor in and of itself. Concealing the exchange relationship between the populations from which these nations emerged evokes the impression of impermeable, natural borders. The identities of their inhabitants appear to be "intrinsische Eigenschaften naturalisierter, verräumlichter und abgegrenzter Einheiten" (Coronil 2013 (2002), p. 499). And these are viewed as the "Resultat unabhängiger Geschichten und nicht das Ergebnis [sozio]historischer Beziehungen" (ibid., p. 498). Using other societies to construct a separate collective identity is likely something that all societies do, but in the case of Occidentalism, the global economic rule of the west allows this representation of difference to transform into a hierarchy. Capitalism is not just exported, as per the common incorrect assumption, but rather transformed reciprocally under various historic conditions, as shown above using the example of sugar.

Coronil connects ideas on the emergence of the nation-states with the effects of capitalism: with the increasing importance of commodities and commodity communications, other areas, too, are increasingly objectified. As territories represent a much more tangible object than historic relationships, territories are utilized by preference to represent peoples (ibid., p. 499). The general understanding of set territories and fluid history means nothing more than "dass die Moderne durch eine asymmetrische Integration von Raum und Zeit konstituiert ist"(ibid., p. 498). The historicization of territory mentioned above, that is the emergence of nation-states, remains hidden; they are often

considered the natural location of history. Coronil notes specifically in this context that we cannot forget that maps representing territories do not reflect reality "sondern sie aus parteiischen Perspektiven abbilden und sie in Übereinstimmung mit bestimmten Standpunkten und spezifischen Zielen wiedergeben" (Coronil 2013 (2002), p. 470).

In the following section, I will describe how Oriental and Occidental views have had a concrete effect on the emergence of nation-state power, how they continue to have an effect in neo-colonial structures, and what this means for Muslims in Germany.

3.1.1. Interdependencies between the nation state, Orientalism and colonialism

As European powers expanded their areas of influence during colonialism, economic and political interaction between European countries increased, but so did interaction with the non-European world. Due to a specific historiography, there is hardly any acknowledgement for the fact that "Europe [...] [emerged] not least in the context of its imperial projects, while colonial encounters were simultaneously influenced by inner-European conflicts" (Conrad and Randeria 2013). Their interactions were often deeply hierarchical, and produced not just a common history largely ignored, but also boundaries. "Modern nation-states appear, therefore, not just as the basis and starting point of capitalistic and colonial relationships of exchange, but are, simultaneously, a product of the same" (ibid.).[18]

Current conceptions of 'them' and 'us', of nationalities and clearly defined national territories, can be seen as a by-product of imperial European projects; that is, they are relatively new, and there is no indication that they will endure. However, discussion of nationalities today gives the impression that the nation-state is an immutable prerequisite of socialization, instead of an exceptional case. The

18 This may explain why the shaping of symbols of the nation-state such as anthems, flags or even constitutions are often so similar. They emerged as a joint project of mutual demarcation.

meaning of a term once used as a pejorative[19] has been changing since the 18th century; the concept of popular sovereignty came into being and reached its height during the French Revolution. With this concept, the horizontal separation between nobles and the clergy on the one hand and peasants without any noteworthy culture on the other shifted to become a vertical separation between nations.

> The development of the nation-state shifted perceptions of belonging in regards to other parts of the population, e.g. the lower classes as citizens. On the one hand, we see the integration of just these previously excluded parts of the population, on the other we see the exclusion of all others that live outside of the nation-state or are not recognized as citizens of same. "As part of the social and political incorporation of the worker as a citizen over the course of hundreds of years, the characteristics of the working class are increasingly transferred to the 'borders of nationality'" (Karakayalı 2007)

It is no accident, therefore, that the borders in feudal times are set between rich and poor, between low class and nobles within a region, as these groups can be understood as opposing, irreconcilable 'nations' (Karakayalı 2010, p. 180). Today, in contrast, poverty is largely outsourced to other nations. Even the lack of permeability between systems is similar: just as changing nationalities today is not easy, in pre-modern times upward and downward mobility between classes understood to be endogamous groups was rare (cf. Wimmer 2002, p. 55). And of course, both examples are similarly arbitrary. Why nobles should have different rights than commoners is unclear. In the same manner, it is not logical or natural that citizens from one country should have different rights than those from another.

The sedentary norm was, in that time, created based on territorial principles within the national understanding, which then had to be laboriously implemented using "elaborate border crossing and passport systems" (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 46).

19 "Natio" is used in an old German dialect as a pejorative expression, diametrically opposed to the current meaning of sovereignty and self-determination (J. Grimm and W. Grimm 1854–1960).

> "The relative ethnic homogeneity found within Germany is on the one hand the result of fierce fighting between various ethnic groups within the nation and on the other a product of displacement and genocide" (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 42)

There must be dozens of millions of people that, in order to maintain perceptions of identity "during the 20th century alone were driven out of or into Germany, displaced, immigrated or emigrated, imported or deported" (Steyerl 2003, p. 47). In spite of this, the German government until very recently maintained that migration was not a political issue with long-term effects for the country.

What, exactly, entitles members of a nation to exclude others? How can that be reconciled with the right of all people to a dignified life? Even if we accept that one group was there before another, the descendants of the first group arrived even later than the people in the second. Why should only the descendants of the first group profit from the work of both groups? By virtue of an inherited advantage? Therefore, and this point is essential, citizenship is no better than a feudal system, as in both cases it is birth that decides on opportunities and privileges in life, and whose labour will be exploited, and who will receive an adequate salary (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 88). But how do we reconcile this intrinsically pre-modern viewpoint with claims of modernity? With democratic principles? Rommelspacher notes:

> "The democratic state is not a golf club, or a home team or congregation, but rather a politically composed community that constructed itself on the foundations of justice and equality" (ibid., p. 85).

For this is the most important element for the dominant group when it comes to implementing power structures, as already mentioned above: coming to a consensus regarding clearly definable means of distinction between parts of the population that belong and those that are excluded, for example the Islamic religion and, with it, the head scarf. Therefore, the construction of national, or in the current discussion European identities is used in order to consolidate the balance of power within the nation-state; these identities are in latent conflict with groups viewed as not belonging. Identity markers

such as locality, culture and also ethnicity are, as a result, staged as commodities worth protecting that must be preserved in museums, schools, or archives and even, more recently, at the beach (König 2016).

3.2. Neo-orientalism and neo-colonialism

The pattern of colonial appropriation of the work force and resources can also be found after the colonial time period, along with the same justification strategies. The colonial patterns of politics in regards to German labour migration were examined in particular by Ha (2003). He underlines that the industrial reserve army intended to protect economic growth, the Inlanderprimat (national primacy) which publicly favours German nationals, and positioning of migrant workers as lower than the German working class in the class structure are all indications that, in line with colonial strategies, the productivity of the 'other' is appropriated, only in this case without immediately occupying the country either economically (Germany) or by force (Great Britain or France). The migrant workers in Germany after WW2 served, from this perspective, primarily as a buffer against the economic cycle: the employment en masse of people in the low-wage sector allowed industry at the time to increase capacities without investing in modernization. A side effect for long-established workers was upward social mobility which allowed them to achieve salaried employment while the migrant workers continued to work for an hourly wage in the factory. A few years later, once modernization was complete, these workers were unemployed, had precarious employment situations or were pseudo-self-employed (Karakayalı 2010, p. 175). Instead of allowing themselves to be deported however, they used the law to create new forms of employment or found companies.

If we examine the patterns of migration politics, we notice similarities with colonial views: the main focus of the political discourse is the interests of the relevant nation-state and its economy. The state

uses the productivity of its subjects, whose work is needed, without immediately investing in them. The shortcomings of earlier political decisions are, it is true, admitted to, but the consequences of these shortcomings are all too often ascribed to the other. The fact that the other is less well developed as compared to other social groups is ascribed to the other's stubbornness and inability to develop. The current responsibility for change lies with the subjects, not with the German state. In this discourse, the subjects, whether migrant or colonized can be exchanged without consequence; the pattern remains the same.

Another similarity is that, even today, conflicts between Christianity and Islam within Europe continue to be reduced to the fear of 'Turks at the gates of Vienna'(Ceylan 2010, p. 335). In this manner, fear of the cultural past is invoked in order to avoid examining problems that could be solved via investment. If, however, you examine current critiques directed at Muslims, they are above all racializing in nature, and cannot be ascribed to a pejorative portrayal of Islam as practised by pre-modern Christian theology (Ehmann 2010, p. 35). These critiques are instead and in fact a result of the Orientalism established during colonial times, which continues to have an effect today.

This perspective was encouraged not least due to the Clash of Civilizations theory propagated by Samuel Huntington at the end of the 90s, an idea which closely connects essentializing concepts and culture (Tezcan 2009, p. 76). The concept created by 'civilizations', however, serves only to continue and confirm the idea of 'us' and 'them'.

Kandil (2010, p. 550) interprets, in particular, the demonization of Islam as concealment of the neo-colonial 'Western' access to the Near and Middle East, citing the Iran war in 1991 as a starting point. The colonial comparison also makes sense in this context, as here, too, ostensibly altruistic motives were used to legitimize these 'raids'. While colonial projects were proffered as having supposed modernizing and civilizing effects, current projects take place under the leitmotiv of democratization. In the end, however, the results observed are

always exploitation of the newly created state by the private sector. From a domestic perspective, too, it can be concluded that tensions within Germany between the dominant society and minorities are neither unavoidable nor culturally determined, but rather the result of ascription processes which secure social positions and are designed to keep those perceived to be foreigners at bay.

As we live in a democracy that cannot officially sanction such exclusion strategies, preferential treatments and discriminations are legitimized using discourses initiated for just this purpose. Discourses are, as already described, complex social processes that serve production of meaning, and their characteristic feature is direction of conflicts surrounding difference (Karakayalı 2010, p. 179). The more self-confidently people who are perceived as not belonging to the dominant society demand their share of better off positions on the basis of a democratic social order, the more they are made foreign (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 17). Minorities, therefore, are basically created in order to afterwards legitimize their social role as outsiders (Attia 2010, p. 120). Which is exactly the point the arguments above are intended to illustrate.

Hüttermann (2009, p. 119) demonstrates that it is not the immigrants themselves, and not their children, that are staged as a threat to the dominant society. It is, in particular, the grandchildren of the migrant workers, those that no longer stand on the edges of society and, without warning, shatter the established hierarchical order by making use of the state of their citizenship and education, and in particular their knowledge of their rights and how to assert them (ibid., p. 110). As these young people are frequently well socialized and well educated, and therefore hard to criticize from an integrative point of view, it was predominately the problems of older generations that were continually rearticulated in discursive elements at the turn of the millennium, thus restoring the discursive hegemony (Karakayalı 2010, p. 179). Or, as Iman Attia put it: by using religion or culture to establish a section of society as foreigners, “the functionalization and exploitation of labour migration [...] is simultaneously retroactively legitimized and extended into the present” (Attia 2010, p. 120). In

contrast, currently, we are observing predominantly neo-orientalistic demonization strategies in regards to Islam that attempt to legitimize German immigration and border policies and, in all likelihood in the near future, also German labour policies.

3.3. The 'religious turn' in the migration debate: from migrant to Muslim

I have already mentioned that labels identifying the parties have shifted in the discourse surrounding migration. Whereas previously it was migrant workers or refugees that dominated the migration debate, from the 1990s onwards, the focus increasingly shifted to Islamic issues (Spielhaus 2013, p. 170). The cultural scholar Fuad Kandil (2010, p. 548) describes this development as follows: "I can still remember how the identity ascribed to me by my German environment transformed multiple times." He describes envying German colleagues at scientific conferences that, in contrast to himself, were not always stereotyped as migrants or reduced to their religious affiliation, their 'Muslimness' (ibid., p. 548).

People perceived as foreign were, in the period after WW2, initially described by the general labels of migrant worker or immigrant, or were referred to by their nationality. The Italians arrived first, then the Spanish, Greeks, and finally the Turks (Tezcan 2007, p. 51). Riem Spielhaus notes, incidentally, that Muslim life did not initially arrive in Europe along with the migrant workers, but instead had a strong community life even before the second world war. At the same time, in the media and in academic discourse from the 1960s onwards, both this community and the Balkans have been systematically obscured, and Europe has largely been constructed as Western Europe (Spielhaus 2013, p. 170). After the recruitment ban in 1973, which arose from the realization that this type of migration could not be controlled in the desired manner, there was more or less an absence of migration policy. For this reason, in the 1980s, migrants were primarily identified as

'refugees' (Karakayalı and Tsianos 2005).

The first shift in immigration stereotypes for Arab speaking migrants came with Pan-Arabiasm. Instead of being described as Egyptian, Kandil was now part of the Arabic world: as he described, "after Nasser's slogans" (Kandil 2010, p. 548) he was suddenly identified as an Arab. Another shift came after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which brought the Muslim stereotype into the foreground in the 1980s. This rebranding meant that Turks and Arabs could now be lumped together as Muslim immigration stereotypes, as was common in Orientalism with the 'Orientals' (Attia 2010, p. 120). During the 1980s and 1990s Germany, in particular, was specially fixated on the Islamic religion, (Kandil 2010, p. 548), which is distinctly notable in the imagery, which "forcibly modified factual reports on migrants from Islamic countries [...] with image sequences of closed ranks of praying men or head-scarf wearing women" (Hüttermann 2009, p. 117; see also Spielhaus 2013, p. 176). In media discourse, too, the trend today is towards ethnicization of the category 'Muslim' in which it is used synonymously with other categories such as 'migrant', 'Arab' or 'Turk' (Shooman 2010, p. 251).

The current final step in the shift of immigration stereotypes is a demonization of Islam that, at least in the German speaking world did not begin with 9/11 but instead, according to Karakayalı (2010, p. 173), with the murder of Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and which coincided with other media discourse, for example Turkey's application to become an EU member-state or religious education in the German states (Rauer 2009, p. 85). From that moment on, domestic political dialogue is shaped in particular by conflicts that deal with one negative example after another and are connected to Islam as a religion, such as debates surrounding honour killings, the head-scarf, building of mosques, the circumcision debate, and, recently intensified: the purported increased risk of terror attacks associated with the arrival of new refugees. In foreign policy, too, it is generally the Islamic 'problem states' that dominate the discourse, questions as to the backgrounds of said discourse are raised rarely if at all (Ehmann 2010, p. 15). At the same time, it is easy to observe how Europe

is positioned as a frame of reference and the antithesis of all things 'Islamic'.

3.3.1. Why then a 'religious turn'? Five explanation attempts

The following section examines why it is the Islamic religion, in particular, that became the focus of shifting immigration stereotypes. Quite apart from the logic of Occidentalism and Orientalism, there are structural changes that contributed to this move. After all, we must surely ask how this development could come about under the auspices of multiculturalism (Elvert 2010, p. 161). In my research, while reading a variety of authors, I discovered five different considerations that attempt to provide an answer to this question. I give a short summary of each in the following segment.

1. Levent Tezcan suspects that, when examined more closely, there is actually not a great deal to ethnicized cultural differences, and they must therefore shrink to encompass only the visual differences of the religions in question.

   > "But culture is difficult to grasp. Inasmuch as the interests of political control are directed towards it, it therefore dwindles into religion only. The religion, with clear dogma, approachable parties, recognizable symbols, collective rituals and holy sites/places therefore increasingly dominates the cultural discourse. It operationalizes culture" (Tezcan 2007, p. 56).

   Elvert expands on the idea:

   > "Via religion, cultural conditioning becomes nameable and persons can be addressed as religious persons" (Elvert 2010, p. 169).

   Tezcan understands this reduction as a type of control by governments, as a management technique in which self-regulating competences within individual parts of the population are brought into play. In the style of Foucault (2005, pp. 171 sq.), he calls this management technique Governmentality. However, the groups must be definable and in particular their points of contact must

be able to be addressed. The theory is that governmentality is the third form of governance and regulation, used in particular in multicultural societies. The first and second forms were described by Foucault. The first form of regulation is the law. The second form of regulation is the disciplining of the body using techniques that, via monitoring and diagnoses, point to changes within individuals. Tezcan adds the third form, which consists of making risk potential identifiable within a population. To do this, however, the population group must of course be created in the first place. A government that wishes to maintain control, therefore must "performatively participate, using institutionally supported ascription practices, in the constitution of the environment" (Tezcan 2009, p. 50).

In my opinion, governmentality is not, in principle, a new technique. Instead, it represents a classic policy of Divide-et-Impera, as brought to perfection during British colonialism.[20] By reframing migrants as Muslims, points of contact are created using the religious structures already in place, and these points of contact are intended to help control the migrant groups.

2. The second theory, also connected to governmentality, is related, however here the control comes not from without, as in the first theory, but from within. It regards the restructuring of Islamic communities for political participation as described by Bodenstein (2010, p. 355). Every social group must comply with legal regulations if they wish to participate in the political discourse. In Germany, with the exception of migrant associations, there is no efficacious legal institution for incorporating linguistic, cultural or ethnic minorities; religious representation

20 The "invention" of Hinduism by the British can be seen as the most prominent example: before the census, there was no religion known as Hinduism in the land of the river Hindu. There were the religions of Shaivism, Vishnuism and Shaktism, three religions that had much less in common than the three Abrahamic religions that at least all recognize the same progenitor. When people were surveyed as to their religious affiliation, they had no idea what Hinduism was. What they knew, however, was that they were not Muslim, the only other religion listed (Pennington 2005).

is the only option. Due to the special legal position enjoyed by the Christian church, representation as a religious community offers more opportunity to participate than cultural or linguistic markers of group identity, whether said identity is ascribed from without or within, which is why it is most often utilized. The composition of mosque communities supports this theory: it is true that the existing structures have a religious objective, however they build on linguistic-cultural cohesiveness (Bodenstein 2010, p. 360). In addition, mosques are in principle open to all people, but are often visited along linguistic community lines. This indicates that the religion, even coming from a group that self-identifies as Muslim, is used as a vehicle to facilitate participation. Self-organization as a religious community can be understood as a type of integration with the intention of providing a point of contact to the government and society (ibid., p. 356).

In order to participate in legal structures, however, clerical structures must be created, as it is these structures on which German religious law is based on. However, not all Muslims wish to be part of a publicly incorporated body, as this requires a clerical hierarchy that "is completely alien to the grassroots democratic structure of Islam" (M. W. Hofmann 2010, p. 333). Nevertheless, it is hardly surprising that the DITIB, of all institutions, that is the national umbrella organization for coordination of the religious, social and cultural activities of the associated Turkish-Islamic mosque communities, with close cooperation from the Turkish government, increasingly draws on pastoralization of its Imams, although the actual work, for example representative work, is often carried out by 'ordinary' mosque community members (cf. Tezcan 2012; see also Beilschmidt 2016) and in fact more money should be invested in the further education of those parties.

3. The third approach to be listed here: the change to citizenship laws, which resulted in increased naturalization of migrants and their children (see also Spielhaus 2013, pp. 171, 186). After

naturalization, however, the state no longer had access to reliable numbers for sorting people into various categories, for example who had a 'migrant background' and who did not. To collect this social data the government has in the meantime begun to ask who is Muslim and who is not. Not only that, Muslims are generalized into the 'migrant background' category and people from countries in which Muslims make up the majority of the population are now always listed as Muslim, regardless of whether they are Christian, Buddhist or atheists (Shooman 2010, p. 248). The parallels with the creation of Hinduism during the colonial time period cannot be ignored.

4. Theory four on the question as to why there was a 'religious turn', in particular in public discourse, was put forward by Rommelspacher (2002, p. 28). She believed that, analogue to the neo-orientalist developments described, religion is the particularly obvious contrast to 'modern man'. The exclusion of 'the others' takes place in this instance via the denial of historic concurrence. Instead, the other is reduced to the pre-modern, representing in the imagination superstition, traditionalism and irrationality. Those that feel like they belong to the modern position themselves in opposition to the non-modern 'others', and assign themselves modern characteristics such as efficiency and diligence, inventiveness and moral and political maturity. The fact that the 'pre-modern others' also regard themselves as modern when it comes to these characteristics is ignored. The consequence is that "the one dimensional explanatory model, that primarily falls back on the 'alien' religion of the person to be integrated, [...] implicitly [releases] the receiving society from their responsibility for the social conflict"(Shooman 2010, p. 251). Which is why, in the media texts and articles that accompanied the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islamic Conference (DIK)) there is less information on the results of the conference and instead the realization that "there had previously been no internalization of these values by practising Muslims", but that this would be possible by overcoming the supposed

contradiction between the values and norms and the religiosity (Shooman 2010, p. 258).

5. A fifth consideration is connected, in particular, to the micro-politics of people who are less concerned with co-determination than with personal identity politics. It is easier to refer to the abstract category of religion and use this as a frame for development than it is, for example, to refer back to a nationality (Khorchide 2010, pp. 374-375). In the section Identity Constructions within these Religious Minority Situations I will examine more closely the fact that the "tendency of young Muslims to Islam [is] a potential coping strategy for the tension between the orientation of the community of origin and the receiving community" (ibid., p. 381).

The orientation of the migrant subject towards religion therefore takes place partly via political measures, and partly due to momentum (Tezcan 2009, p. 76). In total, the various elements of external ascriptions and self-description combine and finally develop from an identity construct to an essentialist identity. The incorporation of immigration stereotypes in the Muslim, and the associated legal shaping of labour migration are not surprising developments, but rather a reprint of colonial strategies (Attia 2010, p. 120). The problem is that any and all differences amongst Muslims as well as similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims are concealed and codified (Spielhaus 2013, p. 170).

3.3.2. The paradox of the secular Muslim

The result of this religious turn for Muslims, for a long time, was that in the end the discourse did not leave room for anything other than religious actors (Elvert 2010, p. 163; see also Spielhaus 2013, p. 172). The result could be read in the various discourses, when, instead of a multitude of migrant representative groups, Muslims were often the only organized representative group spoken to (Elvert 2010,

p. 161). The result was that the people affected felt forced "into overemphasising the ascribed identity" (Kandil 2010, p. 548). This means, for example, that even non-Muslims referred to themselves as Muslim, specifically secular Muslims.

"'The Muslims' were thus represented as a dichotomy: the group that organized themselves into mostly religious associations, and could therefore be represented, and the others, the secularly aligned" (Elvert 2010, p. 162).

At the same time, as Elvert's explanation of secular Muslims shows, the term 'secular Muslim' is in itself a contradiction, as it is usually government organizations that are described as secular, but not groups or individuals. If we take a look at the positions represented by 'secular Muslims', we find that they did not represent a secular position as Muslims, but instead despite their Muslim identity, as it were. Amir-Moazami described this well:

> "A significant element of this discourse is the assertion that the separation of religion and politics is a solely western achievement, and represents one of the most basic differences to the political disposition of Islam" (Amir-Moazami 2007, p. 110).

That is to say that these discourses assume that the political disposition of Islam is such that the goal is the creation of a religious state. Anyone who wishes to live in Germany must reject this ascribed disposition, that is reject a supposed part of the religion. Due to this assumption, it seems impossible for an orthodox Muslim to support a secular position. Only Muslims who are not Muslims can be secular. Lay or secular Muslims are therefore not, for example, non-practising Muslims or those that do not follow an orthodox way or life, but rather Muslims that, when describing themselves, emphasize that they are in fact not Muslim at all (Elvert 2010, p. 169). Why then describe themselves as Muslim in the first place? Elvert offers an answer:

> "The figure of the secular Muslim offers, therefore, the option of addressing a person as a Muslim and incorporating them into a discourse based on religion, yet at the same time emphasizing their detachment from Islam" (ibid., p. 169).

That is, those who wished to take part in the dominant discourse profited for a long time from allowing themselves to be included in the debate using Islam as an identification marker, and therefore to recommend themselves as a representative within governmentality. This is the reason that, for example, Necla Kelek, who describes herself as a critic of Islam, was a member of the first phase of the DIK, although she said herself that she was not a Muslim. "Positioning as 'Muslim' or 'Islam critic' gained in importance in terms of identity-formation and [therefore] politics" (Attia 2010, p. 125).

The media texts and newspaper articles that accompanied the DIK make clear the hidden discrimination contained within this form of address. Muslims are, as shown in the (Shooman 2010, p. 252) case study dichotomized by the press and divided into 'good' and 'bad' Muslims. As an exaggeration, we could instead say into 'secular/liberal Muslims' and 'radical and obstinately orthodox Muslims'. Good Muslims, however, are probably only good because their criticism appears to come from within, when in fact it does not. This criticism can then connect to other discourse, e.g. feminist discourse (Elvert 2010, p. 164). Accusations from the 'secular Muslim' camp, or even from non-Muslims, directed at practising Muslims and Muslim practices legitimize the exclusion strategies of the dominant society. Islamaphobic statements are thus made socially acceptable to begin with.

As so many groups put on the 'Muslim' marker, the focus of the political discourse is the question of an authorized point of contact, and the complaint that such a thing cannot be found. Which is why Elvert contends that the governmentality, that is the ability to self-regulate, is deliberately called into question by putting the internal claim to leadership up for debate (ibid., p. 163). The complaint that no point of contact can be found is therefore, in principle, also the complaint that the 'divide and conquer' technique does not want to work, as the parties are fighting for power. At the same time, it functions excellently for exactly this reason, as, instead of claiming a position of power within society as a whole, people who identify as Muslims haggle for power positions with the discourse of governmentality. A

problem that was originally structural, that is that minorities were initially constructed for the purposes of discrimination, for example by reducing participation of said minorities, is transferred to the migrants: 'They can't even agree amongst themselves'. By passing on the fight for representation to the actors, the actual problems of social inequality and discrimination are pushed into the background, a strategy already described as handed down from Orientalism. This may not be a deliberate result of concrete actions by individual members of the dominant society, however many people profit from these social structures without ever questioning them.

In the following sections, I will address the question as to what these developments mean specifically for Muslims in Germany. To do this, I will first question common perceptions of identity in order to then observe the ethnic identity ascriptions and constructions within the situation of religious minorities. To conclude the chapter, I will summarize what this means for women who wear the hijab.

3.4. Imposition and Examination of Identity

The problem of ascribed identity is easy to see when examined using the example of migration discourse. Identity can be viewed as the hegemonic concept from western culture. Over the last decades, it has been one of the most discussed topics in the literary and cultural sciences. There has been criticism noting that identity represents a specific western form of self-perception, that, according to the psychoanalyst and Neo-Freudian Erik Erikson "dauerhaftes inneres Sich-Selbst-Gleichsein, wie ein dauerndes Teilhaben an bestimmten gruppen-spezifischen Charakterzügen umfasst" (Erikson 1971 [1966], p. 124). This perception contains the idea of the 'true self' that lies hidden under many layers of 'false selves' and which can be found with a procedural search. According to Hall (1994, p. 67) this is an expression of the human desire for guarantees and stability. He states that if a division is made between external and internal, the external

is felt to be protean. The internal, on the other hand, ought to remain as stable as possible. In accordance with this perception, continuous self-reflection permanently asks the question of what is special about the own self (Sökefeld 2007, p. 39). The influence of post-structural theories has deconstructed these perceptions so thoroughly that their application in scientific discourse can hardly be supported any more:

> "Because subjects exist only in relation to ever evolving webs of signification and because they constantly differ from themselves as time passes and meanings change, the self – as a unified, stable, and knowable entity existing prior to or outside language – is merely a fiction of language, an effect of discourse. Social and cultural identities, it is argued, are similarly fictitious because the selves they claim to designate cannot be pinned down, fixed, or definitively identified" (Moya 2000, p. 6).

Therefore, social actors find concepts of identity not just within themselves; they are above all ascribed from without and thereby dominated by primordial and essentializing patterns of thought that must always be weighed and considered (Sökefeld 2007, p. 33). Which is why the concept of identity must be seen as part of the discourse of power. Identity is inherent in a reputed value, that is non-identity, which pathologizes not-belonging to a specific group (ibid., p. 39). A person must be able to be clearly assigned a category, whether nationality, sex or sexual orientation. An important critique of this notion, analogue to critiques of other essentializing concepts, is that a person with different identity-based affiliations is often reduced to only one single aspect that in turn makes all other aspects invisible (Moya 2000, p. 3). "Identity, as observed from this standpoint, is a set, unchangeable factor; a person receives it at birth and cannot change or acquire it" (Dracklé 2007, p. 197). However, the fact that these categories of identity are constructed remains hidden. Instead, affiliation is perceived as a personal achievement. When seen from this viewpoint, identity appears to be an imposition, not something to strive for, as "this type of [fixed] understanding of [static, fixed] identity is, in the end, equal to a subtle denial of belonging" (Kandil 2010, p. 548).

In the German migration discourse, terms such as migrant workers, immigrants, or migrants in particular denote people that do not belong (Dracklé 2007, p. 199). However, as already clearly explained, collective differences are only manufactured in contact, to explain the strangeness in the other (Nökel 2004, p. 285) and affirm the familiar in oneself. These differences are hard to identify in the real world, and could just as easily be balanced out with the similarities between groups. Even more problematic is the idea that, for example, national identity, usually known as ethnicity, is stylized as a freely chosen earmark of difference. This ignores the fact that ethnic self-descriptions are often not freely chosen, and as a general rule are not the subject of negotiations (Feischmidt 2007, p. 55). Migrant actors that refer to themselves using constructions of ethnic identity do this "against the backdrop of their own knowledge of the meaning and effect of ethnic categories within society" (Römhild 2007, p. 166). This knowledge is acquired by experience over the course of time. Negative experiences such as exclusion, discrimination or even overt racism also play a role here, as when positive feelings of communal support arise in a group due to ethnic associations.

The question, therefore, is why should we continue to work with this concept of identity? One answer is that, on the other hand, identity constructs are influenced by experiences. They are not just products of power structures, but are also actively chosen by people as a way of understanding the world (Moya 2000, p. 9). Which is why some theoreticians suggested concepts intended to help make a person's reality comprehensible by, for example, applying strategic essentialism. Strategic essentialism was developed by Gayatri Spivak and can, for example, be understood as a strategy for dealing with exclusion. This theory assumes that it is advantageous in some situations to call upon rigid concepts of identity (Spivak 1988, p. 13). That is, instead of examining identity as a scientific objective, as an unavoidable fact, it is thought of as an emic actor-concept which encompasses the relevant social and political context (Sökefeld 2007, p. 35). This subjectivist view does not ask after objective cultural characteristics, but rather asks where the person in question feels they belong, that is after

the experiential dimension of social praxis (Feischmidt 2007, p. 53). Which is why, in this work, instead of referring to fixed identities, I will refer to influences which shape formation of identity or describe identity constructs.

3.4.1. Construction of identity in religious minority situations

It is generally assumed that a sovereign self is developed over the course of adolescence. This sovereignty consists of acquiring techniques that make it easier for an individual to deal with various types of ascriptions and essentialism. This is not a process that applies only to migrants and their children, nor is it a given that it will end in a specific result. Those who do not master this process are not without identity (cf. Nökel 2004, p. 297).

Location and space are important structuring elements of identity development. For example, confrontations that allow an individual to learn techniques for successfully dealing with institutions are most likely to take place in school, university and at work. If the individual is able to strike a balance between outward adaptation and self-presentation and the internal, these locations can become sites of upward social mobility (ibid., p. 297). We can assume that young people acquire images and values as well as the ability to move within institutional structures. Their parent's background has just as much influence on this process as the environment outside the family home. "At the same time, these elements change in order to secure a position and the ability to act within the relevant society" (N. Tietze 2004, p. 239). As this also applies to clothing, a variety of different elements of style are adapted and combined to create new styles. For many young women puberty, generally marked by the onset of menstruation or growth of the breasts, which is the moment they reach the 'age of majority' within Islam, is when they decide to fulfil their religious duties consisting of fasting, praying and often morally appropriate clothing. According to Islamic teachings it is only after becoming an adult that "a person is responsible for their good and bad deeds"

(Klinkhammer 2000, p. 246). In addition, Klinkhammer's stories of acquisition Klinkhammer (ibid., p. 280) make it apparent that a change in status within the family and the mosque community is connected to the wearing of the head scarf, a conclusion that matches that in my own Master's Thesis (Kanitz 2010). Many women report that they feel that the community takes them seriously from the moment they start wearing the head scarf.

Experiences of permanent external ascription had by these women within the German society facilitate analysis and preoccupation with Islam (Klinkhammer 2000, p. 252). For many, their ostensible status as an immigrant can be felt everywhere except within their own mosque (N. Tietze 2004, p. 248). The mosque provides a reliable sense of unity not on offer from the dominant society. Identification with Islam thus represents one common instrument among many which "makes construction of subjectiveness and the ability to act in society possible" for these young women (ibid., p. 242). This identification offers them resources for construction of an acting self that is located within society, feels affiliated with a group and differentiates itself from other groups (ibid., p. 244). The element of identity construction is, in many ways, so prominent that the spiritual content of practising religion barely registers. Mouhanad Khorchide (2010, p. 374) describes three types of religiosity that he identified in his study on the social integration of second-generation youth that describe themselves as 'Muslim'. The large majority, that is 80% of his subjects, use religion as an element of identify formation only selectively and depending on the situation, and use religion in particular as part of identity construction within a collective.[21] This is understandable to the extent that many of them do not feel accepted in the dominant society. But even though 90% of subjects felt that they belonged to the parent's home

21 An additional 13% adopted Islam reflexively and created a synthesis of Islam and social values and norms. They implemented democracy, human rights, gender equality etc. into their religious self-image. According to this study, only 7% considered it important to differentiate themselves from those with different beliefs that they viewed in a negative light (Khorchide 2010, p. 374).

country, 60% would not want to live there, as, when there, they are also considered immigrants (Khorchide 2010, pp. 374-375).

This function of religion as an element of identity formation is reflected, for example, in the distribution of liturgical practices. Collective and publicly visible practices such as clothing, visiting a mosque on Friday or fasting during Ramadan are practised more frequently than individual worship or reading the Quran (ibid., p. 375). Religiosity is very diverse in this case, as forms of identification are always changing. Finding a job, falling in love or something similar may cause operational principles to be abandoned or newly adapted in certain situations. These are biographical elements which, in all people, regardless of background, do not make up a fundamental part of cultural identity but instead are called on when required (N. Tietze 2004, p. 249).

3.4.2. Prospects for self-determined construction of identity

We can conclude, for example from the works of Klinkhammer (2000) and Nökel (2004) that, for a long time, identification with Islam provided many women with an opportunity to avoid the poorly perceived identity of immigrant. "It provides [women] with the components of a counter-culture which cannot be derived from the culture of migrant workers which is not highly rated" (Nökel 1999, p. 128). In this way, it becomes a new, identity-forming frame of reference in which a person's own lifestyle can be developed and defended (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 170). This lifestyle is shaped by the specific biography of the woman in question, including its distinctive religious and migratory aspects. I agree with Nökel Nökel (2004, p. 297) who states that for these women, hijabi-clothing can be understood as the main tool for staging agency. The strategy consists of ensuring that insights won from reflecting on cultural biographies are made visible in micropolitics, that is within the social environment. (ibid., p. 285). Instead of simply adjusting to the dominant society, or sole reference to cosmopolitan influences transferred by the parents, clothing is used

to depict a specific biography in the form of stylistic features. However, this means they are in a continuous fight with the dominant society, which applies discursive arguments using collectively stigmatizing and culturally racist ascriptions. The fact that Islam is also not rated highly was, for women interviewed throughout the entire literature, in particular due to the fact that the dominant society associated it with the low rated culture of migrant workers (Höglinger 2002, p. 117). The "Islam of Turkish tradition, low social classes and gender hierarchy" (Nökel 2004, p. 293) is, for them, in stark contrast to the 'new' Islam they practice, which is based on cosmopolitan developments. Which is why young women, in particular, distance themselves and their religious practice from that of their parents (Klinkhammer 2000, p. 249). To implement this, "anti-traditional interpretations of Islamic principles" (Nökel 2004, p. 287) are connected to modern, emancipatory life plans, such as the combination of fashionable clothing and hijab (ibid., p. 304).

> "Covering up in public no longer has anything to do with a connection to a masculine household and its honour, instead it is a symbol of her inviolability as a righteous, faithful woman of moral integrity " (Klinkhammer 2000, p. 175)

The division of genders is maintained in a symbolic way in the form of the hijab. At the same time, the women fight the traditional way of reading the Quran and the associated ideas concerning gender roles and gender relationships (Nökel 2004, p. 291). Which is why Lila Abu-Lughod (2002, p. 285) describes the hijab as a "mobile home". Not only that, separation in daily life is neither possible nor desired, as it would exclude these women from their everyday lives (Nökel 2004, p. 290).

Nevertheless, the dilemma remains that that which provides authenticity to these women is often considered stigmatizing in Germany. If a Muslim woman decides to wear the hijab, she experiences not just congratulations and recognition, but also concerned questions regarding presumed self-marginalization and self-depreciation (ibid., p. 285). And that despite the fact that the understanding of veiling as

a symbol of passivity and oppression was called into question initially by veiled protestors in Iran in 1979 and more recently by female demonstrators in Tahrir Square in 2011.

However, the mechanisms of Occidentalism are so effective that the opinion of women regarding their own clothing apparently no longer plays any role in public debate. To demonize them, to have as 'enlightened', and therefore dismissive an opinion of them as possible, is simply more politically and strategically useful right now.

4. The Production of Meaning in Hijab Fashion

The following chapter does not consider fashion, as is usually the case, from the perspective of the dominant society, but rather from a migratory perspective. The first part of the chapter describes existing fashion theory and, more importantly, what it lacks, as a way of disrupting this mainstream perspective. I will therefore begin by narrowly defining the word fashion from a Eurocentric perspective, attempting to find a more precise wording than is currently available. I will then introduce reflections on the body and gender, in order to relate the terms fashion and modern to one another and then once again step away from the Eurocentric perspective. I will examine both the production of fashion and its framing effects. In doing so, I will continually take the perspective of Muslim women in Germany into consideration and clarify the interrelationships between 'western' and 'non-western' fashion.

Regarding the question as to how meaning is produced in hijabi-fashion, the initial step has nothing to do with the actual manufacturing routes for this fashion; instead I will concentrate above all on how meaning is generated through fashion. The goal of this chapter is therefore to provide a foundation in fashion-theory in order to show how Muslim women shape the visualisation of their identity constructions. I will also provide some information on the manufacturing routes, as I do not wish to completely ignore information on the means of production.

4.1. What is fashion?

It can be difficult to word a general definition regarding what is part of fashion and what is not, as many markers also apply to objects that some fashion theorists do not consider fashion, such as visual symbols and other articles. According to Svendsen (2006, p. 15), for example, wedding rings, commemorative coins or uniforms cannot be considered fashion. But this cannot possibly be applied as a general rule: the engagement ring given to Angelina Jolie by Brad Pitt had so many imitators in such a short amount of time that articles on the subject certainly called it a fad. And the cut of police uniform trousers, as seen in films from the 1970s, definitely exhibit a flare, while those from the 1980s were once again conspicuously straight-cut, which certainly reflects the fashions of the time. Both examples show that wedding rings and uniforms can indeed be subject to fashion, or even an integral part of fashion, and therefore cannot simply be excluded by definition. But even very practical items may be part of a fashion fad. For example, Barnard (2002, p. 165) excluded rain jackets as fashion objects. But if you take a look at the flood of *Jack Wolfskin* jackets from the past few years, it becomes clear that even rain jackets, usually associated less with fashion and more with protection from the weather, can be objects of a fad. And finally, of course, we have to mention the subject of this book: many non-Muslims are astounded by the idea that hijabi-clothing could be fashionable, faithfully reproducing the idea that fashion is 'western'. The goal of the following pages is to make it clear that headscarves are just as subject to fashion as wedding rings, uniforms or rain jackets.

First, we must recognize that fashion applies not just to clothing and fashionable clothing, but to all areas of consumption. Fashion has meaning where taste, that is an idea of what is beautiful or appropriate, plays a role. Of course this applies to clothing, but also to furniture, music, poetry or architecture (Svendsen 2006, pp. 10-12). As this book focuses on clothing, the next section focuses on a definition of fashionable clothing.

4.1.1. What is fashionable clothing?

Regarding the question of what clothing is and how it becomes fashion, I will quote from the often-used definition by Flügel (1986) regarding clothing. The functionalist logic is relevant due to the action-oriented perspective that is the goal here.

Flügel defines clothing, in line with the functionalist paradigms of his time, via its three functions: first, it provides real protection from outside influences such as weather or injuries. Second, it provides social protection from moral dangers, or covering for reasons of shame. Third, clothing serves as a marker and a means of communication. Finally, there is a function missing from this list, that is the shaping and expansion of the body, for example using heels, hats, bags, etc.

Clothing is therefore everything that protects the body, presents it in a socially acceptable manner, communicates the body, and anything that shapes or expands it. Flügel associated fashion with clothing's third function, but it is not solely the marking and communicative function that is subject to fashion; the other functions are also interpreted differently depending on the Zeitgeist. What a person requires protection from, which boundaries of modesty apply or what form the body should have can also change, even at short notice.

But how does clothing become fashion? Here we can refer to Roland Barthes (1985, 13f sq.). According to Barthes, individual pieces of clothing have three dimensions: first, there exists the actual piece of clothing, that is the material object. Second, there is the represented piece of clothing, as it is pictured and in particular described in fashion magazines, advertisements and similar media, and third, there is the used piece of clothing, the one worn on the street. For a long time, fashion-theory publications did not attempt explanations regarding where fashion emerges, and whether or not clothing only becomes fashion once it is used fashionably. Barthes, for example, believed that fashion is created in the metalanguage of magazines that comment on images and connect fashion objects to ideas and concepts (Barthes 1985, p. 27; cf. Rohr 2012, p. 72). This idea cannot be fully dismissed in relation to this work, as the development

of fashion by Muslim women in Germany suffers greatly from the lack of a voice provided to Muslim women's clothing in German fashion magazines. This situation has only begun changing with the emergence of the first Muslim fashion blogs (cf. Kap. 5.5.4). According to Barthes' view, influenced by structuralism, clothing is therefore only the material basis for fashionable clothing, whereas fashion itself represents a cultural system of meaning (Barthes 1985, p. 283). The fashion system is, according to Barthes, the totality of the socially relevant activities that are necessary for fashionable clothing to exist. This includes both the creations of the designer as much as the final ensemble worn by the consumer. As also noted by Lehnert (2012b), production, marketing and the description and portrayal in fashion magazines is also part of the fashion system. And even though Barthes later rejected his own theory of fashion, and I do not agree with the concept of a system independent of people, I do concur that fashion can only be understood in totality, which is why I will discuss the various aspects that combine to create Muslim fashion specifically over the course of this chapter.

Capitalist logic defines three types of fashionable clothing which people combine to create finished outfits. These are largely defined via the significance, the state of the clothing, its origin and the monetary value. The first sort is also the most expensive, luxury clothing, in particular made to measure clothing, and of course Haute Couture[22]. The second type of clothing is mass-produced clothing, which may range from expensive designer outfits to clothing from

22 Haute Couture is clothing made to measure and by hand from large fashion houses. The term is protected in France, fashion houses must apply for it and meet certain criteria in order to use it. Charles Frederick Worth, from England, who opened his first studio in Paris in 1858, is considered the founder of Haute Couture. 10 years later, he encouraged the founding of a tailor's guild (Ebner 2007, p. 25). Worth was also the person who began to sign his clothing as if it were artwork (Svendsen 2006, p. 90). Haute Couture is now considered more of a marketing strategy than an actual means of production, as the strict criteria, such as the large number of hand-sewn and elaborate collections required to apply for entry into the exclusive circle of fashion houses allowed to use the term "Haute Couture", has become quite unprofitable (ibid., p. 99).

more inexpensive stores such as *H&M* and *C&A* and the third is street fashion, which is implemented by all social groups and makes use of bought, but also inherited clothing, goods from second hand shops and small designer stores or street markets. These three types are often mix and merge with one another without rank or order. These days, a mix of objects from all sources, in particular, represents a real eye for fashion.

However, in contrast to what Barthes postulated, it has been a long time since *Vogue* determined what was fashionable[23]. Instead, according to a statement by *Chanel*, fashionable clothing exists only if it makes its mark on the streets (Svendsen 2006, p. 102). This statement also answers the question as to fashion's symbolic point of origin: it emerges in the daily interactions between people on the streets. One indication that this is correct is the increasing number of street-fashion images in fashion magazines. Street clothing can, despite the number of industrially produced goods it makes use of, be considered the intellectual point of origin for fashion, because there are so many objects, pieces of clothing and accessories that can be combined in so many different ways that mass-produced clothing is simply not a barrier to creativity (ibid., p. 61). There is therefore no superordinate fashion structure that ensures that fashion exists and persists in flux, but rather what is fashionable is negotiated during the course of daily interactions. People determine with one another what fashion is, based on their experiences and prior information. This is a thought worth holding onto. It will be developed further in chapter 9.1.

That explains the symbolic production of fashion. But how is clothing actually produced?

23 However, Barthes' analysis also comes from a time in which the fashion magazine *Vogue* from Paris was considered a world leader in fashion. In addition, he declared his work and its theories as failures shortly after they were published (ibid., p. 66).

4.1.2. Features of fashion production

Fashion products, these days, are objects resulting from creative processes that are "invented, produced, purchased and worn in fixed cycles" (Rasche 2012, p. 116). The manufacturing routes of popular fashion, according to cultural studies, generally remain in the background, that is they do not become visible. Which is why I wish to deal with them specifically here. Production routes consist of six components: they begin with a design by a trained designer, after which the pieces are produced, in some cases transported thousands and thousands of kilometres, where they are placed in retail stores, here, they are advertised by magazines and other fashion mediums. Then of course there is consumption by the final customer (McRobbie 1999, p. 41). These components are extremely dependent on one another.

Pieces of clothing are produced by and large in two ways: the transport-intensive manner involves relocating the sewing to low-wage countries. In some cases, individual steps such as cutting, dying and sewing are done on different continents, because doing so saves money. A modified version of this is to have producers, originally from these low-wage countries, produce goods in the country where they are to be sold, working from home and often for a wage that is only marginally higher than that they would earn in their home country. The advantage for the fashion houses is that the retail stores can react flexibly if individual pieces sell better than expected. The retailers can then pass on the orders to the workers that are specialised in these pieces; there is no concern that they will lose money because they are unable to meet demands due to long transport routes. However, these workers often live in precarious conditions, even in large European cities, working from home for long hours at low wages.

Thus, production conditions for the actual clothing pieces stands in stark contrast to their representation as prestigious fashion. The clothing, produced by workers who are often underpaid, is staged by fashionable-photographic placement as a desirable object of enjoyable consumption (Svendsen 2006, p. 103).

But it is not just the workers; the designers are also often not profiteers in this production process, as often only a few finished pieces are actually sold (McRobbie 1999, p. 13). Many fashion designers also live in precarious situations, and postpone their private lives in order to deal with the high amount of work that is required in order to survive as a designer (ibid., p. 27). Designers consider themselves artists, however unlike other artists, their main goal is not to see their work displayed on a wall; instead, the design work they do must enter production in order to be successful. Which is why many designers switch to the large fashion chains and produce work there; their own lines would not yield the sales they require to make a living from their work (ibid., p. 13). And allowing oneself to be bought by large companies offers clear advantages: fashion magazines pay attention above all else to the major labels, as these are the companies that make the most use of their advertising space. A designer working for a major label may even be able to achieve a modest degree of fame (Ebner 2007, p. 25).

4.2. Production of Meaning in Fashion

The previous section explained what is meant in this book by fashionable clothing, and where it emerges, both symbolically and practically: these are protective, presentational, communicative and/or formative objects that are worn on the body and gain meaning through interactions with others. The next section provides a deeper look at this meaning: what meanings does fashion have, how are they generated and what do they do? That is, how does fashion influence daily life?

4.2.1. Fashionable clothing is simultaneously social action...

We have already seen that interaction between two people is required for fashion to emerge from a piece of clothing, which means that

clothing is always both self and externally referential. Which is why fashion must initially be examined using two basic aspects that are both equally legitimate. On the one hand, it follows a social view and is an elemental component of the social construction of the self, on the other it can be evaluated based on aesthetic standards as the expression of individuality (Geiger 2012, p. 92). Let us first examine the social aspect: sartorial objects in use are not neutral. This work posits that the social process of fashion is integrated into social structures and therefore simultaneously represents a statement regarding the dominant power structures. As will become clear over the course of final theoretical considerations in Chapter 9.2, as an example, fashion worn by Muslim women represents a challenge to social hierarchies. According to the German sociologist Georg Simmel, in his work from the beginning of the 20th century, fashion has two antagonistic social meanings that often come into effect simultaneously.

> "Fashion means, on the one hand, a connection with equals, the unity of a group characterized by that fashion, and therefore the exclusion from the group of those with a lower status, characterizing them as not belonging to the group. Connecting and discriminating are the two basic functions that are combined here and cannot be separated from one another[...]" (Simmel N.J. [1905], p. 13)

In part, then, fashion is used as a means of achieving connection and social adaptation to the desired social groups (cf. Rohr 2012, p. 83; and Svendsen 2006, p. 113). Individuals use fashion to position themselves as a subject and integrate with existing groups. They generally remain true to the basic dress code they aspire to, even when short-term aesthetic changes are taken into account; this is designed to maintain sartorial stability within the group. The affirming interactions between individual group members comprise one part of the social process of fashion. Muslim women's fashion is also created based on ascription and in relationship and reference to previous fashions. This is either a cosmopolitan development by Muslim women within the context of globalisation, or it means that this process is not exclusive to 'western' fashion.

The other part of the social process of fashion consists of excluding other social groups. Here, what a person wears is just as important as what they do not wear (Svendsen 2006, p. 14). The more a group is excluded from society, or excludes itself, the greater/more visible the visual difference between an imagined 'them' and an equally imaginary 'us'. This process is also part of socialisation and the process of negotiation within the group: most people want to belong to their group, so they increase their conformity with other members (Barker 2001, pp. 61-63). The headscarf is an example par excellence for this type of development, as the exclusionary discourse in the media provides a major boost to identification with an Islam that provides meaning (see also Chapter 3.4 on identity construction).

According to Svendsen (2006, p. 24) in a loose interpretation of Nietzsche, any adherence to fashion is simultaneously emancipation from the previous fashion, but also an emancipation from the authorities, which might be the reason that some Muslim men do not feel comfortable when their wives participate in fashionable developments and are therefore against them doing so. This being against it may take on many forms, from a *Fatwā*[24] to good-natured disapproval. Of course, Muslim fashion, as a general rule and like any other fashion, does not usually represent a symbolic social critique, as reflected in the idea that long skirts express the desire for a more moral society. If skirts get longer, it is often simply because they were shorter last season. Which is why fashion cannot, generally speaking, serve as a means of analysing societies or their sub-groups (ibid., p. 29).

Practically, these social levels of meaning, in terms of the headscarf, mean that the fact that more Muslim women are wearing hijabi clothing cannot be viewed as monocausal, and traced to a single cause, for example an increase in Islamist tendencies. This is an important point: if a person attempts to read semantic codes into seasonally changing fashion worn by Muslim women and use them to determine social opinions, he or she will come to the wrong conclusions. However, of course hijabi clothing has a social aspect, in which meanings

24 Islamic legal opinion, is written up personally for the asker on request.

consolidate, and this aspect offers a place for the projection of social analysis and discourse, and also includes a symbolic social critique. However, this critique is not exercised via longer or shorter skirts. Instead, there has been a discursive exclusion of Muslims over the last ten years. It has taken the form of ever repeating demands for assimilation, and yet simultaneously pointed out that assimilation cannot be achieved. Melih Kesmen, designer for the fashion label *Styleislam*, commented on this. He "no longer wants to hear the word integration, does not want to see himself as a passive participant in a debate on the edges of a society to which he has long since belonged" (N.N. 2012a). This exclusion has been practised with such intensity that it is necessarily reflected in the clothing worn by many young women. These women, as a result of this exclusion, ascribe themselves externally clearly and visibly to a religiously defined group, which provides them in return with respect and recognition. I will expand on these thoughts in the development of the thesis in section 8.3.

When considering fashionable clothing worn on the street, therefore, we must take into account that one of its aspects is that the fashion can be used to associate the wearer with social groups. But there is another aspect to be considered, that is the artistic aspect which will be dealt with next.

4.2.2. ... and art

Simmel (N.J. [1905], p. 11) suspects that fashion does not have any other type of practical, aesthetic or other substantive significance above and beyond the connections and exclusions just described, at least not contained within the piece of clothing itself. In contrast are comments from the French philosopher Baudelaire from the same time period. He notes that any attempt at embellishment, however primitive or tasteless it may be, already represents art (Geiger 2012, p. 108).

In line with this statement, the British cultural theorist Angela McRobbie identifies fashionable clothing as

> "the application of creative thought to the conceptualisation and execution of items of clothing so that they can be said to display a formal and distinctive aesthetic coherence which takes precedence over function" (McRobbie 1998, p. 14)

That is, while the social component of fashion conveys security to the individual, and the basic dress code creates "stability independent of trends", the aesthetic aspect offers freedom in its creativity (Geiger 2012, pp. 96, 119). These freedoms, according to Geiger, can be found above all in spontaneous and non-binding trials that can be carried out without immediately having to reset the positioning of the self. They provide a great deal of room for interpretation and invention, so that this aspect of fashion is profoundly subject to aesthetic principles (ibid., p. 103).

Building on these considerations, we must therefore determine that fashionable clothing also represents a type of art. However, socio-culturally it is seen as so unimportant that a critical assessment based on aesthetics, as might be used for painting or music, is hardly possible (ibid., p. 99). For a long time this was because there was a lack of artistic criticism for fashion in the regular sense, and what little there was, as with the scientific communication mentioned above, was performed above all by journalists. Thus, fashionable clothing was not recognized as art (Svendsen 2006, p. 93). Adding to this, it was not clear, when it came to fashionable clothing, which is most efficacious when on the street, who is to be seen as the artist to direct criticism at. So many people work on the finished outfit that there is no clear artist to be named. The designer, the people in the production facilities or media production, the consumers who assemble the fashion as actually worn - none of them can be considered the sole artist (cf. Geiger 2012, p. 94). This is another reason that fashion has not been recognized as art. Nonetheless, there has been some collaboration between fashion companies and artists, not least in order to clearly express the close connection the designers see between fashion and art. Marc Jacobs, who created fashion for *Louis Vuitton* for over 10 years, began in 2003 to create designs for expensive women's handbags

together with internationally recognized artists such as Yayoi Kusama, Marcel Sprouse or Takashi Murakami (N.N. 2012c).

In regards to hijabi clothing, there appears to be a systematic lack of recognition from the dominant society regarding the aesthetic aspects of hijabi fashion, which significantly impedes the social classification of Muslim women in society as a whole. The headscarf itself, and the insistence of these women that they be allowed to wear, it is often viewed as the reason for these classification difficulties, ignoring the inability of the dominant society to read these aesthetic aspects appropriately. Many of the people my interview partners encountered assumed, among other things, a lack of any aesthetic components, leading to them experiencing increasing feelings of rejection. This feeling that their clothing is not valued is confirmed by the repeated questions regarding the benefits of the headscarf, or the statements questioning any such benefits. Often, the women hear that their head-covering has a negative influence on their entire appearance, without any recognition that the headscarf is, in most cases, a carefully embedded part of the image.

As Svendsen (2006, p. 157) states, appreciation for fashion induces self-confidence. The clothing worn by these women therefore represents a questioning of the established social hierarchy, as repeated negative ascriptions in the media attempt to undermine this self-confidence. Of course, it is the small details within these clothing designs in particular, for example pants or the use of fashionable accessories such as hijab-needles designed specifically for the purpose, that are intended to signal progressive ideas regarding women and a modern self. Even the choice of fabric is a conscious decision (Haase 2012, p. 49). The actors, as already demonstrated, put together their clothing from a variety of sources and work out the fashionable dynamics in daily interactions with one another.

The general meaning of fashion lies, therefore, in the artistic and social articulation of the body in interaction with others. But how is the body connected to fashion? And which social positionings can be read from this production of the body? The next section deals with these questions.

4.2.3. Fashion expresses the body...

One common idea is that fashionable clothing is a necessary condition for subjectivity, as it articulates the body and therefore expresses the psyche (Silverman 2012, p. 153). "Clothing and other forms of decoration make the human body culturally visible" (ibid., p. 151). Clothing, therefore, connects the social to the "biological" body (Barnard 2002, p. 182). However, this statement anticipates the existence of a natural body, one that exists independent of the social body. This is, at the very least, a complicated assumption. Techniques of the body can be understood as practices with which people represent themselves within the regular social rulebook. The rules construct the behaviour and simultaneously limit it. Fashion is one of these techniques of the body (Lehnert 2012a, p. 16), and also determines the gaze we use to look at the naked body (Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 17). This gaze may be many things, but it largely cannot be considered value-neutral, because it transmits a whole series of social ideas and ascriptions. "Natural" is a particular favourite, if we look at advertising slogans and the associated images (Svendsen 2006, p. 79). However, this 'naturalness' usually follows the common aesthetic ideals of the time in question. Every epoch has their own unique idea regarding what comprises the 'natural' body. Images of women from the European middle-ages are an example of this: Their huge heads and abdomens stand in contradiction to their slender shoulders and breasts (ibid., p. 85). If we examine fashionable clothing from the time period, which exhibits similar characteristics, we can conclude that the images of naked bodies always also follow clothing and fashion. "Fashion has always shaped the body and adjusted it to fit its ideals [... and is therefore] a technology for the production of the body" (Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 14). As a result, sartorial practices entail additional body practices. For example, the corset never really disappeared, but was initially replaced by underwear. Since the introduction of tight clothing, it has been transformed into a muscle corset by sport and plastic surgery. Fashion close to the body, in particular, must be understood as a technology for production of the body. It does not

trace the body, but rather is responsible for creating it (Lehnert 2012a, p. 17). Contemporary photography also always imagines clothing as part of the image, often supported by computer editing, smoothing out all irregularities and flaws in the naked body pictured. For example, the women in the nude portraits by the famous fashion photographer Helmut Newton are not naked in the classical sense; their poses and the shape of their bodies seem so smooth that they might as well be wearing clothing.

The social and the 'natural' body are therefore inextricably intertwined at all times; even a dead body is viewed from a cultural perspective. Fashionable clothing is, in the end, only one element of the social body, and vice versa. They both influence each other. This creation of the body can hardly be called a voluntary act, but is instead the incorporation of social norms such as common beauty and cleanliness standards. These norms are sometimes extremely potent; just look, for example, at size zero models and their influence on the eating disorders of young women (Svendsen 2006, p. 83). In regards to Muslim fashion, this means: nakedness or being uncovered is in no way a natural state, but rather just as much part of societal standards as the covering of the female body may be in a different society.

Fashion, therefore, has to do not just with clothing, but also relates to the entire body and its surroundings. The body is constructed via clothing as part of social practices and assigned meaning. One of these meanings is the representation of social gender. Statements regarding the gender affiliation of a person are, today, some of the clearest statements clothing can make. This is particularly true for Muslim fashion, as, with the exception of a few artistic performances, the hijab is only worn by those who wish to portray themselves as women. Which is why the following section will examine the connection between fashion and gender from a Eurocentric perspective.

4.2.4. ... and creates gender relations

According to McRobbie McRobbie (1999, p. 41), fashion consumption has long been considered an authentic women's pursuit.[25] However, representing gender differences via clothing does not have a long tradition in Europe. This trend only started in the 14th century, with the development of trousers. The idea that the male and female body are basically not very different from one another in fact persisted until the 17th century. It was only afterwards that the idea spread that men and women were fundamentally different in regards to mental and physical characteristics. The 18th century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a typical example for this type of thinking (Svendsen 2006, p. 86). Conversely, in the Q'uran, that is from around the sixth century CE, the idea of differences in gender is considered a law, and it is prescribed that the two genders must remain sartorially separate from one another. But affiliation with a gender can hardly be considered fixed, but rather is negotiated performatively from birth onwards (cf. Butler 1997, pp. 21,49). This does not mean that bodies do not differ from one another. However, to assume that this difference has a solely binary effect on the intellectual and physical capabilities is dubious at best. There are many more genders than just the male and the female, both on the physical and the mental level. Both the a priori binary division of genders and the gendered hierarchy justified based on supposed weaknesses or strengths of each

25 Which is why the subject of fashion was predestined for analysis in feminist research. The general and specific feminist research in this area, however, is mostly concentrated on two subjects: one is the material side of the often-exploitative production process, which represents a very political view. However, many designers cannot really engage with this, as they view themselves as being apolitical (McRobbie 1999, p. 28). Another observes, above all, the cultural-theoretical side of representation once the sartorial object has been sold. Here, too, the research is generally too sociological for most designers, which is why the only written transmission of fashion is generally left to journalists (ibid., p. 18). Which is why the goal of sartorial research should be to combine both subjects, which I aim to do at least partially with this book (ibid., p. 32).

gender, which consists of specific daily disadvantages or preferential treatment, must be called into question.

Social genders are manufactured in Europe using all manner of body practices, from different behavioural rules when eating to equipment available in the lavatory. One of the most obvious examples of differences based on gender is the fashionable clothing people use to position themselves socio-anthropologically and externally referentially when it comes to gender (Geiger 2012, p. 111). Let us take trousers as an example for the interdependence of clothing worn on the body and fashionable clothing in regards to gender. The establishment of trousers as a socially acceptable piece of clothing for 'western' women began at the beginning of the 20th century. Before this time, trousers on women were considered obscene. But the changing awareness of the body during this time period, represented by the manipulation of the body, allowed for freedom of movement, even for women. The result was that trousers first became acceptable for sporting activities, and then as regular clothing for women. This view of the development of fashion as largely driven by personal growth is typical for Europe. However, trousers were always considered appropriate for women in cases requiring free movement of the legs, for example when working in the fields.

While fashion for the female body was in a state of permanent development, quoting the old and pepping it up with plenty of decoration, fashion for men within Europe over the last century remained conspicuously homogeneous and unadorned. Often, the dark suit is understood, in its uniformity, as a sartorial jump into the modern. In this era, so the thinking goes, hierarchisation of society based on clothing is no longer necessary, that is it is now expressed in the standard division of labour between men and women. However, male forms of clothing over the last century have been just as thoroughly coded as those for women. The difference between a tailored suit and one 'off the rack' could not be more obvious for those in the know. The suit itself is also a passing trend, as it has played an increasingly smaller role over the past few years, while fashion for men has once

again begun to offer more diversity (Svendsen 2006, p. 43).[26]

In terms of fashionable clothing, the gender differences are particularly present in regards to the social localisation of sexuality.

> "Eine der wichtigsten [sexuellen] Differenzen ist die Tendenz der Libido, bei Frauen diffuser zu sein als bei Männern; bei Männern ist im Grunde nur der Genitalbereich sexualisiert, bei Frauen der gesamte Körper; dies gilt gleichermaßen für den ausgestellten und den angeschauten weiblichen Körper. Folglich ist die Ausstellung eines jeden weiblichen Körperteils ero-tischer als die Ausstellung desselben Körperteils beim Mann, natürlich abgesehen vom Geschlechtsteil."

This means the entire female body is continually sexualised and that female sartorial practices usually aim either to hide or present the shame this creates. This is not all that different to Muslim women's perceptions of the body, with the difference, of course, that the shame created (in Arabic: ‚Aura) must be hidden at all costs. Gazes are created here performatively via the quality of the observation. The term "male gaze" as defined by Laura Mulvey describes the type of gaze with which men view women, but also with which women view and evaluate themselves and other women (cf. Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 18). It is the expression of the existing power hierarchy between the genders, in which the man is ascribed agency and an active role while women must limit themselves to passivity and being looked at (cf. L. Mulvey 1989, pp. 19 sq.). Fashionable clothing can be understood as the sartorial manifestation of this gaze. It expresses the understanding of a person's role visually, normalises it and perpetuates it (Geiger 2012, p. 110). Ideas regarding the male gaze effect how women dress and how they imagine that their body should look. For example, the debate regarding actress Angelina Jolie's double mastectomy was above all a discourse regarding the ideal of womanhood, which is unimaginable without breasts (Akyün 2013). And that is the point this section makes: western fashion and gazes are in no way less hierarchical, less patriarchal than those of Muslims, and the derogatory tone which is used to write about

26 A series of photos of a Turkish tailor is a great example of this `http://alioutfit.tumblr.com/`, last viewed on the 22nd of July 2013.

Muslim women's clothing on social media and in other forms of media is, from this perspective, completely inappropriate.

4.3. Fashionable Clothing's Potential for Expression

The previous sections concentrated on an exact definition of fashion as used in this book. I first limited the term historically and conceptually from a Eurocentric perspective, and then mapped out the various levels of meaning, including that fashionable clothing helps people to construct the social body. I plan to examine this further in this section. If fashion is the expression of one's own social positioning as a subject, what is its individual structure? How can fashion articulate social statements? This section will find answers to these questions, in order to further narrow the term 'forms of styles and expression' as used in the title of this book.

Roland Barthes (1985, p. 249) states that the significance of fashion, as observed from outside a group, seems to be very arbitrary. Whether a trouser leg is cut wide or close to the leg, either way: it is still clothing for the leg. The view of jeans as casual and the suit as formal clothing is also completely illogical. Seen from within, however, the system of fashion appears subject to strict logical standards. One is example is the practice of Casual Fridays, which supposedly means that workers may wear what they want, but in fact is just as standardised as regular office clothing (Svendsen 2006, p. 60). For outsiders, the system of signs used by groups may appear to be very confusing, but every group, regardless of how chaotic they may seem to outsiders, is in fact delineated quite clearly along sartorial lines (ibid., p. 128).

The meaning of a particular piece of clothing is not set, because different social groups apply very different meanings to the same piece of clothing (Barnard 2002, p. 33). At a particular time and in a certain context, a piece of clothing may mean something very different when compared to the same piece in another time or set of circumstances.

The shift in meaning of a rosary worn around the wrist of a Christian or a Muslim is an example, the meaning of the headscarf in Germany now and a century ago is another (ibid., p. 127). Hijabs, for example, possess multiple symbolic levels of meaning that are hardly read at all by the dominant society, even though it was not so long ago that headscarfs or coverings were a normal piece of clothing for women in Germany.

Pieces of clothing are also 'undecided' in meaning due to the potential to combine them. The stiletto might, just like the headscarf, be furnished simultaneously with meanings of freedom or oppression. Those who wear stilettos or headscarfs are aware of the multiple potential meanings that are negotiated during analysis of these pieces of clothing. The combination of the two is particularly interesting; in Germany as in Syria,[27] the headscarf appears to be much more fashionable when worn with the high-heeled shoe. And yet, both of them, within 'western' discourse, are the ultimate expression of patriarchal self-oppression. But only in 'western' discourse. Simultaneously, in Germany the stiletto is the symbol of a woman who is expressing her own sexuality and separating herself from the well-behaved women wearing flat shoes. Of course, someone with the association "Stilettos = Sex Symbol" will have a hard time reconciling them with the headscarf. As a result, the matter of fact combination of the headscarf and stilettos in Syria fascinated me. I wondered whether the stiletto did not have the same associations in Syria, or if the women were using the creative leeway offered by Islamic law on the subject despite the sexual connotations.

Fashionable clothing is riddled with unsystematic markers, symbols and codes, the meaning of which changes depending on the system of reference. Pieces of clothing are always furnished simultaneously with multiple meanings. The next question, then, is who ascribes these meanings and where does the coding come from? It cannot come from the wearer alone. This becomes clear at the latest in

27 I chose these two countries because I have lived in both of them and researched fashion in both, and thus am able to understand the contexts.

regards to hijabi fashion, in which the women can assign meaning to their clothing as they like and are nevertheless reduced solely to their existence as Muslims by the dominant society. Clothing is also not assigned meaning solely by the employed or freelance designers, as the final combination of the clothing as worn may cover a very diverse spectrum of meaning. If a design object is sold after many years in a second-hand shop, the meaning of the piece of clothing as worn is assuredly a different one than that originally intended by the designer. Observers also cannot be considered those responsible for producing the meaning ascribed to sartorial fashion, as explanations and conversations may later provide a new understanding of this meaning. These considerations show that the meaning of fashion is related to contexts, and is continually renegotiated in light of them (Svendsen 2006, p. 69). This means, in particular against the backdrop of changing historic and social circumstances, that fashion does not exist in its own right. Instead, it is always embedded amongst actors in an experiential web of various objects and their meanings (Barnard 2002, p. 171). Fashion therefore establishes "coded communications within referential contexts that always lie between multiple systems of reference" (Geiger 2012, p. 98). The terms calling card, forms of expression and sartorial coding therefore do not refer to a differentiated language, but instead a series of semantically coded meanings that are read into the clothed body by the actors in certain contexts. However, this clothing is not particularly systematic. Not every piece of clothing automatically represents communication for every person, however exact the system of code may be within a group (Svendsen 2006, p. 64). The significance of fashion changes quickly and has often changed its meaning by the next fashion cycle. Which is why inconstancy is one characteristic of fashion. Using semiotic terms, therefore, we can state that it is the nature of fashion to produce effective signs that transform into ineffective signs within a short amount of time (ibid., p. 130). However, fashion and language are not very similar, as the latter changes at a much slower pace (ibid., p. 71). Not only that, fashion does not possess grammar or any corresponding vocabulary. Instead, clothing is more of a visual form of expression,

closer to music and art than to spoken language (cf. ibid., p. 71). I will now examine the aspect of trends that change cyclically, as they play an important role in the thesis development in chapter 9.1.

4.3.1. The fashion motor

The question as to what principles fashion follows was an important one even in the early stages of social research. Here, too, theorists (e.g. Barnard (2002, p. 13)) continue to reference Georg Simmel, and to understand fashion as a process that can only take place as part of developed societies in which differentiated classes have emerged. The higher classes are the fashionable model that the other classes attempt to imitate (Simmel N.J. [1905], pp. 11-15).[28] In these texts, it is assumed that in less developed societies the impulse to connect to others and identify with a group is greater than the impulse to artistically distinguish oneself as an individual, and therefore the basic prerequisites for fashion are not in place.

This theory, in which people orient their fashionable clothing on that of the next-highest class, can be traced back to the North American economist Veblen. According to Veblen, people select their clothing with the goal of improving their own class position via self-promotion, by using the symbols of the next-highest class (Veblen 1981 [1899], pp. 140-42). This idea was further developed by Pierre Bourdieu (whose analysis is explained in a much abbreviated form here), who postulated that there are social patterns of taste that are subject to habitus and therefore are part of class thinking and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1981, p. 283). This means, however, denying the possibility that fashion can be used to undertake artistic design of the clothing, as this design is not subject to free will, but rather to class-thinking, the result being that following fashion would represent pure sartorial consumption of the taste prescribed by the next-highest

28 See also the quote on page 92.

class sample. This may reflect the social aspect of fashion, but it does not explain the artistic aspect.

And then there are other logical pitfalls: as the upper classes would be confident in their social position, they would not require constantly changing fashion in order to mark themselves as an established group. And as fashion from the past 40 years has been investigated, it has been proven that trends in fact sometimes go in the exact opposite direction, that is from the street to the runway and from there to the upper classes (Svendsen 2006, p. 46). Class-thinking, therefore, cannot be the origin of fashion; it can at most play some part in it. But in that case, why does fashion change?

According to Svendsen (ibid., pp. 60 sq.), fashionable taste is much more than a class-oriented sartorial action, and instead influenced by many different categories such as age, gender and anticipated expectations regarding ethnicity. Instead of class and status, he says that fashion in the 'west' mostly follows age categories, as youth, which now represents less a transitional phase from childhood to adulthood and has instead become a permanent status, has developed into the most valuable asset in the post-modern era. Svendsen (ibid., p. 48) suspects that Simmel was mistaken, because he extrapolated from a small group of workers that he came into contact with to all workers.

> "Like many others, Simmel generalized about the working class as a whole on the basis of the limited section with which he actually came in contact, but this generalisation was partly misleading."

He notes that symbolic capital is certainly a result of taste, but this capital cannot be transformed into any sort of social hierarchy. The fashionable development of the individual is not driven by the goal of improving one's own position in the class hierarchy. The desire to be part of fashion is much more self-referential, more egocentric. These people are, if anything, animated by the drive to be considered fashionable by themselves and others (ibid., p. 55).

But the idea that only fashion that does not cover much of the body can be an expression of modern times remains tenacious, as

does the visual materialisation of the dominant social hierarchy. I suspect that the idea that fashion is something 'western,' reserved for more developed societies, can be traced back to even earlier ideas. Barnard (2002, p. 55) voiced the interesting idea that newly discovered peoples in pre-modern times were categorised as primitive because they covered the body less, that is they had not yet eaten from the 'tree of knowledge' that made them aware of their nakedness. After Nietzsche condemned God to death, religiously motivated covering made way for rational and other considerations, and slowly fewer/other types of clothing layers became the norm. This evolved to a point at which the idea of the modern is linked in particular to the dwindling of women's clothing. This also explains why Muslim women often get the impression that their clothing is considered out of fashion in Germany. After all, this insistence on modest clothing expresses, for many non-Muslims, an imprisonment in 'pre-modern religiosity'. But is fashion really only a product of the modern?

4.4. Fashion production, Capitalism and the Modern

Fashion literature references, in particular, capitalist production methods for fashion, which represents a very limited view. This type of fashion is based on division of labour, production of the elite, manufacture of luxury items for the elite and perpetual change. From this perspective, certainly, fashion can be considered a product solely from the 'western' modern world. However, it does not take into account Indian winding techniques or Chinese weaving techniques, which represented a great range of fashion long before the European heyday. Forms of clothing from the ancient European world are also not considered fashionable clothing under 'western' fashion theory, as they supposedly did not feature the distinctive shifting trends required (Geiger 2012, p. 116). Similarly, for a long time, fashion in the pre-medieval era was referred to as decoration. The individual aesthetic autonomy described in 4.2.2 is not presumed to exist earlier

than the Renaissance and the beginning of the mercantile economic system around 1350; before this, clothing design remained practically identical for all people due to a lack of tailoring techniques. Only the quality of the clothing was different, depending on estate (Svendsen 2006, pp. 21 sq.). Contributing to this view is the fact that laws and codes of conduct clearly listed how people from each individual estate had to dress (cf. Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 13). The lack of drive to use fashion as a social designation for groups, as caused by the estate system was another reason that fashion came to be considered a product of the 'western' modern.

What at the time was considered fashionable clothing was based largely on differentiated and changing cuts, that probably only emerged along with the concept of the tailor. Barnard (2002, p. 159) and others even assume that this type of fashion came into being at the earliest during the industrial revolution and the associated dissolution of the estate system, which slowly turned into a class system. He maintains that the modern can only be understood through consideration of this transformation, which was triggered by capitalism. Fashion, it follows, is not possible without city life, capitalism and the modern era. This is because it is only the modern era that gave rise to people as independent individuals, requiring the body as a medium to express this individuality (cf. Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 12). This fixation on individuality, in particular, marks this very Eurocentric view of fashion theory, which denies that creativity is possible without individuality. These views fail to take into account the particular circumstances of colonialism, that is the exploitation of productive labour forces in the global south that contributed to the emergence of European fashion. These global interdependencies from the past remain, as a rule, invisible. Accordingly, for example, Gertrud Lehnert (2012b, p. 8) defines fashion as follows:

> "In the most general, abstract sense, fashion can be considered a basic dynamic that drives and maintains the modern, i.e. consumption culture, and crystallises in a multitude of fashions: architecture, interior design, design, intellectual or educational trends, artistic

> fashion etc. Fashionable clothing is, in regards to its cultural, social and economic importance, one of its most important creations."

Fashion, therefore, according to Lehnert, is that which transforms quickly because industry has to create a market in the home country, so that business does not stagnate due to market saturation.[29] A fashionable object is, at times, in need of no better characteristic than that of novelty (Svendsen 2006, p. 28). But even though fashionable clothing in Europe has been strongly influenced by capitalism in the last century, I find it very Eurocentric to assume that there was no fashion before 'western' fashion, and that there can in fact be no fashion outside of it. The changes may now come quicker, but fashion in the past was also subject to cycles.

Which is why this book uses a definition of fashion that designates as fashion anything that consciously defines one person from another and draws attention. Every human action is subject to norms, every action is a result of socialisation that took place in the past. Anyone who gets dressed while still half-asleep by simply grabbing something from their wardrobe will, in the end, be wearing clothing that more or less meets societal norms. The definition of fashion is therefore that fashion consists of objects that draw attention worn on the body, used by individuals in order create themselves and their social body performatively. Nowhere and at no time did clothing serve only to keep the body warm or cover private parts, but rather it always also had a conscious decorative purpose. This also means, however, that no society has existed without fashion (cf. Entwistle 2000, p. 6).

My suggestion, therefore, is to designate fashionable clothing in general as conscious, cyclically changing, decorative clothing, with the goal of demarcation from and adjustment to social groups, and as an aesthetic-artistic arrangement (cf. ibid., p. 237). The special capitalist form of fashion, with its quick and regular changes in detail

29 Which is why the major fashion houses trust their 'fashion forecasters'; they follow their prophecies with the result that they become self-fulfilling (Svendsen 2006, p. 57).

in order to promote consumption, will be referred to in this book as popular fashion.

Hijab clothing must also be considered part of popular fashion, as it often follows the exact same principles of capitalist consumption. The clothing worn by Muslim women interested in fashion, its aesthetic, it seasonal shifts is, just like clothing worn by other women, inspired by popular fashion which is driven by the dynamics of the industrial modern era. When Muslim fashion changes, it does so due to the same desire for change that drives people to consume other fashions. However, many Muslim women are reticent when talking about fashion, because they do not wish to be painted with the same brush as non-Muslim women in regards to their intentions and motivations (cf. McRobbie 1999, p. 39).

4.4.1. Non-western fashion designers as a political issue

It is not just designers based in the 'west' that now play a role in the fashion world; indeed, there are now many designers from the Middle East or other countries with a Muslim majority. These designers draw inspiration for their work from a variety of sources. Of course these influences are centred on London, Paris and Milan, but Egyptian and Turkish designers also look to India, Lebanon or Morocco (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 134). One of the most well-known Muslim designers is the British fashion designer Hussein Chalayan, originally from Cyprus, who has been creative director at *Puma* since 2008 (Pyle 2008). Atıl Kutoğlu also deserves mention, as he has garnered a great deal of international attention with his own fashion label. Kutoğlu was asked by the Turkish First Lady to create a new headscarf design for her; he did not accept this commission, but since then he has always added matching scarfs to his collections (Strohmaier 2008). There is also Lebanese Haute Couture designer Elie Saab, who gained wide-spread recognition amongst those interested in fashion with a dress that Halle Berry wore to the Oscars in 2002, the same year she won the prize for best actress (Nellis 2002). Ümit Ünal, who has a

contract with the Turkish fashion label *Abbate*, is the only well-known Turkish fashion designer who still lives and works in Turkey.[30] In Germany, there is the fashion designer Fatima Halwani, who exhibited her fashion, designated Haute Couture, at the famous Berlin Fashion Week, and who gained attention through her cooperation with Udo Walz (Hanisch 2013). And Neslihan Kapucu presented her graduation collection "One Way" in memory of migrant workers at the fashion week as the final project for her degree (N.N. 2012b). All these designers have achieved their own fame by co-producing work with large fashion companies or with famous people from film or politics, but they do not specially design clothing for religious Muslim women, who aspire to dress particularly modestly. However, it is important to list them as examples of non-western fashion designers. Information on fashion designers for Islamic fashion can be found in Chapter 5.5.3.

But fashion made by Muslim designers is often perceived differently from that created by designers associated with the 'west'. This is clear from the fact that their designs are often identified with political, not aesthetic motifs in the media. I understand this to be due to an unwillingness or inability to judge these designers using the same standards used for others. For example, Hussein Chalayan was long interpreted under more political than fashionable rubrics, in compliance with the idea that fashion is really something 'western,' as clearly demonstrated by this quote from an English-language fashion blog:

> "For me, Chalayan's work shows women to appear to be all the same with their faces covered, no matter the length of the mask. As their face cannot be distinguished, neither can they as a person. And does covering the face really change how sexual a woman appears, even when naked?" (misantrophe. 2000)

Chalayan himself, however, distances himself from these views and rejects such observations. Of course his designs have to do with his background, and quote from women's religious ideas in his home country:

30 `http://www.umitunal.com/about.html` last viewed on 23.07.2013.

> "He wanted to show how women mark their territory using clothing, he had said in an interview, and which role religion plays in this. He called the fact that some reviewers reduced this idea to a protest against oppression of Muslim women 'nonsense'" (Schilling 2005).

And yet, designs from the Middle East now have a notable impact on the fashion produced by major labels, as can be seen from the 2012 designs by Jil Sander, Prada and Chanel, but also from street-wear labels such as *H&M*, *Zara* or the British brand *Topshop* (Althaus 2012). Within the fashion industry, therefore, the designers enjoy a completely different type of recognition. The previous chapter defined fashionable clothing as functional objects worn on the body which serve to communicate the body artistically and socially, and are therefore charged with meaning as part of interaction with others. I observed where fashion comes from, both symbolically and factually, and further investigated its potential for generation of meaning. I will now place the subject of fashion into a broader context relevant to this work. To do this, I will focus in the following section on the particular connection between Muslim fashion and consumption.

5. Consumption of Islamic fashion

As was made clear in Chapter 4, fashion is much more than the actual material clothing that contains performative potential. Instead, fashion itself must be seen as a process, as an act of performativity. Fashion, therefore, is that which people make out of their clothing on a daily basis, it is that which happens in the morning as they stand in front of their wardrobe (Lehnert 2013, pp. 7, 12). Daily use of fashion is shaped above all by purchasing practices, or consumption, on the one hand, and the production of meaning on the other. This includes, consciously or unconsciously, analysis of legal provisions and of dominant discourses regarding ideas and meanings1, of applied knowledge on clothing practices and reflection on knowledge regarding historical fashion as worn by a person's parents, which is often studied via pictures.[31] However, these adoption processes do not take place within a closed system of discourse, but are in fact fluid (Hall 2004a, p. 68).

Various types of religious clothing, observed over time, make it clear that religious clothing is subject to the same fads and follows the same fluctuations and clothing worn by other social groups (Schulz 2007, p. 269). Fashion is an important issue, in particular for youth searching for their positioning of the self, and Muslim youth are no exception (Bendixsen 2013, p. 273). The assumption that all Muslim women allow what they wear to be dictated by religious

31 It is this consideration that brought me to the assumption that fashionable engagement allows for a statement regarding integration efforts.

prescriptions is simply incorrect. Muslim women and fashion are in no way incompatible, as is clear from the diversity of clothing types and practices worn or practiced, in part, by very religious women (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 133).

The following chapter will begin by shining a light on consumption theory: what happens when we consume? How is fashion consumed? In the second part, I will examine the concrete objects of Muslim clothing consumption: I will take stock of modest types of clothing in order to present a substantiating description of different hijab designs and explain which clothing pieces this work refers to. My sources were my own interpreted observations and additional research literature on the subject. Finally, I will examine the various contemporary Muslim fashions in Germany and other regions in order to then analyse an institutional perspective of sales in Germany. In doing so, I will also shine a light on a few symbolic forms of production for Muslim fashion and highlight ways in which they spread, for example on blogs.

5.1. Theoretical consumption considerations

Gertrud Lehnert (2013, p. 43) posits that consumers in general can only prove their creativity in regards to the selection and purchase of consumer goods.

> "Selection and purchase are the most important acts of attribution and affirmation performed on a preceding offer; in this way, clothes become fashion" (ibid., p. 123).

However, this hardly takes into account the many categories quoted by consumers in their current fashions: old, inherited, found items or those that are purchased in shops that are not part of the large shopping chains. Re-using rubbish has already become a trend, that is collecting things that would not traditionally be considered fashion - festival bracelets and bag decorations, for example, that are made from soft drink pull tabs or collections of dummies. Contemporary

fashion mixes the old, the new, the strange and the individual, often without any participation from industries, who often simply jump on a trend band wagon and make it available as a mass produced product (Geiger 2012, p. 97). On the other hand, it cannot be denied that successful companies understand not just how to meet the needs of their customers, but are also able to create new needs in the first place (Svendsen 2006, p. 130).

The acquisition of goods for the purpose of self-design, that is that we call consumption, produces the economy (Miller and Woodward 2012, p. 41). Some critics even say that the economy is driven solely by compulsive consumption. However, this is not a new phenomenon, but rather one that most likely also characterized earlier societies (Lehnert 2013, pp. 114-116). One critic, Angela McRobbie (1999, p. 3) from Britain, postulates that this self-design takes place within the framework of cultures and therefore cultural developments have become the most important motor of capitalism. According to her, this is also the most important reason for government to influence cultural developments. Sociologist Georg Simmel noted long ago that "modern culture" (Simmel 1989 [1911], p. 386) seemed to be characterized by the fact that technology, knowledge and objects had become more important than people themselves. The Swedish philosopher Lars Svendsen (2006, p. 119) even goes so far as to say that people have outmanoeuvred themselves with their fixation on objects, and now attempt to use consumption to prove that they are individuals, which basically means that neither the person nor the object has its own meaning, but rather that these are always constructed performatively (ibid., p. 126).

This is particularly applicable when it comes to fashion. This can be determined, at the latest, from the fact that fashionable clothing can have and take on very different meanings over the course of its existence. For example, the transformation of a pair of trousers from a sought-after fashionable object to a worn out pair that can only be worn at home, to a torn old rag used for cleaning; the meaning is always attached to the same object, but has been transformed (Lehnert 2013, p. 112). This means that the symbolic value of the

item is in fact quite a lot higher than its real value, which explains the readiness of the consumer to accept massive price differences when purchasing fashionable objects from different brands. Even the smallest details are loaded with meaning in this case, for example identical bags perceived to have a difference in authenticity based on whether they were purchased in an expensive retail shop selling luxury items or at a cheap market for replica goods.

Ways of dressing are connected, by people, to ideas regarding who we are or, indeed, who we want to be. Sartorial actions can therefore be understood as a central formative mechanism for social action, as they make statements regarding both hierarchies and the individual positioning therein (Bieger and Reich 2012, pp. 8, 10). These authors note that over the last 20 years, class identification has faded into the background, and the positioning of the self has gained importance. Finally, according to Mona Abaza (2007, p. 289), this trend can be traced to the fact that class distinctions as marked by clothing have become much more subtle. You could also say that the discourse of social positions has been subjected to the rules of fashion, or translated into types of fashion (Hall 2004a, p. 68).

Therefore, it is more that we consume the meaning transferred to objects than than that we consume the object itself (Svendsen 2006, p. 129). The difference between the real and the imagined object leads to a continued desire, which we then attempt to satisfy by consumption (ibid., pp. 115 sq.). This is, however, by no means simply egoistic behaviour, but instead a meaningful process in which people become creative as they consume actively and in particular selectively. Not only that, there are alternative or even altruistic forms of consumption that show that people are not simply remote-controlled by the industry (ibid., p. 112). The consumption of fashion thus becomes an expression of "thoroughly ambivalent productivity [... and is] an unavoidable element of social existence" (Bieger and Reich 2012, p. 8). Mary Douglas has a similar view of consumption; she considers *shopping*, in reference to the work of Bronisław Malinowski, Marcel Mauss and of course Claude Lévi-Strauss, as a cultural activity to be taken seriously (Douglas 1992, p. 150). Daniel Miller (2012,

pp. 46 sq.) argues for a similar position when he posits that there are two aspects of a person, that is that which one (this includes the person themselves) knows about them, and that which one imagines for them. The performative act of shopping is an opportunity to negotiate between these two spheres, and to experiment with drafts for the future on oneself. His anthropological research in Trinidad revealed, in this regard, that people often have a very exact idea of themselves when it comes to items, which is why they might be unable to find anything they want in a warehouse full of items. However, once something has been purchased, the person immediately loads it with meaning and incorporates it (Lehnert 2013, p. 118).

This incorporation is part of people's agency (Latour 2007, p. 79). It is driven by their ingenuity, their imagination, their aspirations (cf. Appadurai 1996). This also applies to participation in fashion, when a person imagines their own life and then implements it in fact through actions. A fashion can therefore be understood as a collective form of imagination. Muslim women, in particular, are often denied agency in their actions, as they supposedly are unable decide freely for themselves when it comes to their life and their clothing, particularly if they wear the headscarf. But participation in fashion is the best evidence that Muslim women in Germany and other countries do not have access to any less agency than, for example, non-Muslim German women. The separation often made, between the fashionable and the religious, must be viewed as arbitrary and as updated orientalism, in which the 'Orient' is viewed as ahistoric and therefore less capable of development (cf. Said 2009 [1978]).

5.2. Muslim Clothing

5.2.1. Definition of terms

It is important to note, before continuing, that even Islamic legal scholars do not always agree in regards to terms used for clothing.

The categories listed here are based in part on my own research and in part on research, for example from Moors (2007) or Abaza (2007).

Hijab Hijab is the term used in the Q'uran for shrouds of any sort, in particular for the room dividers intended to protect the prophet's wives from the onslaught of visitors to Mohammed. In pre-Islamic poetry, the word hijab also appears in connection with room dividers. Today, hijab generally refers to the headscarf, which usually covers the hair, ears, neck and part of the neckline. Many Muslim women call the plain white hijab, which leaves the face uncovered but sits relatively close to the neck a *Hijab ʾIslāmi* (Knieps 1993, p. 130). The hair is either tied up on the back of the head or at the neck, and usually there is a sort of headband which makes up the first layer of fabric, which is elastic and sits tightly around the head to prevent hair from peeking out. This headband often has a colour that matches something in the other clothing, creating an optical bridge to the head covering. At one point in Syria, this piece was made of lace (cf. Image 8.1). A second scarf is laid over this piece; it often has a decorative colour and may be wrapped very loosely, or tightly.

There are countless variations on this type of headscarf, e.g. changes to fabric or bindings, colours or patterns. One variation, for example, is the *Al-Amira*, which is a pre-sewn one-piece tube that is easy to pull over the head and is often worn by young girls during prayer, but may also be part of a school uniform (Kanitz 2010).

Face veil: There are various types of face veils, and their shape and the way they are worn differs depending on a woman's current fashions, background and status. The veil has a different name based on the part of the face it covers. The *Niqāb*, which is often used today and spread from Saudi Arabia into every country, was described early on, in a verified text, by a lexicographer who described it as a special face veil which sat across the cheeks. Today, it hangs freely down from the forehead and has an opening for the eyes. This is practical on the one hand, as it means the wearer can eat in public. On the other

hand it is very impractical, as only very careful movement ensures that the face is not uncovered accidentally. The *Lifām*, on the other hand, rests on the tip of the nose and is tight against the face, which allows for much more secure freedom of movement. Another option is the *Liṯām*, which leaves the nose free and only covers the mouth. Neither are mentioned in pre-Islamic sources, but are described in Islamic sources as special types of *Niqāb* (Knieps 1993, p. 99).

Khimār This type of headscarf is mentioned in the Q'uran (ibid., p. 102). Today, it is worn in Iran among other places (where it has become known as the *Tschador* or *Sharshaf*), and is marked by the fact that it is very wide and keeps the shape of the shoulders hidden. This is because sits on the head but keeps the face free. Particularly fashionable forms of the *Khimār* may reach as far as the wrists or even to the knees. Other *Khimār* types end just below the shoulders. A mini form of the *Khimār* is known as the *Esharp* and is worn in Iran in particular, leaving the forehead and temples as well as the neck free (TB-FF 2011-13).

Jilbāb The *Jilbāb* is also mentioned in the Q'uran (Knieps 1993, p. 109). Over the course of my research I discovered it had many different names, such as *Manto* (Syria) and *Jalabiya* (Lebanon). It refers to a thin, trench-coat like coat, often with buttons, which is usually worn together with the hijab and without a face covering over everyday clothing. However, the term may mean different things: the Libyan term *Jalabiya* refers, in Libya, to a loosely woven overdress with an uneven hood, and in Egypt the *Jellabiya* is the robe worn by Bedouins.

Abaya The *Abaya* is sometimes also called a *Jilbāb*, and refers to a type of wide overdress which may have decorations on the hem and on the sleeves. The *Abaya* became fashionable in Saudi Arabia and was imported from immigrant women to their home countries, where it in turn became fashion (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 135). Here, too, just

like the face coverings, it is important to note where the clothing sits. For example, for a time the *Abaya* was criticised by scholars because it sat on the shoulders and therefore revealed the shape of the body (Moors 2007, p. 327).

Accessories Many women add accessories to their clothing, for example scarves in matching colours worn around the neck or decorated headscarf pins. These are a sign that the clothing was chosen with care and attention. These small details are so important that, in the little hijab booklet brought out by the SOAS student Sofia Niazi, they were called Hijab-Pals[32] and had an entire page dedicated to them (Image 5.3).

The same is true for the shoes: whether or not the heels are in line with current fashions, and whether they match the handbag, is one way of communicating that the women select their clothing autonomously and with careful attention to their environment.

5.3. Contemporary Forms of Clothing in Germany

According to Bendixsen (2013, p. 274), Berlin has a structure of clothing that is oriented on the Mosque community, just like the one I described in Syria (Kanitz 2010). For example, the young women from the MJD (Muslim Youth in Germany)[33] that Bendixsen researched combine a series of authentic Islamic sartorial ideas regarding identity with a fashionable understanding of Muslim clothing. Members of the IGMG (Islamic Community Millî Görüş)[34], in contrast and according to Bendixsen, are more conservative when choosing their clothing; many of them wear a coat, quadratic silk scarves and flat shoes, and

32 *Pal* as in the English slang term for a friend.

33 One of the largest organizations of Muslim youth which is not part of an umbrella organization.

34 Second-largest umbrella organisation for Mosque communities in Germany, which grew out of the Millî Görüş movement

Figure 5.1.: *Khimār*, Berlin, October 2012. Source: JK.

Figure 5.2.: *Abaya*, Berlin, October 2012. Source: JK.

place a great deal of importance on their outer appearance. A woman from the IGMG that Bendixsen interviewed noted that she preferred the style of the MJD, because it was easier for her to realise. She said she really preferred *H&M* clothing and sometimes wore tight clothing and even make up (Bendixsen 2013, p. 280).

Only a few women limit their clothing selection to the *Tessetür*[35] imported from Turkey. Instead, women purchased their clothing at international fashion chains such as *H&M*, *C&A* and others. In regards to off-the-rack clothing, the very practical suggestion made by the Muslim Youth in Germany (MJD) is simply to purchase items that are one size too large (ibid., p. 277). Not only that, they say black should be avoided because it has negative associations, and red draws too much attention to the wearer. Increasingly, elaborate Saudi styles have spread to the international modest fashion scene, and have become even more important for many women, particularly after 9/11 (Abaza 2007, p. 288). The *Abaya*, most notably, has been growing in popularity as a fashion since the turn of the millennium. Many women cultivate an elegant and fashionable appearance in order to define themselves in opposition to the stereotypes (black) with which Islamic movements have been represented, and as a result, black and dark clothing has fallen out of fashion (Sandıkcı and Ger 2007, p. 203). Black headscarfs, often connected to pro-Iranian statements, are, in other contexts, more or less popular (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 161).

Bendixsen interprets this to mean that her interview partner's clothing selection is not purely dominated by either external influences nor personal taste. Instead, she says, the clothing is chosen in the context of Islamic fashion and multiculturalism in Berlin. It is, above all else, personal experience within, for example, a history of immigration, which influences the clothing biography (Bendixsen 2013, p. 279).

35 *Tessetür* means 'hijab' when translated, and refers to the fashion recently developed in Turkey.

5.3.1. Some examples

There is currently a Berlin style that is special inasmuch as that it combines different style elements. Even only ten years ago, a clear difference could be noted between Turkish and Arabic influences. Arabic influences could be identified via a cotton shawl, often a single colour, worn tight on the forehead, and women who incorporated Turkish style elements wore a sort of cap in the forward part of their patterned and quadratic silk headscarf, which in some cases was strengthened with a strip of plastic. Materials and patterns used for the headscarf were therefore quite different. This has changed, in particular, amongst the Muslim women who grew up in Germany. It has in part become difficult to determine a woman's background, or the things that influenced her development, at first glance.

This new way of combining style elements can be considered a style in and of itself. It is true that appearances differ between age groups and national influences, but there are patterns. Constants for this style are straight-cut jeans in the latest fashion, or other straight cut trousers, as can be seen in Image 5.4. Many women wear jeans and fashionable shoes, thigh-length jumpers or jackets, and a matching hijab which may have more body or sit quite tightly. The clothing is purchased, in part, on holidays in their parent's home country; other items are purchased in fashion chains such as *H&M*, *C&A* etc., and still other pieces are added that were purchased in special stores for religious clothing in order to achieve a specific colour combination (cf. Schulz 2007, p. 267). Wearing skirts or dresses over trousers has also become an established trend among non-Musliom women, which is for many Muslims proof that Muslim fashion certainly does have an influence on the fashions of the dominant German society (Maryam 2011; cf. also Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 154).

Muslim clothing, as has already been determined, has multiple levels of meaning and can vary greatly in its rigour (cf. Abaza 2007, p. 284). Regardless of how religious individual clothing appears to be, there are always references within it that provide information on other identity-forming elements, such as background or marital



Figure 5.3.: "Scarf Pals", ironic depiction of hijab decoration by Sofia Niazi Niazi (2006).

Figure 5.4.: Biker jacket over a knee-length black dress over jeans, combined with a golden silk hijab with decorations. Berlin, October 2012. Source: JK

Figure 5.5.: Green patterned maxi-dress with wide sleeves, combined with a matching dark green headscarf and black underscarf. Beside that, a somewhat tighter version with visible blue sleeves and trousers, including a matching hijab. Berlin, September 2013. Source: JK.

Figure 5.6.: Grey jeggings and a white jacket, with a red mini tube dress over them and a thick red scarf moving up to a black headscarf with a red underscarf. Berlin, September 2013. Source: JK.

status (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 136). These forms of expression within clothing have changed drastically over the last three decades (Abaza 2007, p. 288). These days, even leggings might be worn in combination with thigh-length coats, pullovers, shirts, etc. Head coverings usually consist of several layers of scarves, and one of the lower layers is strengthened with a plastic strip that frames the face like a cap and has a colour that contrasts with the upper layers. Usually, this cap layer references a colour from the rest of the clothing or from the accessories. In addition, the choice of shoes, combined with a matching handbag and accessories such as neckerchiefs or conspicuous necklaces, are striking characteristics of this new style. As already mentioned, this street fashion in particular appears to have become more important for the fashion industry over the last few years in terms of the ability to combine different elements (Lehnert 2013, pp. 59 sq.), and has been picked up by fashion magazines from every country, such as the magazine *Âlâ*, the first Turkish magazine for Islamic fashion.

There appear to be two opposing trends: Tarlo and Moors (2007, p. 135) note, on the one hand, a tendency towards diversifying the different styles, but on the other they observe a tendency towards homogenisation (ibid., p. 134). This observation matches my research: the homogenisation tendency appears to be a mix of styles occurring simultaneously with the establishment of a new style. In the following, I refer to this style as the "Berlin Style". And this style has a wide variety of variations, all complying with specific basic rules of modest Islamic clothing. These two tendencies, one towards homogenisation and one towards differentiation, can also be seen in the use of different labels for the same pieces of clothing, and vice versa (ibid., p. 136).

5.4. Some Fashion Developments Outside of Germany

How women integrate their interpretation of Islamic regulations into their clothing is influenced by their position within their own bio-

graphy, as well as their economic and professional status (Schulz 2007, p. 267). "Sartorial praxis differs based on age, level of education, status, occasion and location" (Moors 2007, p. 323). This quote from Annelies Moors, a pioneer in the area of research into Islamic fashion, shows that there is a great deal of variation in terms of what is considered acceptable Muslim clothing. Fashionable consumption of clothing is, as already mentioned multiple times, in no way restricted to the global west or secular societies. Throughout the world, including in Muslim majority countries, there are various types of fashionable consumption, even in places in which female clothing is subject to legal restrictions. Even in Saudi Arabia, fashion is not just a phenomenon which takes place below the outer clothing, as implied by movies such as *Sex and the City II*. Instead, the outer clothing itself, the materials, cuts and colours, are also subject to fashionable change. As part of this, individual pieces of clothing have, depending on the context, different meanings and create different echoes and resonances (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 135). While wearing the *Abaya* is actually legally required in Saudi Arabia, the same robe, for example in India and in Yemen, represents a welcome, fashionable and modern alternative to robes considered traditional. In other contexts, on the other hand, such as in Germany, the *Abaya* is the clothing of the Islamist other and is considered very religious (ibid., p. 135).

That which outsiders consider to be traditional clothing may be produced and introduced in very different locations: Moors provides the example of the straight-cut and colourfully patterned robe, the *Sitara*, which was imported from India to Yemen. Or the three-layered Yemeni face and head covering, the *Sharshaf*, which was originally introduced from Turkey in the 1960s (Moors 2007, p. 323). It is this mix of various types of styles, that is the coexistence of style elements which may be considered Islamic, western or traditional by the wearers, which makes Muslim fashion in all countries so interesting (cf. Abaza 2007, p. 288). At this point, I would like to provide some examples from fashion research on Muslim women. Research on Turkey was largely carried out by Sandıkcı and Ger (2007). Moors (2007) worked in Yemen, and in Egypt the research was done by Werner (1999) and

Abaza (2007).

5.4.1. Turkey

Over the past few years, young, educated and usually urban Turkish women have begun to discover the headscarf (Sandıkcı and Ger 2007, p. 192). This development can be traced to an accumulation of money in Turkey and the growing middle class - processes from which Islamic social classes have also profited. The Islamic bourgeoisie that has emerged has the characteristic of representing conservative values on the one hand, but following avant-garde consumer practices on the other (ibid., p. 192). This development has opened up new economic fields of activity in Turkey: the sale of Islamic consumer goods. The restructuring program for the Turkish economy, taking place at the same time, which aims at a liberalisation of the market, has in turn introduced Turkey to the global market.

Signs of this introduction include proliferation of international brands, growth of the advertising industry, new shopping opportunities and the development of an associated high spending and consumer oriented middle class (ibid., p. 192). However, this applies not just to the secular middle class, but also its Islamic equivalent. In line with capitalist logic, rural Islamic businesses in Turkey have developed into large companies, which then moved into the city, bringing along the owners and their families as consumers. This created an Islamic group of consumers that drew the attention of even the largest companies. Products with Islamic labels, for example toothpaste, were quickly developed (ibid., p. 194). In terms of fashion, this was expressed in the publication of the first Islamic fashion magazine in Turkey, the *Âlâ*, which for a time was also available in Germany. This development was seen as a threat to the social classes in Turkey that considered themselves secular, and the conflict played out mostly as a fight regarding the public visibility of the headscarf. This ended with a ban on religious symbols in public.

5.4.2. Egypt

In Egypt, the Islamic lifestyle is prominent above all in the educated classes. The new urban conservatism associates Islamic clothing with social success (Abaza 2007, p. 288). This "Subculture provides its own codes that connect to existing markers of social position, but modifies them, i.e. assigns new meanings to them" (Werner 1999, p. 250). This shows that the integration of various style elements is itself a phenomenon that is present in many Islamic countries. It seems as though the patterns are similar: a secular educated elite creates various types of styles in order to stage themselves as part of a class. Ambitious, partly Muslim classes adapt these styles and rework them for themselves. In a positive sense, they 'islamise' them.

My interview partner Khadischa described the latest hot trend in the Cairo fashion world as a type of headscarf wrap that used a great deal of fabric and was mockingly referred to by older women as "Krunb," which in English more or less means cabbage head. This is an obvious fashionable development, as at the beginning of my research, the Egyptian style was considered the headscarf tied at the neck combined with a turtleneck or raised collar, as can be seen in Image 5.8. The images are from one of Khadischa's trips to Egypt, and were taken at my request for use in this work as examples of Egyptian fashions.

5.4.3. Yemen as an example of full body coverage

So what is the situation like in countries in which women are legally required to wear certain clothing in public? Yemen, although not subject to laws in this regard, has fashions, just like Iran or Saudi Arabia, marked by long, black robes; these robes, when worn outside, are often judged as having a positive relationship to *Scharīʿa*, the legal foundation of these country's ideologies. Some women that I talked to, for this reason, never wear any black at all. However, these regional peculiarities are a long way from being clearly defined. As already

Figure 5.7.: Egyptian Krunb from 2012, from the front and the side. Source: Khadischa.



Figure 5.8.: Egyptian style after the turn of the millennium, the scarf is tied at the back of the neck and combined with a turtleneck or raised collar. Source: Khadischa.

stated, it is not the case that fashion in these countries takes place only below the outer clothing, as is often assumed. Annelies Moors, in her research on Yemen, proved that the outer clothing worn by women in Yemen is just as subject to fashion as outer clothing worn anywhere else. Not only that, Moors (2007, p. 329) described how, in Yemen not too long ago, young women anxiously awaited the point at which they were allowed to cover their faces, as this marked their transition into adulthood. At some point, however, students from the south of Yemen stopped doing this, and began to wear only the white *Hijab ʾIslāmi* instead. Removing a face covering in public exposed the women in Moor's research, living in a Muslim majority country, to much more scrutiny, as they were no longer able to simply disappear in the crowd. Which is why, these days, there is a trend in which some women cover their faces in public but remove this covering in situations in which they want their personality to shine (ibid., p. 333). The fashionable movements triggered by globalization did not just bring paisley and 'harem pants' or 'fisherman's pants' to Europe, they have subjected sartorial practices to complicated development processes, even in societies with clothing regulations or where the full-face veil is socially acceptable. For example, Moors (ibid., p. 324) names the *Sharshaf* as a robe that was imported from Turkey to Yemen in the 1960s and replaced the clothing there that had previously been considered traditional.[36] The *Sharshaf* is similar to a triangular cape - it is worn on the head and reaches down to the shoulders, and is combined with a variety of ankle length skirts and wide trousers, as well as a tight face covering. In Sana'a in the 70s, the maxi-skirt, imported from Beirut, was just as popular as it was everywhere else (ibid., p. 324). Starting in the late 1970s, families that either returned from holidays or from labour migration introduced the *Balto* (ibid., p. 325). This piece, available in many colours, promised 'fashionable modernity' and in addition was considered a halfway acceptable piece of clothing by conservative Islamists when worn loosely cut and at full length.

36 The Sitara, considered traditional up to that point, had been imported from India at the end of the 19th century. It is still worn today (Condra 2013, p. 767).

Only halfway, however, because in contrast to the *Sharshaf* it sits on the shoulders, and therefore reveals the shape of the body. The *Balto* is very similar to the *Abaya* and is worn together with a hijab and a *Niqāb*. Even though dressing in all black may seem very uniform at first glance, there is a huge variety available to modest fashion, because fabrics and their decoration varies widely: fabrics popular in one season may already be considered 'out' by the next (Moors 2007, p. 324). Shining satin, rough cotton and linen switch around just as much as embroidery and decorations on the sleeves and the hem.

5.5. Institutions

Aesthetic sensibilities, intended to evoke resonance in Muslim observers, have allowed an Islamic fashionscape to emerge (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 170). The associated industry reproduces a variety of ideas regarding cultural difference. They therefore play a large role in the identity production of their consumers. In Germany, this 'Islamic Consumptionscape' (Sandıkcı and Ger 2007, p. 203) cf. also Appadurai 1996) has until now existed only on a small scale, but it has development potential, as Muslims are the minority group most represented in the media.

When observing modest fashion within the framework of a global economy, it is particularly interesting to note when and how clothing is bought, who buys it, and in particular where it is bought. It is also interesting to note who designs the clothing pieces being produced, and who are the sellers and the consumers. When observing these structures, two things become obvious: first, ideas regarding western dominance in the fashion sector must be deconstructed. International fashion shows, fashion magazines and innovative designs are not a phenomenon of the global west. Second, fashion is institutionalized, and needs infrastructure and people to implement it. The following sections, therefore, provide brief information on some of these people.

5.5.1. Transnational retail

One important point of contact Muslims use for details on modest fashion are small retail businesses that, based specifically on the needs of Muslim consumers, make purchases from Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. These shops offer *Abayas*, evening gowns, tops and jackets, in particular long-sleeved shirts, long scarves, quadratic headscarfs and *Al-Amira* in many colours. The goods are, at least they were in the small shop in which I carried out my field research, selected personally by the employees and imported to Germany. The owner of the business purchased goods in Turkey, her employee in Egypt. Both combine their trips with family visits. The women in their families are essential sources when it comes to the latest fashions in the country in question (Khadischa 2011-12).

The newly imported clothing is then, after a sale to create space, simply hung next to the old goods on the rack, meaning that the shop often seems overcrowded. My interview partner Amina complained that, because of this practice, she had no idea which fashions were actually current. In general, she said, women wore a wild mix of fashions on the streets, as the older fashions are not taken off the shelves. In contrast to the countries where the goods are produced, where the tailors look to Milan, New York and London, copy the designs, and have them hanging in their shops quickly, she said, it took time before they made their way to Germany. Because trends in religious fashion are not brought to Germany via the large chain shops, but are often only available in specialised transnational retail stores, trends in Muslim fashion are often behind the times. The development of fashionable ideas in Berlin's Muslim community therefore takes other paths than that in dominant Muslim societies, and new fashion ideas take longer to spread.

5.5.2. Hijab-friendly hair salons

Analogue to wedding hairdressers, special headscarf hair designers have established businesses for themselves. They work in a separate part of their store and offer services for hijabis in addition to regular hair cutting services (Hurriya 2011). This development, in my opinion, has been possible above all in the global west, on the one hand because young women begin wearing the hijab quite early, and on the other because they prefer mixed-gender weddings. I will explore this thesis in more detail in Section 8.1.1.

5.5.3. Designers

In Chapter 4.4.1 on fashion, I already explored some of the fashion designers active in Muslim contexts. However, the intention was to discuss designers of Muslim fashion in this chapter. Modest fashions designed specifically for Muslims is designed and sold just like regular fashion, and quite successfully.[37] According to a study by the *French Fashion University "Esmod"* in Dubai, around 96 billion dollars is spent on Muslim fashion globally each year (Geiges 2014). The development of religious, well-off middle classes, who are becoming more visible in the cities of Turkey but also of Germany, has created a large market for fashionable but modest clothing in countries in which women can choose how they dress freely. However, most designers give countries with legal regulations regarding clothing for women a wide berth, as many of them, as already described above, consider themselves apolitical (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 135).

In Germany, in terms of fashion produced by and for Muslim women, the label *Styleislam* plays the largest role; it was founded in 2008 by Yeliz and Melih Kesmen (Herding 2013, p. 99). The designer couple produces everything from accessories to streetwear to bags, and sells them online. The hip-hop inspired designs with prints such

37 For information on the actors, cf. Chapter 5.5 on designers.

Figure 5.9.: Different *Abayas* with embroidery. Berlin, October 2012. Source: JK.

Figure 5.10.: Designer Sarah Elanany's advertising brochure Source: Sarah Elanany.

as “I love my Prophet” or “Terrorism is not a Religion” are intended above all to “support the community” but a quarter of the products are purchased by non-Muslims (N.N. 2012a). Small playful allusions to Muslim content, that are not immediately obvious to outsiders, are intended to provide a feeling of solidarity (Herding 2013, p. 109).

The only other Muslim fashion labels active in Europe and based in Germany, according to work by Maruta Herding (ibid., p. 106) are the smaller t-shirt production companies *Communi-T* and *Muslim Shirt*. In France, the label *Ünicité* produces streetwear, and the label *Zaynab* produces modest swimwear above and beyond the burkini. However, most of these fashion companies do not work transnationally. They do not expand, but rather remain within their country of origin (ibid., p. 120).

5.5.4. Blogs

Far more established than the relatively few designers are the Muslim fashion blogs, which are run by women from a variety of countries and greatly contributed to the development of an international Muslim fashion. Some of these blogs are run by designers. Fashion houses can no longer seriously sell fashion without a fashion blog; at least, that was the unanimous opinion of the experts at the conference “Mediating Modesty: Fashioning Faithful Bodies”, which took place in the summer of 2011 at the London College of Fashion. But of course there are also blogs run by consumers, who generally post photos of their latest purchases online to share with others interested in fashion, and discuss their outfit designs.

Just like forums, these blogs represent intra and interreligious discussion sessions for all three Abrahamic religions. On the internet it is possible to separate religious discussion regarding clothing from the male sphere, creating new forms of religious authority.

Some examples are *Eva Khurshids Blog*, *Haute Hijab* or *Artizara*. The latter, which went online in 2004, was one of the first sites for Muslim fashion. *Gutbetucht* is an example of a fashion blog

that is partially written in German. The Facebook Page "Hijab is my Diamond" from Sümeyye Coktan has become very famous in Germany among Muslim women. The author now has her own website; at some point during our discussion, most of the women I asked for a photograph advised me to take a look at it.

Blogs in English Here are a few blogs that are considered pioneers in the area of Islamic fashion. The list is not exhaustive.

- `http://www.hijabtrendz.com/`, last visited on 22 July 2013, one of the first blogs (2007) on the internet for Muslim fashion.
- `http://hanatajima.com/`, Tajima no longer produces fashion herself, but continues to blog about urban, Japanese-inspired hijab styles.
- `http://daysofdoll.com/`, last visited on 22 July 2013, became famous by offering alternatives to the burkini.

Blogs in German And of course a list of currently active fashion blogs from hijabis in German.

- `http://gutbetucht.blogspot.co.uk/`, last visited 22 July 2013, one of the few bilingual blogs (German and English).
- `http://hijabiblog.com/tag/hijab/`, last visited on 22 July 2013, one of a few active German blogs on Muslim fashion.
- `http://www.sumeyye.de/index.php/en/`, last visited 22 July 2013, the off-Facebook blog associated with "Hijab is my Diamond".
- `http://nour-iman.blogspot.de/`, last visited 22 July 2013.

5.5.5. Online retail

Some of the early bloggers now sell clothing online. The various internet shops use their text and images to emphasize their mission,

that is to prove that it is possible for Muslim men and women to wear modest clothing and recognize their own beauty. Many began selling fashion as a last resort, as they were simply unable to find appropriate clothing to wear and concluded that other women must have the same problem. The following list represents a selection of the shops that I noticed during the course of my research from 2011 to 2014, because they were linked from blogs or online articles.

- `http://www.barjis.co.uk`, last visited 17/10/2014.
- `http://sunnahstyle.com/`, last visited 17/10/2014.
- `http://www.shukronline.com/`, last visited 17/10/2014.
- `http://www.thehijabshop.com/`, last visited 17/10/2014.
- `http://www.sixteenr.com`, last visited 17/10/2014.

6. How the women interviewed position themselves

Of the many spontaneous interviews, as well as the six more extensive problem centred interviews that I carried out over my three years of research, I have selected four extensive interviews based on their thickness.[38] Here, these interviews will be used to provide, as an example, detailed representations of fashion motifs and clothing style motivations. The four women are all between 25 and 40 years of age and wear hijabi clothing, that is a headscarf and matching outfits. Two of them, Suraya and Amina, have migration experience themselves, and the other two, Maryam and Hurriya, have been ascribed this experience externally in the form of a 'migrant background'.

The following descriptions are not intended as a full clothing biography, or indeed as a complete description of Muslim fashion. Some interviews focused more on clothing biographies than others. Instead, this chapter serves to provide a more exact image of the individual interview partners. Over the course of this analysis chapter, I will discuss the theses outlined in the beginning of this book and corroborate them using interview quotes that have been selected from a series of similarly appropriate text passages.

The following initial section, however, is designed to fine-tune the thesis of this work. A failure to do this would make introducing

38 For specific information on the research situation, see the chapter on methodology and operationalisation

the interview partners difficult, as some of the required and precise concepts are not available in the English language. First, I would like to discuss a particularity in terms of differences in the definition of space. Sigrid Nökel noted, accurately:

> "If we follow the principle of space as a dominant social principle of classification, then an analysis of Muslim actors cannot begin with clothing [...], it must begin with space" (Nökel 2004, p. 296).

Finally, I introduce my interview partners and, after a short legal discourse, move on to the second part of this work to summarise the basic analytic results of my research as part of this thesis discussion.

6.1. The Subtle Differences: Public and Private Space in various Contexts

In the following section, I would like to draw attention to a phenomenon that I noticed as part of my research. However, it was a long time before I found an explanation for this phenomenon, as I did not have access to the right concepts or even the right descriptive words, and it was not immediately explained either by my interview partners or the relevant literature. It is true that Ludwig Ammann (2004) has already written extensively on the topic. However, he does not apply his findings to clothing or the complexity created when a Muslim woman migrates to "the West", meaning that his descriptions remain on a more theoretical level.

Cordula Bachmann describes two types of clothing systems in her dissertation: the binary system and the affective-chaotic system. The former, mostly men in her study, separate their own closet into two spatial spheres, often: "is suitable to wear in public" and "is not suitable to wear in public", that is clothing assigned to the private or public spheres. Here, the initial decision when selecting clothing entails a chain of restrictions and follow-up decisions,

> "...without the person getting dressed having to think too much. The clothing is set: a specific pair of pants is matched to a specific jacket, specific shoes, etc. [...] All pieces of clothing in this clothing style can, in principle, be combined with one another, so there is [...] no need for further thought" (Bachmann 2008, p. 67).

While Bachmann, who is examining clothing and gender, relates and analyses this binary system above all as applying to men, stating that it is connected to the two positive role models available to men within cultural discourse, I have been able to observe this split independent of gender. It is not just men that are not particularly interested in fashion and the consumption of fashion that systematise their clothing choices in accordance with this schema, but also some of the women I interviewed. This means that the spatial sphere of the decision for a particular outfit is more dominant than the occasion, which in turn is more dominant than personal feelings.

In the chaotic system, on the other hand, according to Bachmann, selection of clothing is dependent on the current dominant mood and sense of style. This type chooses anew each day from a large selection of items which often do not match, based on how they feel on the day in question. The clothing situation is such that each piece of clothing could, potentially, be combined with other pieces of clothing, but they often do not match (ibid., p. 71). This basic assumption of the two types of people separated by a difference of interest in fashion and fashionable clothing was a constant companion throughout my research and the writing of this paper, and is to be used repeatedly within the framework of this analysis.

Although I thought I recognised my interview partner Amina's clothing as belonging within the binary system as described by Bachmann Bachmann (ibid., p. 67), I was unable to explain the *binary* in her clothing choices. In doing so, I was hindered by the categories I was attempting to use to sort clothing choices for Muslim women. In general, this behaviour is described even by Muslim women themselves as covering up in public but not at home. But Amina's clothing selection, in particular, did not match this statement, as Amina does in fact wear very revealing clothing to some public events, even doing

her hair and using lots of make-up. However, these are events at which only women are present. And yet, some men are allowed to be present in private moments, while the presence of others changes private space to public.

I remembered that I had written, in my Master's program, about the conceptual difference between private and public space in Germany and Syria. I emphasise this at this moment because it became clear to me, as I tried to sort through the facts regarding Amina's clothing choices, that I had not understood the principle difference in the division of space between western and Islamic societies, as described in my Master's thesis, until I attempted to make sense of my interviews with Amina. Even though I had described the differences in division of space correctly, it was only as part of researching this project that I clearly understood the ramifications. And the ramifications are that it is simply incorrect to state that Muslim women only cover themselves in public and do not cover themselves in private. As fashion is closely connected to spatial analysis, it is very important that I make this discovery clear.

The Q'uran is very precise in describing those males that Muslim females do not have to cover themselves in front of; these are those persons, who, according to the law, cannot marry the woman in question. That is, her own sons, and the sons and daughters of her husband from other marriages. Similarly, the woman's husband's father cannot marry her, and therefore it is ok for her to show herself to him without the hijab. It is also, of course, possible for her to go without the hijab in front of those directly related to her, such as her own brothers, father, and grandfathers, as well as all children that have not yet reached puberty. For a time, for lack of a better term for these groups, I used the word '*Haram*'[39], and for all others the term: "Men, who do not belong to their own *Mahram*"[40], however both

39 The terms *haram* and *halal* define those things that are ritually forbidden and allowed. In Judaism, the equivalent words are *kosher* and *trefe*. Also see glossary.

40 *Mahram* is the Arabic participle to *harama* (forbid). It means 'forbidden' or perhaps 'tabu'.

terms seemed unwieldy. It soon became clear that a better term was required as part of spatial analysis of Amina's fashion, or at least a word that is used in practice. I first asked a few people spontaneously. I trusted them to give an appropriate answer based on the fact that they themselves were hijab wearers.

These were young women that appeared to have undergone socialisation in Germany but were speaking to each other in Turkish. From this discussion I learned that amongst themselves they had a very strong separation between public and private spaces as defined in the western world, and that they would not even take off their hijabs for a bride's henna night. I also learned that in Germany, at least among Turkish speaking women, there was no existing term for the group of people for which one had to cover oneself. I therefore began a survey on the social media platform Facebook, in which I asked my Muslim friends from around the world to help me find the word I was looking for. I explained I was in the middle of writing my thesis and wanted a quick solution for the problem. However, the answers to my question were so enlightening that I feel it is important here, unlike in other sections, to present the background information in full, as it was extremely informative. My question was:

> "In German you have two spaces, the private and the public. But what do I call the women's-section at a wedding? It's obviously the public, but make-up and hair and dresses and everything can be seen, so how do you descibe that space in a concept... Or what do I call it, when my male friend visits me at home? '*Mahram*' then seems not very fitting anymore..."

A friend from South Africa, who I got to know in Syria and who had since married a man from Australia, suggested a word commonly used in English speaking countries, '*Mahrams*', but the word applied, for her, not just to the space, but instead to an entire group of people. She was therefore able to replace my inelegant word with one that was actually in use.

> "You can perhaps say '... wears whatever she wants amongst other ladies and in the home but prefers hijab when going out and amongst non *mahrams*'"

When I asked if this was a common term, others also confirmed that they had already encountered the word. But then other women answered and provided much more precise answers than I had expected to get from my rather open question.

Another woman, whose biography I do not know, as I have never met her in person, suggested:

> "I guess I would call it a women's only space. Which can be both private or public. All of our weddings are segregated and we use terms such as 'the women's wedding'"

This suggests a completely different way of thinking about public space than that used in a western context. There are terms such as "women's party" that indicate a separate area reserved only for women.

A third woman took a similar position:

> "I am struggling a bit on how to answer the question but I'll break it down in two sections. I will give you an answer as a Saudi woman from Saudi, then I will give you the answer as a Muslim living in the UK. The perception of the space in Saudi Arabia in my opinion is gender based. What I mean by that, is that the majority of spaces are known as women sections and men sections. So, most of the facilities are segregated. We have schools for girls and schools for boys (this includes public and private schools but may not apply on international schools). Universities for example, have female sections and male sections (basically, the buildings are located on the same land but the campuses are totally separated, so I've never seen my male classmates). However, public spaces in Saudi Arabia are the spaces where men and women are at the same location. For example, hospitals, shopping malls, restaurants, the Holy mosque in Makkah, fun fairs, the beach or even public parks. Based on that, you could say that women in Saudi follow the dress code in public places as I identified it previously. And they don't follow the dress code at 'women sections'. However, my sense of space has changed since I came to the UK. I consider all spaces as public. But what I consider to be private is: my home, or if I was in a 'female only' facilities or places such as toilets, changing rooms at gyms. Regarding your question on 'male friend' visit, basically since I have never had a male friend in Saudi I don't think that I can answer your question because I don't know. But here in the UK my male friends never

> visited me, but I mingle with them in public places like restaurants or coffee shops or social gatherings. And if they ever visited, then it is a visit."

This quote makes it obvious that the writer clearly perceives space differently in the context of Saudi Arabia or the UK. She defines four spatial spheres: private and semi-private visits at home, women's public spaces (and therefore also men's public spaces) and the open public. The semi-private sphere at home, however, clearly does not exist in her reality, as she is not yet married and as an unmarried woman it is not proper to invite men or a mixed gender group into her private space.[41] She only spoke of this possibility in response to my questions.

This description of the four spheres appears to fit well with my interview partners Amina and Suraya, who were both socialised within a dominant Muslim society. I therefore conclude that women in countries with a dominant Muslim society usually experience this society as divided into four spheres. As part of migration, the fact is that these four categories shrink to just two. The majority is public space, and only a very small portion is the space reserved for women, including personal, private space. My interview partners Hurriya and Maryam described, in turn, completely different behaviour when it came to clothing, which corresponds with the two-dimensional perception of space as expressed in the western ideas of separation into private sphere and public space. This can be used to explain the statements made by the Turkish-speaking women above when I asked them to explain this observation. In fact, they were perplexed

41 One experience that left a mark in Syria was breaking the Ramadan fast each evening in a group (August 2008) with male and female students from various friendship groups brought together by the members of a female shared apartment. People from various Muslim and non-Muslim societies, with a variety of religions, were sitting together in an informal atmosphere, eating and praying, when a neighbour rang the bell to complain about the mixed gender meeting in the building, and demanded that the men present leave the apartment immediately. This demand was met with incomprehension, particularly from those Muslims (male and female) who came from non-Muslim countries.

by the assertion of public space divided into four parts, and even more perplexed when I stated that my interview partner Amina would wear a half see-through outfit to a women's party. One asked the other if she would take off her headscarf in a women's space such as the Henna evening, and the other reacted with a dumbfounded look and clicked her tongue, representing the clearest form of denial. Klinkhammer (2000, p. 276) described this behaviour as a mark of distinction amongst the women: as a sign of 'true Islam', these women would keep the headscarf on even when amongst other Muslim women. I agree in part with this explanation, however my investigation shows that distinction is not the only reason for this behaviour. There are, for example, simple styles in which the hijab is put on in the morning and fixed in such a way that there is no need to remove it until the woman returns home in the evening (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 169). That is, the hijab is part of the outfit, as shoes might be to other women. To take off the shoes would ruin the look, and the same is true for the hijab. It is important to remember that hijab layers are complex, and the hair underneath the scarf is not done up in any way.

The last comment I want to quote here provided even more clarification on the differences regarding perception of space:

> "I'd happily call the wedding environment the private space. It is private, not everyone can attend it, they are invited guests and the woman takes her hijab off knowing that the people present and the venue will conform to her religious needs. It is not too dissimilar to the conditions present when she is in her home, where she takes her hijab off because once again, she has the security and assurance knowing that the venue conforms to her needs, and the people entering the home are eligible to see her without her hijab. I would not associate a wedding with the term public when it is segregated, and clearly not open to anyone from the public but select people."

For those women I quoted, space separated by gender is partially considered private space, and partially public space reserved for women. The third woman's statement indicates, in addition, that getting to know the western division of space had significantly reduced the perception of women's spaces as private spaces, as she does not talk about women's spaces as private but instead notes, much more

clearly than the fourth woman, the existence of public women's spaces, whereas the fourth commentator is able to call women's public spaces private. The main difference between the various contexts such as Germany or Saudi Arabia appears to be the trust mentioned by the fourth woman. This trust refers to the fact that in certain environments, the need for a Muslim woman to cover up is respected by specific groups of people.

However, even in clearly public spaces, the social interaction between men and women is very different in societies influenced by Islam. My interview partner Hurriya, who grew up in Germany, experienced this treatment of women in Abu Dhabi not as restrictive, but in fact as respectful.

> [Hu:] "You know, it was so hard to come back to Germany. 'Oh no, not again.' You know, the men there really treat the women with such respect. If you are in a lift and a man wants to get in, he'll just take the next lift instead of getting in with you. And it doesn't matter where you are, in a bank, in a business or in the government offices, there is always a line for the women and one for men, so that the women don't feel cornered. Or if there isn't a line for women, the women always get to go first, doesn't matter how long the line is, you get to go first" (Hurriya 2011, Line 660)

The considerations regarding the structure of space to this point provide information on another observation I was able to make over the course of my research. While Amina and many other women I knew from Syria and other contexts who grew up in a dominant Muslim society sorted their clothing based on event, regardless of whether they chose their clothing in a binary manner or more chaotically, Muslim women socialised in Germany in a minority situation appeared to follow a different method when choosing clothing. As there is no reliable separation of space into public space and public women's space, but instead only one type of public space, many women choose their clothing in such a way that it will reliably get them through the day and the many different situations they will face. Even in different spaces, they do not change their clothing style, for example by taking off the headscarf or something similar, as they cannot be certain that all people present have the same ideas regarding the structure of the

space. It is only at home that they can be certain that the space is private, and thus only at home do they choose clothing as desired without having to select additional covering. They do have special festive clothing for particularly celebratory events such as weddings, but this clothing is just as 'Islamised' as their day to day clothing, a word introduced by the interview partners themselves. It means to further develop a piece of clothing purchased at the store using long-sleeved shirts, long tops, turtle necks, underscarfs and other covering clothing, that is to transform basic western clothing into clothing suitable for Islamic wearers.

> [Ma:] "But of course you islamised it [the clothing]. [...] Maybe you would wear it without sleeves, and I wear a long sleeve shirt underneath it. Or maybe you might wear it without trousers, but I wear trousers under it[...] if I like it, I buy it, but I try..." *[J:] "...to islamise it?"* [Ma:] "Yes, exactly, to islamise it, I really do."[42]

This part of clothing depends on trends. For example, in Libya, fake lace sleeves were all the rage for a time. These are wrist-warmers with and without lace. Women could either purchase them here in Germany for a lot of money in translocal small businesses, or, as an alternative, create them out of old stockings.[43] The other individual extra clothing pieces are also either imported when returning from holidays, home made from other pieces of clothing, or purchased at markets and in small translocal businesses. It is rare that these pieces of clothing are purchased from 'western' stores, as they can still be bought for less from translocal small businesses. For the most part, 'fake lace sleeves' could not be found anywhere else. If they are available at all, then only as wrist or arm warmers that do not match the fashionable or practical needs of Muslim women.

It is therefore necessary to change one's views in order to describe the clothing situation of Muslim women. Within German society, from the beginnings of the middle class onwards, most people have divided space into two spheres, that is the public and private spheres

42 Maryam 2011, Line 1230-40.
43 Suraya 2011-14, Line 195.

(e.g. in Habermas 1990 [1962], p. 54). Of course there are grey areas in between, but as these are not often mentioned, the following consideration focuses on just these two. In some Islamic societies the space, as demonstrated, is structured differently. You could even say that an additional dimension is added: on top of the two spheres named above, there is also the semi-public space, such as a women's wedding, which belongs to people of the same gender, and the semi-private space, which is indeed private and not accessible to everyone but in which "non-*Mahrams*"[44] might be present, e.g. when visiting another's house or when receiving guests. The description of Amina's wardrobe will now make clear what this division of space into four means in a practical sense.

6.2. Amina: Pragmatics, not Fashion

Amina was born in Syria, more specifically in Aleppo. After studying pharmacy, she began work in a pharmacy, which is where she met her husband. She followed him to Germany for his PhD, where her children first went to kindergarten and then to school.[45] Amina is in her early thirties and currently a house wife. Her husband, on completion of his dissertation, was unable to find work in Germany even after a great deal of searching, and so the family moved to Saudi Arabia, as a return to Syria and Aleppo appeared impossible.[46] One of the most important questions I asked Amina concerned the role of fashion in her life.

> [Am:] "For my part, I don't like ordinary things. But I also don't buy every new fashion that comes along. But there are plenty [of people], who, when a new fashion comes out, go quickly to buy it.

44 This is a well-known term in British colloquial English spoken by Muslims, but there appears to be no similar term for the concept in German or Turkish.

45 I got to know Amina at this kindergarten and asked her for an interview.

46 From 2012 to the time of the interviews in this work (mid 2013), there was a civil war in Syria and in particular in Amina's home city of Aleppo.

> Right? For my part, I don't like that" (Amina 2011-10, Line 255). [...] "I prefer a normal hijab. There are so many out there, and everything can be fashionable, but I don't participate in that" (ibid., Line 175). *[J:] "What does normal mean?"* [Am:] "That there isn't anything extra on it, or anything. Sometimes they have a flower, or it's braided or twisted, sometimes they're really tight, like really tight around the neck or [the material] doesn't go to your chin, those are all extras that aren't good, I think. They just aren't me, you see..." (ibid., Line 180)[47]

Amina does not acknowledge fashion as a big part of her life. She does have and maintain a certain style, but she does not follow fashion trends in her day to day life. However, this only applies to her day to day life, as we will see.

In private at home, Amina likes to wear comfortable pyjamas. However, she only considers these to be suitable if she is alone, with her family, or with other women. For informal or private events in semi-private space in which non-Mahrams are present, e.g. at her own house or with others, she has another set of clothing that fully covers her body with the exception of her hands and her face. Her clothing style for this semi-private 'non-*Mahrams*' space is, in particular, marked by clothing that completely covers her body and is not tight enough to emphasize her figure. In regards to private and semi-private clothing, she particularly notes a difference between practical clothing for everyday life and nice clothing for socialising, e.g. *Abayas*.

> *[J:]"Do you love this Abaya?"* [Am:] "Yes!" *[J:] "Why?"* [Am:] "If we have men here, as guests, then I can just throw it on." *[J:] "What exactly do you like about this Abaya?"* [Am:] "The colour and the embroidery sculpture" (ibid., Line 305).

However, she cannot wear *Abayas* for housework; they are too long, uncomfortable and stiff. Which is why, at home, Amina prefers pyjamas or trousers, which is what she wore during our interview (ibid., Line 315).

47 Translation from the Arabic by the author, and from the German by the translator.

On the street, Amina wears a coat with a white headscarf typical for Syria. These coats, known as *Jalabiya* in Lebanon and *Manto* in Syria, are what she prefers to wear for daily life in open public spaces, for example when going shopping or to the kindergarten. The coat allows her to wear trousers outside, which she would otherwise only find appropriate at home. These coats are definitely fashionable. Amina divides them into those that have a classic cut and those that show a more fashionable cut.

> *[Ju:] "What about that is fashion? What is the difference between a classic coat and a fashionable one like this one?"* [Am:] "The collar is open. And this part here is not... And the fabric is very light, and there is no lining and no buttons" (ibid., Line 285).

Amina is mostly practical when it comes to choosing colours for everyday wear.

> [Am:] "For example, I always wear jeans, or brown or black trousers. I wear jeans a lot. Jeans or black pants match every other colour" (ibid., Line 130).

In addition, she prefers the colour purple. She does not wear darker colours because she finds them inherently more attractive, but rather because otherwise she would have to wash the coats every time she wears them, as they get dirty on the playground with the children. She also does not wear floor-length coats, but only ankle-length, meaning they do not sweep up dirt or trip her (ibid., Line 50).

> [Am:] "The colours that I like include mostly dark colours, of course. I bought a beige one from the store, but its just not practical with the kids, because every time I go out wearing it it gets dirty. And then I have to wash it. (We laugh) Every time I go out I have to wash it, but with the darker colours, they don't show dirt as much. [...] And on top of that, the coat can't be too long, because sometimes there is dirt on the steps or it's easy to trip over. Plus it gets very dirty when it is so long. That's why it's better for it to be a bit shorter. Not a lot shorter, just the right length" (ibid., Line 50).

However, the colours have to match her sense of colour:

Figure 6.1.: Dress/*Abaya* belonging to Amina. Berlin, 2012. Source: JK.

Figure 6.2.: One of Amina's fashionable coats. To the lower right, as a comparison, a 'classic' sleeve together with the sleeve of the 'fashionable' coat. To the right a winter coat in a store. Berlin, 2012. Source: JK

> [Am:] "Coat and hijab have to match, that is have the same colours or close enough. And the bag and shoes as well" (Amina 2011-10, Line 125).

For formal events in semi-private spaces, Amina also has outfits or particularly festive *Abayas* and other clothing that cover her completely, as she wants them to. For example, she owns an outfit with a jacket and long skirt made of grey wool (ibid., Line 345).

In formal and semi-private spaces, such as the women's section of a large wedding, Amina wears clothing that is appropriately fashionable for the occasion. As this is a purely female space, these clothes can be very revealing (ibid., Line 360). The women wear coats, *Abayas* and shawls over this clothing, which hides their finery from unbidden glances on the way to the celebration. Suraya, who comes from Libya, also told me about this custom. She said participants would wear a *Jilbāb*, which is sometimes more or less transparent. But as soon as they enter the event location, they take off their head scarves. According to her, this is an event in Libya to which every single woman wears a *Jilbāb*. Not only that, if they are wearing a lot of make-up, they also wear a *Khimār*, which covers their face (Suraya 2011-14, Line 375).

This is why Amina's photos of her own wedding include very informative pictures that provide information on the degree of relation between the women present. While Amina was photographed together with her husband in a white dress and with all her jewellery, only her husband's sisters and mother can be seen in similar festive finery. The other guests put on their outerwear and hold their veils in front of their faces for the photo, and then take them off again when the husband leaves the women's part of the party (Amina 2011-10, Line 365).

Amina owns special wedding clothing for when she is invited to a celebration in a woman-only space, but this clothing seems to go out of fashion quickly. The dresses she showed me are mostly out of transparent fabric embroidered with beads (ibid., Line 365). I find these elaborate outfits, which Amina wears together with plenty of make-up, particularly noteworthy, as I see them in sharp contrast to

Figure 6.3.: Amina's grey woolen outfit. Berlin, 2012. Source: JK.

Figure 6.4.: Wedding outfit for a public women's space, suitable even for otherwise very modestly clothed Muslim women. Berlin, 2012. Source: JK.

Amina's other clothing. One in particular I found to be extremely revealing. It was only after contextualising the dress in the division of space into four categories that I was able to explain it: it is intended to be worn to the women's part of a wedding. The dress itself is a coral coloured two-piece dress. The top section consists of finished gauze, that is fine, semi-transparent woven fabric which is decorated with elaborate beading in a fragmented pattern. The skirt is reminiscent of a flamenco skirt. Her husband had brought it back for her from Syria, as he was there once for a visit without her.

> [Am:] "This is from Syria. My husband went there once and brought it back for me, I didn't buy it. My husband bought it, it was a present for me." *[J:] "That is a beautiful piece, what do you wear under it?"* [Am:] "Just a bra. I don't have many things that are appropriate for here. In Syria I have lots of things, but not here"(Amina 2011-10, Line 355-375).

In a specific spatial sphere, therefore, Amina thinks her party clothes are appropriate. Amina reports on her missing clothing with regret, saying she had to leave a lot behind when she migrated. If she has to attend a wedding in Germany, she is not able to use clothing from her own wardrobe. It is important to her to be dressed appropriately for the occasion, which is hardly possible with 20 kilos of luggage per flight over several years. As part of the conversation on her wedding clothes, Amina's sense of fashion becomes clear.

> *[J:] "And all the women at the event wear fantastic clothes and so on? And lots of make-up?"* [Am:] "Of course! [...] But this here is old. I bought it three years ago. If I went anywhere with it now, everyone would think it was old. It's old fashion. I couldn't wear it." *[J:] "Everything here is old, is that right? The materials, the embroidery, all* out*? So what is* in *now?"* [Am:] "I don't know. I have no idea until I go back to Aleppo." *[J:] "Oh. But this is so pretty."* [Am:] "Yes, it is! And nice, but they'd say it's *out.* I don't know what I should do with it, because it's out of fashion" (ibid., Line 355-375).

Evidently, Amina is more conformist when it comes to this clothing, as she wears what society considers appropriate. The fashion that Amina

wears to celebratory events, it seems, does not follow her own ideas of aesthetic patterns, but rather largely serves a social purpose. She wears fashionable clothing to celebrations, but not primarily because she enjoys the variability of fashion, as can be seen from her first quote, but rather because she would otherwise be confronted with derogatory comments by others. That is to say, she follows fashion as the ability to dress herself in the latest fashion represents a cultural opportunity to gain recognition from others and perhaps confirm her own role within the group hierarchy. I will return to these ideas in Chapter 9.1.

Even in regards to her own wedding, it appeared to be primarily other people who influenced Amina's clothing in accordance with their own tastes. Amina said that she herself would have preferred a simple hairdo for her wedding, but she was told quite clearly that her critics, for example her husband's family or her own sister, had hoped for a 'more appealing' hair style (Amina 2011-10, Line 480-495). In the pictures, as a result, she has a complicated up-do with a great deal of ornamentation.[48]

Nevertheless, it would be too simple to ascribe Amina's clothing selection to purely external influences. Amina told me, for example, that her husband does not like certain pieces of clothing, but she wears them anyway because she likes them. For example, she prefers a certain coat even though the clothing beneath it stands out. She simply wears the coat when he is not around (ibid., Line 300). I was unable to determine whether this is with or without his approval, and whether it is a subversive act.

Nonetheless, Amina made it clear that even though she follows fashion in semi-public spaces based on what she considers the acceptable social norms, particularly at celebrations, she does not like the ideas behind fashion, consumption, and 'dressing provocatively' (ibid., Line 175). She criticized certain developments in fashion as not good for herself.

48 However, Amina does go to the hairdresser, even in Germany. These are special hairdressers that offer their customers a women-only space. In her wedding photos, for example, Amina has blond highlights.

> [Am:] "Yes. When I was at university, around 10 years ago, that type of clothing didn't exist. But I don't like it, I don't think that type of clothing is good. I mean, you could wear it at home, but I don't think you should go out in it" (ibid., Line 590) [...] "But lots of women do wear it. Maybe they just dress based on their mood"(ibid., Line 185).

Amina, on the other hand, does not dress based on her mood, but rather selects clothing based strictly on event and spatial sphere. This does not mean, however, that Amina thinks only her coat is Muslim fashion; in fact, the opposite is true. She is certainly able to view the various clothing styles of Muslim women without immediately questioning their religious dedication.

> *[J:] "Is there a Muslim fashion?"* [Am:] "Yes, there are lots. Particularly in Egypt or Lebanon, there is lots of fashionable clothing, and the cut of the clothing is fashionable, but it is Muslim clothing. It doesn't have to be a coat. Shirt and pants, or maybe [...] There are lots of types of Islamic clothing, the majority of Muslim women wear pants and then a shirt or blouse, maybe a short jacket. Or something similar. Or an Abaya" (ibid., Line 150).

6.2.1. Putting on the head scarf for the first time

Amina began wearing a headscarf under the influence of her family, and explained that at the time (she was 14 and entering grade eight) she did not yet feel ready to wear the Hijab.

> "To be honest, at that time I didn't want to wear any hijab at all. [...] Maybe because I wasn't used to it and felt uncomfortable in it. At the beginning I didn't like it, I didn't understand what it meant at all, I couldn't get it. But after a time, when you get older, then I understood. After a while, when you grow up, then you understand why you have to wear it" (ibid., Line 540-545).

As Amina did not experience a fracture, a change in her biography or important event that caused her to start wearing the headscarf, she did not change her other clothing at all. She reported that she

did replace her t-shirts with long-sleeved shirts, but apart from that she wore the things she had preferred to wear before (Amina 2011-10, Line 555). The fracture in Amina's clothing biography did not come until she decided to wear a coat, after finishing her pharmaceutical studies.

> "When did I first wear a coat? Around the time I finished studying at university and began to work in the pharmacy. First I finished my degree at university, and then I found work at the pharmacy. Before that I wore pants with a jacket or a blouse" (ibid., Line 60-75).

Although she did not decide on her own to wear the headscarf, the switch to wearing a coat was her choice alone, made, as she said, for religious reasons:

> "In Islam, Muslim women are supposed to cover their body. [Clothes] are not supposed to be tight on the body, they are only supposed to hint at the body" (ibid., Line 85).

In contrast, the move to Germany did not change anything for Amina, she made no changes to her make-up or her clothing.

> *[J:] "When it comes to clothing, did anything change for you before or after you came to Germany?"* [Am:] "For myself? No, everything stayed the same" (ibid., Line 585).

I can only confirm this when observing her clothing selection, as Amina dresses exactly like the women I was able to observe in Damascus (see image 6.5). She has not changed her clothing to suit the environment, the way, for example, Suraya did in Germany or Hurriya did in Abu Dhabi. This observation supports the idea that changing one's clothing style as part of a migration requires a certain basic interest in fashion, and if there is no interest, a person sticks with their original dress code. Even considering the fact that Amina gets stared at in Germany has not made her change her basic dress code. Instead, she simply got used to it.

> "No, there was no big difference, but when I first got here most people looked a bit [at my clothing] as if it was very foreign, but after a while I just got used to it" (ibid., Line 520).

Perhaps, however, there is another aspect which prevents Amina from changing her clothing. I describe this aspect in chapter 8.3. According to the reflections in that chapter, Amina's coats already represent the 'best' form of Islamic clothing, and there is therefore no reason for her to change them. If she changes her basic dress code, then she does so for pragmatic reasons in the winter: this interesting point on the subject became clear to me in a conversation with Amina as we talked about her coats. I had previously thought that clothing must be simpler for Muslim women in winter than in summer, as everyone chooses long, wide clothing in winter, but I discovered that it was just as difficult, if not more difficult. Clothing has to be found that is suitable both for semi-private indoor areas and for public outdoor areas. For example, a woman who prefers to wear a coat and generally does not take it off when indoors will be faced with the issue that winter coats are very warm and can hardly be left on in Germany's well-heated indoor spaces. While in summer these women are able to wear lightweight clothing under an unlined summer coat, which is created for them and is very practical, because it can be simply thrown over what they are already wearing, this is not possible in winter. In semi-private contexts, where she does not want to wear the clothing she usually wears in private, Amina solves the problem as follows: if she visits a location in winter in which non-*Mahram* men are present, she wears long skirts instead of the pants or fitted clothing that she would usually prefer (ibid., Line 105). Here, then, she uses similar strategies to those women that grew up in a non-Muslim dominant society.[49]

6.2.2. Classification

Amina has a very pragmatically oriented system for selecting clothing. However, in wearing a coat and headscarf she wears clothing that

49 This problem, by the way, was not an issue in Syria, as the rooms there are rarely heated, but it can get just as cold as it does in Germany.

matches almost every situation in her daily life, even though this clothing does not otherwise match Muslim fashion in Germany. Her moods and feelings are not a high priority when choosing her clothing for the day. In fact, she rejects the idea of choosing her own clothing based on her feelings. According to Bachmann (2008), then, Amina's clothing has a double binary structure, more or less divided by four.

As a result, Amina divides her clothing based on two criteria: on the one hand she differentiates based on spatial sphere, i.e. whether the event is taking place in a private, semi-private/public or a semi-public space. The second criteria Amina uses to select her clothing is the occasion. Thus, in private and semi-private/public day to day situations, she wears clothing suitable for everyday life, such as trousers, tracksuits and a coat, but she has special outfits for special events that are in fact in line with fashion (Amina 2011-10, Line 340-350)

Her clothing is organised in such a way that a strict separation between private and semi-private/public space is possible without complications: at home she wears comfortable clothing such as tracksuits, jeans and shirts. She simply has to throw a coat over the outfit to go outside and she is fully dressed. She likes her elaborate *Abayas* or dresses with a similar cut for the same reason; these are clothes that are easy to wear and represent a complete outfit, but also allow her to appear well-dressed.

Amina seems to have no need or perhaps no opportunity to make her broad selection of available clothing useful in her situation as an immigrant to Germany. Her lack of basic interest in popular fashion, in my opinion, led to her limiting her clothing behaviour in particular to the coat. As a general rule, she is reduced to wearing clothes for purely public or purely private spaces, she does not really mix the two. When young women declare that their mother is not interested in fashion, it would be interesting to know whether they truly are not interested, or whether they were simply never able to adjust to the reduction to two spatial spheres.

6.3. Maryam: Pragmatics, not Fashion II

Maryam was born in Germany, the child of Lebanese immigrants. She is a married woman in her mid-twenties with two small children, and studied English and American studies at a university in Berlin (Maryam 2011, Line 355). She had already begun working in embassies as a translator during her degree (ibid., Line 375-380). For a time, she was active in a mosque community and studied Tajweed with the others, that is the correct way to pronounce the Arabic in the Q'uran (ibid., Line 1125). At several points during the interview, it was clear that she is considered the most religiously educated person in her family. Her fashion style, she said, is boring, but very important to her. She said she finds it very important to look pretty and well-dressed.

> *[J:]"How important is fashion in your life?"* [Ma:] "Very important. I mean, I don't go overboard, I mean I don't have thousands of handbags and thousands of... [shoes]. [...] I really like to look nice when I go out, well-dressed you know, so that I feel good in the clothes I put on and that they look good. But like I said, I don't really go overboard." *[J:] "But your headscarf and top have to match?"* [Ma:] "Everything has to match. The pants have to match, the top has to match." *[J:] "Shoes, bag..."* [Ma:] "Shoes, bag, yes. I sometimes... For example: purple is my favourite colour, I have a purple handbag, purple shoes that match, then a purple headscarf, it looks very elegant. I also think it's nice, I mean, we women who wear hijab are alive too, we have taste and so on. There are some really nice things" (ibid., Line 405, 435, 500).

However, she takes care that her top reaches, at the very least, her upper thighs and is not too tight, that is the shape of her body is not obviously visible in it.

> *[J:] "If I could try to summarise it, you are trying to find a balance between fashionable clothing and religious clothing."* [Ma:] "Of course. And for myself, that is, it is important to me that it looks good, that I like it, but also that I..." *[J:] "...feel decently dressed?"* [Ma:] "Yes. So that it really isn't too tight anywhere, or that no-one can see what they aren't supposed to see. I mean, I definitely pay attention to that. And if not, then there is going to be someone who will tell me about it." *[J:] "Is that why your scarf is so wide? So that your*

Figure 6.5.: 'Fashionable' and 'classic' coat and white hijab. Damaskus 2009. Source: JK.

Figure 6.6.: Young women with islamised, that is modified 'western' fashion. Berlin, 2013. Source: JK.

> *shoulders are covered?"* [Ma:] "Not necessarily, but if the top is a little tighter, than I make sure that it is covered a little in front" (Maryam 2011, Line 1390).

She actively tries to balance fashionable and religiously correct clothing, as in her own mind she then becomes a role-model for others.

> "So for me, it is really important when it comes to fashion, especially if I wear a headscarf and so on, mostly that it's long, that is the top shouldn't be too tight. It should look good and I want to encourage other people. That is, those people who always think you know, women with a headscarf, they always walk around as if they were wearing a potato sack, I want to show them: that's not true. [...] And like I say, it is really important that I look well dressed. That's also to make a statement: 'Everyone, a headscarf doesn't have to not look good!'" (ibid., Line 405, 500).

She does not restrict herself to a specific style which she would want to give a name, but rather has found her own way of dressing and remains true to it, and when she selects new clothing she only selects those pieces that also match this style.

> "But I mean, you do have your own style, you don't just adjust to fashion or keep to the latest fashion or the latest trend, and then put on any colours, or I don't know, that are a bit weird. I'm not like that at all. For me, the most important thing is that I feel good in the clothes, they look good, and that's enough for me. [...] Yes. I mean, maybe I'm too old fashioned, my style doesn't change at all" (ibid., Line 795, 815).

This style includes shoes with high heels, without fail. Shoes in general appeared to often be the only exception from a generally postulated requirement to remain inconspicuous. They are excepted from moral discussions and are not criticised provided they do not clack when walking. In contrast, they are an important component of women's clothing. They are a sign of belonging to those adult women able to marry, and sometimes they must be worn. Even very modestly clothed Muslim women, who I interviewed as part of my research into clothing, preferred heels, which they wear when going out with family (cf. Kanitz 2010, p. 86).

> "I always wear heels. But they don't always have to be in fashion. But I like to wear high-heeled shoes, even though I know it's unhealthy and gives you varicose veins." *[J:] "Is that important? High-heeled shoes?"* [Ma:] "It is important. [...] Usually they are open from the back, that's really no problem, but open so that you can't immediately see that my feet peak out at the front. Like I say, that's why I don't get into every fashion, I don't really think: 'I have to get in on that'" (Maryam 2011, Line 990, 1020).

For example, Maryam wears a plastic strip in her hijab which protects her face a little like a cap. This style was first established among Turkish speaking women and has now spread to Muslim women who speak a different language.

> [Ma:] "This is a sort of plastic bit, a while ago, in the beginning, when I started to wear the headscarf I didn't use it, I just had a cloth and then it just went like this and the headscarf went over it, but at some point, sometime six, seven years ago, I discovered this." *[J:] "Turkish women started it, right?"* [Ma:] "Yes, I think so. At the beginning I thought it was totally stupid, I thought, what am I going to look like with that sort of plastic thing on my head, but some people looked really extreme in it, as if they had a kind of roof on their head, a rain hat" (we laugh). "But at some point I discovered it for myself, and then I noticed it really works better with my face. I thought, ... I mean now, if I put it on normally again, that is without the [strip under the] headscarf, then I see that you can really see my whole face, and I don't like that" (laughs) (ibid., Line 825).

Even though Maryam initially rejected this fashion, she eventually integrated headscarf caps into her style. When she needed to keep her face free of shadows for her job application photos[50], which I was there for, Maryam was, in consequence, unhappy about the *Al-Amira* hijab that she had bought and worn specifically for this purpose. This hijab was eggshell coloured and sat tightly around her face.

The spread of the plastic strip among women from different backgrounds points at the development of a unique style that has

50 In Germany, it is still quite common, and sometimes even required, to add a professional photo to job applications. The 'Bewerbungsphoto', a head shot, is thus a common service offered by photographers. The applicant must be professionally dressed and the photo should show the face clearly.

sprung up over the course of the last few years. This style is notable because it follows a basic western dress code and, for its aesthetic design, quotes from various clothing styles while intermixing various categories. I will examine this style more closely as part of subsequent sections.

Maryam also uses other opportunities to try out new styles for herself. When she is in Lebanon, her relatives there convince her to try new types of hijabs that are 'in' at the time.

> [Ma:] "Whenever I am in Lebanon, all my family and friends are like: 'Maryam, you have been wearing the same headscarf for six or seven years, you wrap it the same, you are totally old-fashioned, it's embarrassing to go out with you.' And then they come and try, no idea, try to do something, and in the end it just looks terrible. And then they always say: 'Come on, that looks way better, now people can see your face' and you just feel... 'Oh, really?' And I just don't feel comfortable in my own skin. In Lebanon, we were there two years ago, they convinced me to try some thing or other. I couldn't even wrap it myself! Every time we wanted to go out, we called my husband's sister. And every time, they were all finished, and I sat there as the last one to get ready, waiting with my headscarf, and then they said: 'Can't you wrap it yourself by now?' 'No, I can't!' (laughs). No idea how on Earth they did it. And then, when I came back to Germany, I did it once myself and then a friend saw me, and she said right away: 'What do you look like?' And I was like: 'Doesn't it look good?' 'No, it doesn't look good at all! You looked good before.' And then I said to myself: Never again!" (ibid., Line 1150-1165).

In this instance, it does not seem to be the fun of trying something new that led Maryam to go along with the new style, but mostly pressure from her family. As was the case with Amina, for Maryam, fashion is primarily a tool for social positioning. On holiday, where no-one knows her and it is possible to try out new things, she attempts to add new fashionable elements to her clothing, but is unable to bring these style elements back to Germany.

Maryam prefers strong colours, for example blues that range from violet to turquoise. On the other hand, she does not like pastel colours, and does not buy them; she also does not by fashion in orange, yellow, or pink.

> "I was there for purple, for a while I think turquoise was totally 'in', I did that too. But that orange, there was a time when that orange was everywhere, I didn't wear that. Or that really bright pink. And then there was a sort of mustard colour... I also really didn't like that" (Maryam 2011, Line 1070).

Here, Maryam differs from her friends, who she sometimes observes in disbelief because they purchase clothing in certain colours simply because these colours are 'in'.

> "I don't know, I have friends that just blindly follow fashion. We're at the mall together, 'yes, this colour is totally in' (stunned) and then they wear it, just because it is 'in'. And I think it really looks... I mean, how can they walk around with that colour? 'Yes, I mean it is *in* right now.' And then you see it (the colour) once as a top and once as a skirt and shoes and I think 'you guys are crazy!'. Someone decided that it is in right now, and then that's the only reason you are wearing it" (ibid., Line 1070-1080).

Popular fashion and its rapid variability is, as already observed with Amina, not part of her world. It is often the case that Maryam is offered colours and cuts that she would not wear, that do not match her wardrobe, which is why she prefers to stick to her own style. And that style can be quite unique, as she explained. For her wedding, as is traditional for Muslim weddings, Maryam received high-carat gold as a present. For a long time, this served as a sort of pension scheme for women, who could then sell the pieces individually when times were tough. Maryam, however, did not like the shape of this gold jewellery, or how heavy it was, and so she exchanged it shortly afterwards. She bought lower carat gold jewellery that better matched her style. Her family reacted with disbelief to this decision, as who would prefer gold with less value? (ibid., Line 1100). However, according to Islamic law it is her gold, which serves as protection for her future in emergency situations. It is her decision to sell it. We can assume that Maryam, based on her education, feels that she does not need the gold, which is why she can afford to exchange the more valuable pieces for those which she prefers.

Maryam has decided that she wants to be a role model for others when it comes to religious clothing (ibid., Line 880). It has happened more than once that other women praised her clothing choices.

> [Ma:] "I was sitting with friends once and then, I don't know what we were talking about, but then we were getting really angry about it. People who wear the headscarf but they don't even keep to the code, that is what you are supposed to wear and what the clothing of a person wearing the headscarf is supposed to look like, and then one of them stood up, she doesn't wear a headscarf, and she said 'Let's be honest now, really honest. I don't know anyone who wears a headscarf,' and really I was quite shocked by what she said next 'but I don't know anyone who wears the headscarf who really follows the way you're supposed to dress except for Maryam'"(ibid., Line 1375-1380).

Because she tries to find a balance between fashion and religious suitability, and because she rarely receives compliments regarding her clothing due to her headscarf, it seemed that these moments secretly mean a great deal to Maryam. The fact that she keeps this secret can be determined from her statement "and really I was quite shocked by what she said next." These moments make it clear that her sartorial efforts to find a style that combines integrated western fashion and religiosity have been a success; she can move between various contexts and still be acknowledged.

At the time of our interview, Maryam would have liked to go further for this recognition and add coats to her clothing, as she considered these a way of adding more religious clothing to her outfits.

> "I would like to wear *Jilbāb*. Do you know them? Those long jackets and those coats, they are totally elegant and they come in who knows how many colours and they look really good. And I think, you have... sometimes with these things I have the problem that something is a bit too tight here and a bit too tight there and then I have to find some way to adjust it all properly. [...] And I would really like to wear it [the coat]" (ibid., Line 190) [...]

She thinks the coat is a lot more practical and declines to wear it not for aesthetic reasons, but rather due to financial and social considerations, as she said. On the one hand she finds the coats too

expensive. Good quality coats meant for summer that are nonetheless ankle-length are quite expensive. As a certain level of clothing style cannot be simply changed on a whim, she would also need more than one coat, that is in different colours and with different levels of warmth, as well as the matching headscarves. It is interesting to note at this point that she would actually prefer the coat. The reason for this is that she considers it more religiously desirable, because she connects it with a certain level of religious engagement. I will return to this point in section 8.3 regarding sartorial empowerment.

6.3.1. Putting on the head scarf for the first time

Maryam decided, without input from her husband, to change her clothing style to hijabi style. She emphasizes, just like Hurriya below, that the decision was made of her own free will, which is hardly surprising in the context of the discourse surrounding the headscarf in Germany, as the media often associates the headscarf with coercion, partly without any context, as I will show in the course of this chapter:

> "Oh, he [her husband] is happy, I mean, I was born in Germany, I grew up here, I went to school here, I did all of it on my own, he is actually really proud of me, even if he knows. I mean, I do pay attention to that. But sometimes, when he notices: 'When you walk, then people can see your...' (smile), then he lets me know really nicely. I mean really nicely" (Maryam 2011, Line 1395).

Maryam always knew that she would begin wearing a headscarf one day, but always put this day off to some nebulous point in the future. At that time, she associated the headscarf with getting older and less attractive.

> "When I am older, then I will wear the headscarf. At that point I'll already have a few children and then I'll look old anyway, then I won't care what I look like. But I was still young, I was 19" (ibid., Line 1295).

Maryam began wearing the headscarf while on holiday with her family in Lebanon. She had been married for just two months, had

successfully graduated high school, and had applied to university. Her husband did not put any pressure on her, although Maryam knew that he had imagined he would marry a woman who wore the headscarf. But she had imaged her white wedding with flowing hair, and once she had achieved this dream, she had no reason to put it off any more (ibid., Line 850-860). Spontaneously and deliberately, she decided to take this step at a time at which she was far away from any context that she was otherwise familiar with. And she wanted to use the opportunity provided by the changes in her life, that is the time between high school and university, to begin wearing the headscarf.

Maryam also recognized that it was a good idea to begin with a change in her usual clothing at a time when her new environment had not yet gotten to know her without the headscarf, as getting used to the headscarf can be a difficult process if everyone is telling you how you look when wearing it (ibid., Line 840).

> [Ma:] "It's really true. If you decide for yourself, then it's best to do it there. Because then you have time. It is really, at the beginning, when you are wearing the headscarf, it's a struggle. It's an inner struggle. 'You look so ugly, why did you do this to yourself...'" (ibid., Line 1285).

As part of our conversation on beginning to wear the headscarf, Maryam told me about one of her friends who had not experienced any change in life due to migration, but rather a personal change when her grandfather died.

> "Another friend, I would never have thought that she would wear a headscarf, she was very into fashion with her hair and it was always important to her to have it coloured and cut. I wrote her off, I thought, she'll never wear a headscarf. And then there was this cut when her Opa died. She loved him very, very much and at the burial, and the wake, so to start with it happens at their place, and then he is buried after a few days, here in Germany. In Lebanon and the Arabic countries it all happens very fast. But to start out with the wake was at home and she was wearing a headscarf for it. And every time someone came in, they said: 'Oh, did you start wearing a headscarf, nice.' And she said to me 'Hey, they all think I'm wearing a headscarf now, are they stupid? I'm not going to start wearing a headscarf, I'm just wearing it for now, then I'm taking it off. But

> they say if you don't wear a headscarf then the angels won't come.' And then I thought 'OK, sure.' I mean, she isn't all that religious. She doesn't pray, she's basically a Muslim by habit, I mean she was born a Muslim. But she doesn't really practice it. Then at the burial, when they really put him into the ground, she started to really think about the meaning of life and punishment, you know what I mean, and then she thought: 'OK, now I'm going to do it', and then she started wearing one. And she really struggled, sometimes she though 'am I doing the right thing?'" (Maryam 2011, Line 1305-1325).

Even for herself, and she considers herself very religious, she emphasizes that it was hard to make the change. Maryam describes how difficult the switch to hijabi-clothing felt, so difficult that she even dreamed about it.

> "Sometimes you get really critical at the start, look at yourself, you look like an old lady now. At the beginning I was always having dreams about running around without a headscarf"(ibid., Line 1295).

She emphasises how advisable she found it to make the switch in a country with a majority Muslim population (ibid., Line 1295). Lebanon was also a good choice for her, because she was able to find appropriate shopping options there that are not available in Germany. In Lebanon, in contrast, year-round, there are light tops available with long sleeves and collars that sit tight around the neck, and so on (ibid., Line 840). In addition to the apparently normal pressure and lack of understanding from her non-Muslim environment, Maryam had unwittingly chosen an extremely bad moment to start wearing the headscarf. Ever since September 11, 2001, resentment against Muslims has increased noticeably. Maryam sensed this when returning from her holiday to Germany, just a few days after the attacks (ibid., Line 860-875).

> "There's this scepticism, that happens no matter what. Even if you are religious, when somebody looks at you funny, then you do think 'did I do the right thing, or not?' But if you aren't religious, I mean it strengthens you, your beliefs, the knowledge that I did this for God" (ibid., Line 1305-1325).

This makes it clear which consideration generally outweighs all others in Germany when a woman decides to wear the hijab: religion

is the main motivation. Hardly any woman in Germany would decide, as a secular person, to wear a headscarf, even though of course there are exceptions as highlighted by this blogger: "In certain communities, hijab can allow a woman to enter into public spaces to work and support her family, whether she believes it is a religious requirement or not. People do indeed choose to wear it for religious reasons, cultural reasons, identity reasons, as a form of protest, solace, protection or fashion expression and feel empowered by this choice. Women who may otherwise feel pressure by their community to cover up, may in fact feel confident, respected and protected by covering - and may even garner a level of power within that community. Of course, people also use the hijab to oppress, restrict and control women, and it is absolutely a target for Islamophobia and an excuse for prejudice" (wood turtle 2011).

I will return to the issue of secular women wearing the hijab, for, among other things, "cultural reasons" in the discussion in Chapters 7.6 and8.1.1. For Germany we can assume that these considerations do not play a large role, at least in a woman's own self-perception, as every one of the women I asked in the last five years replied by first saying she wore the hijab because she believed in God.

6.3.2. Classification

I also classify Maryam's clothing as organised in a binary fashion, as she adds items of clothing based on whether they match her already existing clothing or not, and does not primarily decide what to wear based on her feelings or the latest fashion. As she is a working mother and grew up in Germany, she has developed a style of clothing that is practical for her, because she can wear it in any situation. She does not try on popular fashion because she enjoys risk taking and is interested in fashion, but rather only experiments in protected spaces and because friends talk her into it. Therefore, fashion has a significant social component for Maryam, just as it does for Amina. Both are not particularly interested in fashion of their own accord.

But while Amina simply uses a coat for every space outside her home, Maryam has developed a style that both meets her desire for fashionable elegance and her need to wear modest clothing.

As to her assessment from above, that is that she finds her own fashion boring, I interpret that as her finding it boring as compared to popular fashion, which she does not follow. She considers her clothing stylish, and this includes the fact that she is definitely interested in well maintained clothing; she pays attention to her clothing, but not in terms of popular fashion. This explains why at one point she emphasizes how important fashion is to her, and the important role it plays in her life, and yet at another point states that her clothing is boring. I suspect that Maryam associates popular fashion with the hierarchy of the dominant society, while her own stylistic efforts are directed towards a completely different hierarchy. This hierarchy can be viewed as an alternative to that used in the dominant society. Muslim women orient themselves to this alternative hierarchy, as it apparently does not matter how hard they try to appear integrated. Their attempts are, in their own perception, not appropriately appreciated. It is worth making a note of this point, too, because I will return to it in the course of this work.

6.4. Suraya: Cautious Experiments with Fashion

Suraya comes from Libya and is very interested in fashion. Before the outbreak of civil war in her area in 2011 (not well covered by western media), she lived with her family close to Tripoli. She studied history and is a doctoral candidate and lecturer at a university in Libya. Beginning in 2004, she visited Germany regularly in order to extend her mother's visa. Her mother is sick and is being treated in Germany. Not only that, ever since the war began, she has been unable to finish her doctoral thesis in Libya, which is why she applied for university in Germany and is now completing her PhD here (Suraya 2011-14, Line 305). She is 40 years old, divorced, and divides her time between

Berlin and her family in Libya. Suraya is the youngest girl in her family, and has four older brothers. Two of them are just as interested in fashion as she is (ibid., Line 185).

Suraya does not have a husband to influence her clothing style, nor does she allow her father and brothers to dictate what she wears. She says she is very independent when it comes to fashion. Suraya enjoys experimenting with her clothing and is happy to try out the latest trends, provided they stay within certain limits she has set for herself.

Suraya is an exception among my interview partners. According to her own self-perception, she is very religious, but also has a definite and pronounced aesthetic interest in fashion, which she integrates into her everyday life. She therefore represents exactly the intersection that is denied existence by many critics. On the one hand, she is extremely exact in following Islamic clothing rules, but on the other she is always working new fashion trends into her clothing. At our regular meetings over the course of my three years of research, she often pointed out her latest purchases and how she combined them to me. For a time, she combined a plaid, anthracite coloured tunic from *Esprit* with a scarf in exactly the same shade of anthracite with a leopard print pattern. Due to the mix of patterns, it was not immediately clear how well-thought out her clothing choices were. Working together with Suraya taught me to rethink my extremely culturally influenced ideas about fashion.

For her, fashion applies to all sorts of things, including handbags, cars and mobile phones. I would describe her as more focused on popular fashion and consumption. She places great value on her clothing, follows current fashion and loves, in particular, German brands such as *Gabor*, because to her they represent good quality. She spends time in the evening thinking about her outfit for the next day. Her family is very large, which is why Suraya selects her clothing in the morning and lays it out properly, irons it etc. As privacy is not always guaranteed, given the size of her family, she brings her clothing with her into the bathroom in the morning.

> [Su:] "Early in the morning, or even at night, I think about the fact that I'm going to go out and I consider what I am going to wear." *[J:] "At night?"* [Su:] "([German] Ja) (laughs) What I am going to wear. And I take the things out of the closet." *[J:] "The night before!"* [Su:] "Yes, in the evening." *[J:] "Awesome!"* [Su:] "And I take a look at them and sometimes they have to be ironed. I iron them at night, because I might not have enough time in the morning. And then I think about the fact that the next day I am meeting a friend that I haven't seen in a long time. And I think about the nicest clothes that I have, I have to wear them." *[J:] "The nicest clothes."* [Su:] "And the colours have to be pretty. And maybe I will see ([German] my colleagues, that is men) And I think it has to be acceptable. That means that the colours can't be too striking. ([in German] Ja. Not red, not...) [Switches back to Arabic] It is a colour that is good and suitable [meaning appropriate]" (Suraya 2011-14, Line 100).

The colours she prefers range from black to orange, and she combines them with other colours that she considers matching. She also wears an additional second colour. In Libya, she said, black is the king of colours and it is considered an independent colour, that is not invisible or unmarked[51]. Not only that, she also prefers to wear underwear that matches her clothing, so much so that her best friend always asks her what colour her underwear is today, to find out which colour from her outer clothing she has chosen. She lists orange and dark green as examples of her favourite colours, as well as black and white. She prefers her hijab, long sleeved shirt, shoes and handbag to match in terms of colour. She usually wears trainers on her feet, but only when in Germany. In Libya she prefers leather shoes, loafers or boots with a slight heel. In general she finds matching shoes and bag to be quite nice, and she has noticed that people in Germany do not often match the two. According to her, people in Germany wear all items and all colours in a wild mix, in particular the younger crowd. With

51 The same is true for denim, which she considers a colour. Miller and Woodward (2012) determined that jeans are considered a neutral piece of clothing, which can be worn independent of other colours in the outfit, mostly in the global west. This may explain why outfits consisting entirely of denim are now considered unwearable in Germany, but are, for example, quite common in Damascus.

older women, she observes more clothing that matches and does not mix up so many colours. Her preferred fabrics are cotton, as well as cashmere and wool.

> [Su:] "And these are colours that are harmonious or similar. ([German:] For example white with black, orange with dark green) and so on. The colours and the type of clothing. I love ([German] cotton. And cashmere and wool), I love those fabrics. But in summer I only wear cotton. Because the things are good quality and because it is so hot in my country that I have to wear ([German] cotton) things" (ibid., Line 115).

Suraya owns many bags that she wears to match her clothing.

We also talk about current fashions and what has caught her eye recently. She told me that she was particularly interested in the sandals with the zip at the heel, as well as long maxi-skirts. She said was particularly happy to see them. Some time ago, she had tried to purchase long skirts in Germany, but she was simply unable to find any. I asked her what she did if she could only find shorter clothes. Then, she said, she tries to find something at another time. However, she did clarify that she does also wear short skirts: over trousers. She said this had been a big fashion trend in Libya for a while.

Suraya always keeps up on the latest fashion trends. In addition to her own observations of streetwear, she gets ideas from TV and newspapers, sometimes also from the internet, however not from blogs. She purchases clothing at *C&A* or *Kaufhof*[52]. She said she had tried transnational clothing stores in Neukölln and Wedding, but found the things there to be too unfashionable, and therefore unwearable (ibid., Line 160). In summer 2014, Suraya tried out a new hijab style that she otherwise does not wear. She reported the following dialogue to me between her and her mother:

> [Su:] "My mother said to me today 'Why are you wearing your headscarf like a Palestinian?' I told her that it was fashionable now. She just answered that she found it nicer the way it was before. I said to her that I would wear it like this for a little while longer, and if she still didn't like it, I would change it again." (winks) *[J:]*

52 A European clothing chain and German department store, respectively.

> *"You aren't actually planning to change it, are you?"* [Su:] "No!" (laughs) (informal conversation Suraya 2011-14))

Suraya combined a mint-green scarf with a black underscarf and put kohl eye-liner under her eyes to match.

In Libya, she separates clothing for at home from clothing for going out, and this is how she sorts her wardrobe. Her winter clothing is also separated from her summer clothing. In Germany, this separation is not as strict, as her wardrobe is very different from the things she has and needs in Libya.

> [Su:] "Yes, there is a difference. The closet in Libya is very big and organised, much better organised. And in Germany it is smaller, since I do not stay in Germany for long and I also don't need as much clothing." *[J:] "Why not?!"* [Su:] "Because I don't work in Germany, I only go out (German) for groceries, or to the library, or to meet with a friend, to go for a walk). But in Libya I need ([German] lots of clothing, because I am at work) and sometimes I go to see a friend and my family and that is why the clothes are different in Libya and Germany" (ibid., Line 60).

As with Amina, migration has set clear limits on her fashion, as it is not possible to bring appropriate clothing for all occasions. However, as Suraya, just like Amina, does not have a variety of different occasions for which she needs appropriate clothing in Germany, this is not a problem. She probably also needs less clothing because the spatial spheres have been reduced to two. When Suraya got to Germany, she discovered that she found her regular clothing impractical here. The long skirts did not allow for freedom of movement, as they do not allow the wearer to take big steps. She also found getting on the bus or going up stairs difficult with long skirts. Not only that, she did not like the way this revealed her legs. In addition, she said there was much more wind here, particularly when going down to the train stations (ibid.). Suraya found the pace in Germany to be different from that in Libya, and therefore did not like the fact that it was not possible to walk quickly in longer skirts. Finally, she listed a few social reasons for not wanting to wear skirts in Germany. She had the impression that she was less noticeable in other clothing than in

Figure 6.7.: Image of Suraya in a library. Berlin, 2012. Source: JK.

Figure 6.8.: Suraya with a new style: mint green headscarf and matching mint green kohl eye-liner under her eyes. Berlin, 2014. Source: JK.

a skirt, and reported that she felt that she got stared at less (Suraya 2011-14, Line 20-25). As no one in her family attempts to dictate her clothing choices, she changed her basic dress code, trying out trousers with a long Cardigan, and since then has found this style to simply be more practical in Germany.

She purchased her first pair of jeans together with one of her brothers, who accompanied her to *C&A* and was there to help her choose a pair. He was the one who had suggested she buy trousers, much less noticeable in Germany, in the first place, in place of the impractical skirts that she was used to wearing. Her brother wears *stonewashed* jeans, but Suraya thinks they look like used clothing, even though she knows that they are currently in fashion.

She has on occasion attempted to wear the jeans from Germany in Libya; she reported that several times she had them on while standing in front of the mirror, only to take them off again. But she finds she is unable to wear the jeans, or the trainers she prefers to wear in Germany when in Libya, as the latter do not match the skirts that she prefers to wear outside of Germany. However, this is not a rule of any sort, it is simply that Suraya does not feel comfortable in Libya in jeans and trainers. Here we see the affective meeting of space and emotion already mentioned.

In one of our later conversations, I asked again if she had started to wear jeans in Libya. Suraya said she had not. She said the timing was not right for something like that due to the war, but that perhaps she would start wearing jeans after a potential wedding.[53] It was, she noted, not possible in any case to wear jeans to her job as a lecturer at the university, as jeans were frowned upon there as being unsuitable. As Suraya worked as a lecturer at the university, she preferred a more formal clothing style when there, as, in her opinion, it was expected of her (ibid., Line 155).

53 Every once in a while, she considers marrying a new husband, however he must be a 'good man': unmarried, religious, honest, etc. Those who ask for her hand are often, due to her own age, already married, and the wedding does not take place (Suraya 2011-14, informelles Gespräch).

She often told me about new fashion trends in Libya, which she was able to follow due to her frequent travel between the two countries. At one point, she told me about a fashion that, at that time, had already lasted for two years in Libya. In this style, an *Abaya* was cut along the seams, and combined with a loose pair of trousers or long skirt in the same colour. In summer, the cut reached the thighs, in winter, however, the fabric was thicker, and the cut reached only to the knees. However, it was always the case that the colour of the *Abaya* and that of the trousers were perfectly matched. She also told me about another example of Libyan fashion, in which wrist warmers were sold in special stores for Islamic fashion which could then be combined with three-quarter length sleeved blouses. I find it particularly notable that even in Libya, these stores appear to exist apart from other sartorial businesses. Most recently, she said the trend was wearing lace wrist warmers, which featured a ruffle and small frills around the wrist. There was also a time, she said, where two scarves, for example one white and one black, were worn crossed on the head. She observed this style particularly in Egypt. I can confirm that this style was also popular in Syria at the time. When asked, Suraya brought me photos of current fashions in Libya, which she took at the university for this project (see image 6.9).

At another point, Suraya explained that she had observed how the clothing had changed over the last few years in Libya. It did not become more or less religious, it simply changed. While previously in Libya the main types of clothing were *Jilbāb* and Hijab, Suraya noticed that this had changed over the past few years, and skirts, trousers and blouses become acceptable. Suraya explained that everyone wore *Jilbāb*, as the *Scheikhs* had said it was necessary, claiming the requirement came from the Q'uran. Suraya contradicted this. In her opinion, women should not wear clothing that is particularly noticeable or tight, and they should be appropriately dressed for the circumstances, but otherwise the Q'uran does not make any stipulations. She said that those who wanted to wear very religious clothing wore the *Khimār*, which is entirely black. In Libya, however, she said it was not worn often, instead it belonged to *Ḥijāz*, that

is the Arabic peninsula. This change, as observed by Suraya, was also mentioned by Amina and by the women from the transnational clothing store in which I carried out field research over quite a long period of time. This development got me thinking, and inspired the idea that an inclusive fashion has developed in Europe over the last few years (cf. the fashion from *Elanany*, p. 135, which is also called inclusive by the designer). In this fashion, the basic western dress code is incorporated into clothing concepts and rounded out using style elements that correctly adhere to Islamic law. This inclusive fashion has, over the past few years, thanks to the internet age and via globalisation, migrated back to countries with a dominant Muslim society and has changed the fashion in those countries. I will return to this idea in the thesis discussion in chapter 8.1.

6.4.1. Putting on the head scarf for the first time

Suraya began wearing the Hijab at the end of grade 9. It was the day of final exams for the Libyan upper secondary level, and her and four of her friends decided it was the right day to begin wearing a headscarf. Suraya had had her period for a full year, and had always known that she was going to wear the headscarf, planning to start at 14 or 15. On this particular day, they wanted Allah to see that they were good women and to help them. Not only that, Suraya felt that she was now a grown woman, and responsible for her own actions. She came to this conclusion because she noticed that her mother sometimes criticised her differently, and often drew her attention to the fact that she was no longer a child and was responsible for her own actions (Suraya 2011-14, Line 240) (see also Klinkhammer 2000, p. 245). Her family congratulated her on her decision, but there was no party or anything similar, which is usually the case with women. However, brothers or fathers do go shopping with their daughters to purchase clothing appropriate for the Hijab, and this was the case in her family. Despite this, she rebutted the idea that some girls only put on the Hijab because then they are given new clothes. One of

her friends, after the exams, took off her headscarf again, saying that it was not beautiful; this earnt her sharp criticism from the rest of the group. Suraya still shakes her head about this event today, as in her opinion once a woman has begun wearing the headscarf she cannot take it off again, as it marks the transition from childhood to womanhood (Suraya 2011-14, Line 235-250). I will also return to this idea, that is that the 'correct' way to wear the Hijab is associated with belief in God, independent of actual religious engagement, at a later point (Chapter 7.6) .

6.4.2. Classification

Suraya is very interested in fashion and clothing, and spends a lot of time considering her sartorial performance, including when it comes to style. In doing so, she engages in a massive act of sartorial translation. However, it is clear that, for her, clothing is very dependent on context. Instead of determining a clothing style for herself and sticking with it, she likes to try different things, and changes her style depending on the context and the event for her own reasons, although the context seems to play a larger role than the event. This is different from Amina and Maryam, who both mostly stick to their style independent of context, or, if at all, only try out new fashions in response to social pressure. Suraya's behaviour, on the other hand, is closer to that of Hurriya, who I will introduce shortly.

Suraya's ideas regarding matching colours, as well as those of many interview partners from this research and my Masters' Thesis, also demonstrate that the era of stylistic inconsistency, in which it has become possible to break old clothing rules, is a phenomenon of the global West.

> "Suddenly you can combine green with blue, wear stripes with checks, flowers and polka dots, and chiffon with rough cotton" (Schipp 2005).

Young Muslim women who grew up in Germany are also happy to make use of this style, however this is not often the case for women

who are immigrants themselves and were socialised in a country with a dominant Muslim society (cf. Image 6.10). Suraya, in fact, spoke of this style with astonishment.

6.5. Hurriya: Fashion as Translation

Hurriya is a small, very energetic woman in her early forties, married to a restaurant owner.[54] She is the mother of four children and works as an employee in the restaurant, taking care of errands and procurement for the catering business. She grew up in Germany, in a village close to Stuttgart. As a young woman, she thought her father was very strict, which is why she swore to never live "like that" (Hurriya 2011, Line 265). For example, her father would have preferred that his daughters began to dress 'appropriately' much earlier, but Hurriya and her sisters refused.

> [Hu:] "If my father had any say in it, I would have had to put it [the headscarf] on immediately after the wedding. He tried it earlier, but we wouldn't let him force us" (ibid., Line 310).

It was only after she met her husband that she changed her mind. Her husband showed her a different side of Islamic life, and her decision to marry him turned out to be a good decision for Hurriya in the years that followed. She made this clear using an anecdote from her early years of marriage.

> [Hu:] "Right after my wedding, when I visited [my parents] for the first time: [...]" *[J:] "'Why aren't you wearing a headscarf yet?'"* [Hu:] "Yes. And I had already spoken to [my husband] and I told him 'I'm not ready yet. I don't want to.' And then he said: 'Ok, then you don't need to.' And I said: 'And my dad?' 'Leave your father to me.' And then I went to my father and my father looked at me so strangely, I hid behind my husband, you can't see me behind

54 Hurriya's husband was my employer during my degree. As the two have a very trusting relationship, he sometimes sat at the table with us during the interview doing paperwork.

> him anyway... and then he said to my father: 'I want to speak with you.' And then he said: 'Look, leave her alone, she's my wife now, I am responsible for her and I think it's fine the way it is.' My father pulled the worst face...(laughs). But he swallowed it, because he is also very religious, he knows a lot, so he can't fool him at all" (ibid., Line 305).

Her husband defended her in front of her father regarding her clothing choices. Once Hurriya had explained to her husband that she was not yet ready, he took on the responsibility of ensuring her father respected her desires, and also defended her to his own friends. Not only that, he encouraged his wife to go to the hairdresser and to find her own clothing style.

> "Then I was allowed, after I married, to go to the hairdresser for the first time, I was allowed to wear make-up. I could wear what I wanted, he was fine with anything. My parents went nuts, and he said: 'Leave her alone'" (ibid., Line 320-335).

Even today, Hurriya occasionally receives criticism on her clothing style from her female and her husband's male acquaintances. And while Hurriya's husband dismisses this criticism, the women continue to press her. This may be one reason that she has let these friendships lapse over the last few years, concentrating instead on her own family.

> "But honestly, lots of people tell me that I look too modern. My acquaintances, for example. The ones who don't even wear a headscarf: 'If I wore a headscarf, I would only wear long cloths, I would only do this and that and this...' So I said: 'Ok, so why don't you do it?' 'I'm not ready yet.' So I said: 'Yeah, then don't [bother me]' 'But you are already a Hajji, you went to Mecca.' So I said: 'What about it? Just because I was in Mecca doesn't mean that my life is over or that I don't have anything left to do in life'" (ibid., Line 470). When she was younger, she had lots of friends and joined a lot of working groups, but over the last few years it has become too much. She implied that the was sick of the continued criticism from others (ibid., Line 585). [Hu:] "Look, they are all jealous people, unfortunately. All envious. You always have to pay attention to what you say and I just don't want to any more. Always talking and talking. I just don't care, do you understand? They all respect me, I don't have a problem with any of them, thank God, but I just

> keep my distance. I have my children, they're grown up now, I have a good relationship with them, I have my siblings here, I have my sister, I get along really well with her, we do everything together and then of course there's my husband. My husband is really my friend" (Hurriya 2011, Line 595-600).

From Hurriya's description it is clear that her style is very important to her, and that she will not let anyone talk her out of it. However, Hurriya admits that her husband does have a say in what she wears, as his ability to influence his wife has an effect on how the family is respected and whether or not he is acknowledged as being well versed in Islam. So occasionally she respects his wishes and considers that her contribution to the family (ibid., Lines 205, 845-850).

> [Hu:] "Well... I mean, like I said, I am sometimes too modern for my husband." (laughs shyly and looks at him sideways) *[J:] "What does that mean?"* [Hu:] "If I am wearing a short top and you can see my bottom, then he does [...]" [Hu's Husband:] "Yes, it doesn't fit together." [Hu:] "He says that is too much. If you can actually see my behind. (added quickly and in a soothing tone directed at him) No-one looks at my behind, only you. (laughs shyly again) Then he doesn't like it, do you understand? But he tolerates the rest. He tolerates my fingernails, he tolerates my make-up and so on. [...] (laughs again) My daft ideas... that are part of my style, he also tolerates those [...] right?" (pats his thigh) (ibid., Line 205).

However, she always dresses for the occasion:

> [Hu:] "Well, then I'm casual again. Unless we have something, an event or something, then I dress nicely again. It really depends on the situation. If the weather is nice, you wear airy things, if it is colder, you wear warmer things. If you go out, you wear nicer clothes. He sometimes is surprised by the stuff I have" (ibid., Line 720).

She describes her own fashion as 'modern clothing' which, of her own free will, she 'islamises', as Maryam favourably described it, that is, for example, adding long sleeves. The emphasis on free will appears to be very important to her, she has heard too many German media reports about women being forced to wear the headscarf. As she has the feeling that her husband makes a lot of compromises for her

sake, she in turn makes concessions when it comes to her clothing, for example by not selecting tops that reveal the shape of her bottom.

Instead, she combines loose jeans with tops that reach her thighs, and then hijab and shoes with matching colours, flat trainers or heeled pumps depending on the occasion. She wears an *Al-Amira*-Hijab, with a plastic strip just like Maryam.

> *[J:] "Tell me, do you have a strip under it?"* [Hu:] "Yes, I have one of those plastic strips, they are cut to fit, you can even buy them ready to use. And I always make a hole and then I put it in. I think it just looks nicer than when it sits just flat on your head" (ibid., Line 110).

Hurriya's clothing style, just like Suraya's, seems to be that which Bachmann (2008) describes as everyday chaos affective clothing selection. She says she loves fashion. She also adjusts to the circumstances, like the other women:

> [Hu:] "I mean honestly, when I go to Lebanon, I have way worse things on than here. I adjust to match." [Hu's Husband:] "She's even more modern there." [Hu:] "Yes! I am even worse there. There really are things that I wear in Lebanon that I don't wear here" (Hurriya 2011, Line 695).

It is interesting that Hurriya describes her own clothing as 'worse', and implies that this is the reason for the criticism of her clothing style mentioned above. I will return to this point later. Maryam also described adjusting styles during holidays. However, this adjustment always stays within certain limits.

> *[J:] "Are you different from the women in Lebanon, in terms of fashion"* [Hu:] "No? They wear more daring clothes. I would never wear boots up to here (points at her thighs). I wear a skirt to here in winter and boots to here (to her knee), sure" (ibid., Line 215).

Unlike Maryam, however, Hurriya puts more priority on her overall fashionable feelings regarding clothing, and less on religious recognition through individual people in her environment. It appears to be important to Hurriya that the affective connection between space and clothing feels right to her. The difference to Maryam may be that it

is more important to her to differ sartorially based on context, and that she is able to better endure concrete criticism from individuals. Which is why she completely changed her clothing style on several occasions, in particular before and after her move to Abu Dhabi.

After her pilgrimage to Mecca, Hurriya switched to wearing *Abayas*. She had moved with her husband to Abu Dhabi for work and adjusted her style to match the relevant customs. Hurriya also wore the *Abaya* on the streets of Germany at an earlier point in her life, during her pregnancy, as they are comfortable to wear as maternity clothing due to their loose cut. However, she definitely had a bad experience with this:

> "Back then, they just yelled at me. Just heckled, all the time! And if I was pregnant, 'Just look at her, man, she's gonna get even more child benefit and more kids and everything'" (Hurriya 2011, Line 160).

It was only during her stay in Abu Dhabi that she found that this clothing was valued, and that it provided sartorial recognition.

> "I mean, I lived in Abu Dhabi and it was just wonderful. In that country, where people say there is only desert, and only people with money are respected, but there everyone walks around looking how they want, nobody looks at anyone else. The woman walk around with a black veil, but they have the most exclusive expensive wardrobe... the best make-up, the Dior handbag, and it just looks really sexy" (ibid., Line 80-85).

Then Hurriya went on the Hajj[55], which is a deeply religious experience for many Muslims. Afterwards, she decided to change her clothing style to the *Abaya*.

> "Anyway, like I said, after I went to Mecca I decided on my own that I would wear the long *Abaya*, that long dress" (ibid., Line 125).

Some time after her return from the family's stay in Abu Dhabi, it once again became clear to her that she was not happy with this

55 The pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the five pillars of Islam; up to two million Muslims yearly engage in the custom on specific days of the year shortly after Ramadan, in order to participate together in a variety of rites at the site.

type of clothing, and she switched once more to an integrative style which combined western and Islamic clothing elements in one style. " 'Gradually I realised, shit, I love fashion, you know?' (ibid., Line 125). " Her husband was initially not happy with this decision, but in light of his belief that one should never force another person to wear a certain type of clothing, he finally accepted Hurriya's new style.

She still loves the *Abayas*, beautiful and expensive dresses that she was given in Kuwait that are decorated with *Swaroski* beads. However, she only wants to wear them to suitable events, for example to receptions in embassies, where the other women are also wearing fancy clothing and therefore make admiring comments regarding Hurriya's exquisite clothing and her finery.

> "I have very nice and very expensive *Abayas*. I got them as presents from Kuwait. But I only wear them occasionally, when I visit someone, you know what I mean?" (ibid., Line 135).

It is important to note here that in Kuwait or Abu Dhabi, her expensive *Abayas* are instantly recognised as being expensive, but this is not the case in Germany.

So, in Germany, Hurriya changed her basic dress code back to what she perceives as 'modern clothing', despite resistance from her husband, as this must also represent a step down within the Muslim sartorial hierarchy for him.[56] Wearing these *Abayas* is only worth it when she meets with the spouses of Ambassadors, as the clothing is suitably acknowledged in that setting.

> "Recently a friend of mine, from the Embassy, said to me, we had an event. And I was invited." *[J:] "Which embassy?"* [Hu:] "The Emirates embassy. But I was at her house, the wife of the Ambassador. Everyone there was a diplomat, but I was also invited. And she looked at me: 'What do you look like? Wow, you look like your husband is a minister.' Then I said: 'My husband is a minister. He's a minister to you all.' Then she said 'Wow, you really look great!'" *[J:] "What were you wearing?"* [Hu:] "I was wearing a dress, it went down to here and boots and a blazer, it was really

56 I will provide further explanation on Muslim sartorial hierarchies in chapter 8.3, which focuses on sartorial empowerment.

> lovely and a nice headscarf with it all. It really stood out. Nicer than what the women-diplomats were wearing" (Hurriya 2011, Line 720-730).

Hurriya's feeling that her fashion interests are not appreciated and the lack of acceptance for her as a person are made clear in a quote regarding the time of her return to Germany. [Hu:] "You know, it was so hard to come back to Germany. 'Oh no, not again'" (ibid., Line 660). Nevertheless, she believes, just like Maryam, that she is in an advantageous position, as she is able to select the best parts from both societies (ibid., Line 270).

> [Hu:] "I miss a lot of things when I go to Lebanon or to Islamic countries, probably because I grew up here" (ibid., Line 795).

6.5.1. Putting on the head scarf for the first time

Hurriya began wearing the headscarf on holidays, a few years after her wedding. She had dealt with her father and his ideas regarding appropriate clothing for a long time; after the wedding he insisted that Hurriya should finally start wearing a headscarf, saying that, after all, her husband was a respected man in religious circles. When she refused, her husband stepped in for her and discussed the issue with her father, who did not pester Hurriya after that (ibid., Line 305-325). But when Hurriya was pregnant with her first daughter, she decided she was ready and wanted to start wearing the headscarf. Her husband then suggested that she wait until the holiday and use it as a type of trial period. If she came home feeling good about it, she should keep wearing it, but if not she could take it off again, because she was not ready after all (ibid., Line 345). Thus, they drove to Denmark, and while on the road Hurriya's husband helped her to put on the headscarf, as she had never worn one in public before, only for prayers.[57]

57 During prayer, the rule is that a woman's body must be completely covered, otherwise God will not accept the prayer. As the first of the five daily prayers

The idea was that getting used to the headscarf would be easier in a context free from friends and family than if all her acquaintances were commenting on her new style at once.

> "I went to Denmark to visit friends, nobody had seen me with a headscarf, without a headscarf, nobody said: 'Ah, it suits you, it doesn't suit you... makes you ugly, makes you look old', the people just accepted me. And then I got used to it and I said: 'OK, I can manage this'" (ibid., Line 345-355).

On her return, Hurriya's mother immediately said to her: "You look like an old grandma, it doesn't suit you at all" (ibid., Line 395). Of course, this made switching clothing styles even more difficult for Hurriya. In order to better cope with the transition, therefore, she wore the headscarf in accordance with her own style. Although Muslim clothing rules allow only the hands and the face to remain uncovered, Hurriya simply wore what she wanted to start with.

> "But I was still wearing short-sleeves, you know what I mean? It's true! (we both laugh out loud) then over the years I finally started to understand, even though I grew up like that, but I didn't want to accept it. I first wanted to accept it the way I wanted it. My son was looking at photos recently: 'Mama, you are wearing short sleeves and a headscarf, are you crazy!'" (ibid., Line 350).

The description of Hurriya's switch to modest clothing reveals that the family expectations, expressed through her father's demands, are aimed at negotiating an appropriate outer appearance. Not fully covering oneself is reserved for children, and by her wedding at the latest, Hurriya, according to her father's ideas, should have started clothing herself like an adult woman. At the same time, he no longer had the power to define appropriate clothing for her, he was no longer part of the discussion. From the wedding on, the negotiations took place between Hurriya and her husband. And even though her

takes place in the morning before sunrise, many women keep a long *Khimār*, often home-made, close to their bed, so that they can simply throw it on for prayer. In university prayer rooms, too, these types of *Khimār* are available for Muslim women that come to pray but do not, in their daily lives, cover themselves or cover themselves completely with other clothing.

husband expresses desires and ideas, Hurriya remains the person who consistently implements her own ideas regarding appropriate clothing.

Her son's statement, on the other hand, reveals another important point for this work regarding criticism within the Muslim discourse, which I will return to in chapter 7.6. Here, it seems, the younger generation has different views. In Muslim discourse, I was able to observe the critical views with which Muslim women's clothing was often considered. The differentiation between Muslim forms of fashion has heightened this discourse over the last few years, just as the fashion itself has developed, egged on by the possibilities of anonymity over the internet. My discussion and interview partners, too, evaluated the clothing of other women either negatively or positively. This evaluation is part of a hierarchisation strategy that I will discuss in chapter 8.3.

6.5.2. Classification

Hurriya's story makes it clear that there is a connection between major changes in her biography and the changes in her clothing biography. Hurriya went to Abu Dhabi, where *Abayas* are recognized and viewed positively. There, she can use *Abayas* to express fashionable variety in accordance with her wishes, as the women combine expensive fabric and appliqué, clothing cuts and designer handbags to make statements, for example that they are capable of being sexy and fashionable in a religiously correct way. This is made possible by the division of space into four categories and the presence of women-only public spaces. For outsiders, however, *Abayas* look like the same black dress, worn over and over again. And thus, after Hurriya's return to Germany, her collection of expensive *Abayas* no longer symbolises elegance and sophistication. Instead, the Abaya is viewed as the 'black smock' of the poor immigrant, a figure Hurriya does not identify with at all. This makes it clear that experimenting with fashion involves more people than just the woman who wears the clothing. It also involves those observing the clothing; their reception of the fashion places the

clothing in a desired context. Hurriya noticed this, and changed her basic dress code back to a style that can be read here in Germany, and which does not expose her to derogatory looks.

6.6. Initial Interpretation

Hurriya does more experimenting with fashion on her own initiative than Maryam does. Both grew up in Germany, and both also have lots of experience in Muslim contexts. Independent of this, one of them is interested in fashion as popular fashion, and the other assigns more value to a consistent style. Hurriya is more like Suraya when it comes to experimenting, as she integrates and adjusts her clothing in new locations. Hurriya's story is, just like Suraya's, an example of successful sartorial translation. Using their clothing, they show that they have understood that space in Germany is binary, not divided into four spheres. The fact that Hurriya adjusted to the non-western division of space while travelling between Abu Dhabi and Germany, and implemented this into her clothing, shows that she is better able to play the fashion game than Maryam, who failed completely in her sartorial translation attempt when she was quickly talked out of the latest Libyan headscarf fashion.

Hurriya, on the other hand, is able to do even better and implement fashion suitable in dominant Muslim societies to Germany, but only in appropriate spaces, for which she sometimes gets a great deal of recognition: for example, people tell her she looks like one of the diplomat's wives. By dressing in a women's public space in Germany, which otherwise has a binary spatial structure, the way Amina would in a semi-private space, e.g. when visiting someone, she performs, without being aware of it, an incredible feat of sartorial translation. The Abaya, combined with a jacket, works both in the open public (on the way to the meeting) and in the semi-private space as well as in a women's space, which is why it really comes into its own in the latter. However, this also means that Hurriya is sometimes subject to

strong criticism in situations in which her sartorial translation is not recognized, in which case she merely appears inconsistent regarding her religious ideals, regardless of whether this is actually the case or not. This is an important point which I will also return to in Chapter 7.6 on inter-Islamic criticism. But Suraya also takes major translation steps when adjusting to the binary division of space and by selecting, just like Hurriya or Maryam, western clothing and then Islamising it, that is developing it further. In addition, she is able to transfer her fashionable developments when taking the clothing she purchased for Germany back to Libya with her and slowly making it wearable there. In doing so, she also influences the development of fashion in Libya, albeit unconsciously.

Amina and Maryam, who, according to their own statements are not very interested in popular fashion, remain true to their own basic dress code at all times. Amina's interest in fashion is apparently not strong enough to adjust her preferred style to the fashions here in Berlin. However, she also does not have any events that would force her to do so, unlike Maryam does when she goes on holiday. She simply learnt to withstand the disparaging looks, she got used to them. She would not change her clothing as a result of these looks, as her clothing has a clear structure. For religious reasons, she wears a coat in public, and sees no reason to change this. Maryam also remains true to her style due to lack of interest in popular fashion, and generally does not change it at all. She later regrets the moments in which she is tempted to try out a new style, as her interests lie not with recognition of her fashion sense, but rather recognition of her ability to integrate modest clothing into her 'western' basic dress code. The fact that she is excellent at doing so is proven by the occasional comment regarding how religiously correct her style is. Despite the fact that she is not interested in fashion in and of itself, she is able to develop a style that more than meets the various requirements within Germany. It is only in Lebanon that she is not fashionable enough, but she is able to ignore this as Germany is the context relevant to her. And it is in Germany that she remains within the framework of that which appears to be particularly appropriate from a religious

perspective, while simultaneously managing not to attract too much negative attention from the dominant society.

The comparison between these two fashion and migration types was therefore pertinent inasmuch as it shows that development of a style which works in various contexts, or a change of this style, represents a special integrative achievement. The adaptation and development of a new clothing type requires engagement with and interest in fashion. These four women, then, provide examples of different approaches to fashion and dealing with types of styles, depending on whether or not they have had their own migration experience or not, and also whether or not they are interested in fashion.

Figure 6.9.: Suraya's niece with her friend. Both are wearing the newer style. Tripoli, 2014. Source: Suraya.

Figure 6.10.: Light chiffon blouse combined with a cotton skirt and leather bracelet. Particularly striking: pink and white patterned headscarf and a pink ring. Alexanderplatz, Berlin, 2012. Source: JK.

7. Regulatory dimensions

7.1. Introduction

The following chapter examines the legal position of the headscarf in Germany and what Islamic legal sources have to say about clothing. In both cases, I have limited myself to a simple description of the relevant legislative environment: the German perspective, which understands itself to be secular, and the religious foundations the Muslim women refer to when speaking about their clothing. For the latter, I have carried out my own thorough analysis, instead of referring to concrete statements made by the women interviewed, as those statements can be found in the previous chapter.

In regards to the questions explored in this research, this chapter is important inasmuch as it illuminates the claims made within the framework of the continuing discourse surrounding the hijab in Germany and contextualises various assumptions. For example, I am often told that the Q'uran makes no mention of a duty to wear a veil, or people ask, upon finding out what my research involves, whether fashion is even allowed 'in Islam'. However, I will not be making an argumentative judgement; the women themselves, when choosing their clothing, are generally not concerned with whether or not there is proof that the Q'uran requires them to wear a veil (Klinkhammer 2000, p. 273), as will be shown over the course of this chapter. Instead, the goal is to provide information from the perspective of Islamic studies

and the law, and in doing so provide a foundation for discussion. It is, at any rate, impossible to definitively answer the question of clothing regulations in Islam for all Muslim men and women, as there is no such thing as *Islam* as a single entity, in Germany or in any other country. To provide information on the legal interpretations, which are usually touched on only briefly in other works, I will be referring to more than just the Q'uran; after all, the women themselves use more than this single source. I will also examine the *Ḥadīth* and pre-Islamic literature. In doing so, I will not refer to the entirety of legal discourse within cultural anthropology; to examine which legal foundations must be obeyed when it comes to hijab clothing is beyond the scope of this book. Finally, I will take a look at internal regulation strategies used by Muslims.

I will also strive to describe the legal situation in Germany within the framework of the research question.

Many Muslims answer, for themselves, the question as to whether or not the hijab is a requirement by saying that when the prophet Muhammad (s)[58] was alive, he and the people closest to him lived exemplary lives. Most of the women I asked about this either referred to their own study of Islamic law and had made up their own minds after spending a lot of time thinking about the issue, or they relied on the legal opinion of Islamic scholars. Still others mentioned expectations from those they were close to.

Edward Said (2009 [1978], p. 113) noted, quite rightly, that it does not really make any sense to judge the reality of everyday life for Muslims around the world based on the analysis of classic texts, or to consider the opinion of Muslim experts the foundation of realpolitik decisions. However, it must be said that most women who begin wearing the headscarf in Germany do so as a conscious decision based

58 This abbreviation is used in this work as a sign of respect. It stands for " صَلَّى ٱللّٰهُ عَلَيهِ وَ سَلَّمْ *ṣallā 'l-lāhu ʿla'hi wa salam* " and means "may God honour him and grant him peace". It is a blessing, also known as a eulogy. It is used by Muslims when they hear the name of the prophet Muhammad (s) or say it themselves.

on their study of the previously mentioned sources. Even women who are themselves well versed in Q'uran exegesis trust, in part and in addition, the interpretations of religious scholars. They are of the opinion that Islamic law is too extensive. Therefore, a relatively short period of self-study is no substitute for a lifetime spent working with legal sources.

On the other hand, whether and to what extend the headscarf is allowed in Germany, and its legal status, has been hotly debated since 1998 above all in regards to civil servants, with the debate surrounding whether or not teachers should be allowed to wear a headscarf in the classroom.[59] This debate clarified the legal situation in Germany, which is why some of it will be discussed here as part of the broader perspective. More detailed descriptions of this discourse can be found, among other sources, in Amir-Moazami (2007), which deals with the discourse from an academic perspective, Oestreich (2004), who provides a summary of the discourse and its participants with journalistic precision and Blumenthal (2009), who discusses the issue from a legal perspective for individual German states.

I will begin this chapter with a discussion of the legal status of fashion and clothing in Islam, and then continue by discussing German laws regarding the headscarf, in particular the legal regulation of the headscarf for teachers in Berlin, and will conclude by discussing internal Muslim regulatory measures.

7.2. Basics of Islamic Law

In terms of their faith, their thoughts and their actions, Muslims live according to Islamic law, at least when it comes to the religious elements of their daily lives. The Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan (2001, p. 188) refers to the profession of faith, the *Shahāda*,[60] as the lowest

59 In Germany, teachers are employees of the Ministry of Education for the state they live in, and thus civil servants.

60 The *Shahāda* is the Islamic creed: There is no God but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God: لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا ٱللّٰهُ مُحَمَّدٌ رَّسُولُ ٱللَّهِ *lā ʾilāha ʾillā ʾl-lāhu muḥammadun -rrasuwlu ʾl-lahi* .

common denominator in terms of being Muslim. Some Muslims strive, in addition, to commemorate God with every action, every conscious thought, indeed every breath; not for nothing is Islam considered a religion of complete devotion and submission (Khoury 2009). From this come the many intertwined versions of figures of speech containing the name *Allāh* and used in everyday languages, including German. *Mā shāʾllāh*, *Bismiʾllāh*, and many more. Dedicating every action to commemorating God is taught even to very small children at mealtimes, as they learn to bless every bite in the name of *Allāh*. In this way, every action, from eating to crossing the street, can become worship carried out in *Allāh*'s name, which is translated as *Bismiʾllāh* (in the name of God). Conversely, every action is also examined in the light of its obedience to the law. The foundation for the action, which for some people must always be as in line with their faith as possible, is based on the Q'uran, the word of God. The Q'uran, according to the Islamic faith, was recited by the Prophet Muhammad (s) over the course of 23 years from 609 to 632 CE. The well-known year 622 CE is the year that Muhammad (s) and his followers went on the Hijra[61] from Mecca to Medina. This year marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

In addition to imitating behaviour from the Q'uran, the faithful imitate the exemplary behaviour of the Prophet Muhammed (s) himself, his deeds, his sayings or the things that he approved of by not speaking out against them. If there is no answer in the Q'uran in regards to a specific question, believers look to the collected knowledge surrounding it. This exemplary path is known as "*Sunna*", from which the Sunnites get their name. The actions of the Prophet Muhammad (s) are passed down in stories known as the *Ḥadīth* (Arabic plural: *aḥadīth*), sometimes also called the traditions of the prophet. The majority of Muslim legal scholars make their judgements based on these two sources, that is the Q'uran and the *Ḥadīth*, and almost all schools of Islam agree on the validity of these two sources. Which is

61 Arabic for immigrate. Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

why the statement that there is in fact no instruction in the Q'uran regarding the wearing of the headscarf is hardly considered valid by the majority of Muslims (Ferchl 1991, p. 7; Khoury 2009, p. 11). The *Ḥadīth* are simultaneously an admonition and edification, and they also impart many practical notes and provide information on life in the early Islamic world. However, following them is considered more of a voluntary service which will be rewarded in heaven. There are no consequences for not following them (cf. Krawietz 2002).

200 years after the Hijra[62], there were as many *Ḥadīth*, including ones which were simply made up, as there were fish in the sea. This was because the quickly expanding Islamic empire took on characteristics in particular from local Greek and Iranian cultures, and because some believers attempted to give their ideas and views more weight in the form of *Ḥadīth*. Various political disputes after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (s) also left their mark, as individual groups attempted to legitimise their teachings or political goals with sayings or actions from the Prophet (Ferchl 1991, p. 11).

The *Sunna* was supposedly recorded on papyrus during the life of the first *khalīfah*, but the first collections of *Ḥadīth* which were sorted by topic and included attempts to authenticate the veracity of the statements using scientific methods only came into being during the end of the 8th century. A unique science of the *Ḥadīth* developed. Even today, a *Ḥadīth* always has two parts: the chain of those it was handed down from, known as the *Isnād* which is Arabic for support, and the actual contents, that is the story. The *Isnād* lists, one after another, those who passed on the contents of the *Ḥadīth* and examines their biography, whether they could have had contact with one another and their reputation.

The story itself is also evaluated, and the entire *Ḥadīth* is given a quality ranking, in which weak is the worst rank (*Ḍaʿīf*) and authentic is the best (*Ṣaḥīḥ*). In this context, I wish to mention the works of Bukhārī and Abū Dāwūd, which I used in the course of this analysis. These two *Ḥadīth* scholars created collections that are still in existence

62 Mohammad's (s) move from Mecca to Medina.

today, and, together with four additional collections, are respectfully known as The Six Books: "*al-Kutub as-Sitta*". Bukhārī lived from 810 to 870 CE, that is only around 200 years after the Hijra. His collection is the most famous and is known as "*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*", which translates roughly as "The authentic *Ḥadīth* from Bukhārī."

One serious critique of the *Ḥadīth* is that they were not passed on word for word, and therefore were more vulnerable to changes made by the teller based on their understanding of the text. Therefore, they are considered unsuitable as a binding legal source.

The tradition of memorizing them, which requires great mnemonic skill now as in early Islamic times, however, means that the oral delivery combined with proof of who passed on the story is a much more reliable source than, for example, the earliest written records that were often written without "vowels", that is without diacritic characters and, just like the Q'uran itself, allow for multiple readings. To make clear what exactly is meant by multiple readings, here is an example in English; the consonant sequence 'lv' could be interpreted variously as 'live', 'love', 'lave' or 'lava'.[63] It is the diacritic symbols above and under the consonants that indicate the short vowels. Thus "*l̥v̆*" would be pronounced live while "*lv́*" would be pronounced lave. In Arabic, for example كَتَبَ*kataba* means "he wrote" and, without diacritic symbols it cannot be distinguished from كُتُبْ*kutub* "Books", that is the plural of book.

After that brief introduction to a complex topic, I will now examine both sources, the Q'uran and *Sunna*, for statements regarding clothing, and therefore on the subject of fashion. For the sake of completeness, I will end by taking a short look at pre-Islamic writings

63 The example is not entirely correct, because these are different words with different roots and meanings, whereas words written similarly in Arabic often have a logical connection, as shown by the second example.

and later legal sources.

7.3. Female Clothing, in accordance with the Q'uran

One of the arguments often cited in Germany against wearing the headscarf as a civil servant is that there is no direct instruction in the Q'uran stating that women must cover their hair. This section will examine the direct instructions regarding hair coverage.

First, there is an *Āyā* (verse within a Surah) in the Surah *An-Nūr*, which is Arabic for "the light" and which urges both sexes to avert their gaze from one another.

> 24.30, *An-Nūr* "*Tell the believing men to lower their gaze, and guard their modesty. That is purer for them. Verily, Allah is All-Aware of what they do.*" (Khoury 2009)

The verse then addresses women. Their instructions are even stricter.

> 24:31, *An-Nūr* "*And tell believing women to lower their gaze, and to guard their modesty and not to display their adornment except for what is apparent. Let them draw their head-coverings over their bosoms, and not display their modesty except to their husbands, their fathers, [...].*" (Khoury 1999)

This *Āyā* provides two pieces of information. First, it assumes, as if it were obvious, that there is a head-covering which should be extended to cover the bosom in order to hide the cleavage. Secondly, it states that adornments should not be displayed openly, and on this point, some women argue that their hair is one of their biggest attractions, and therefore must be hidden at all costs. Sigrid Nökel (2002, p. 93) writes about a young woman who, as part of the debate for and against the headscarf, provided arguments using not just Islamic sources, but also examined the image of women in the global west, making critical observations regarding the role of hair. She focused on models, which to her represented the "embodiment of female beauty ideals" and, based on these observations, came to the conclusion that more or

less all women in the advertising industry have excellent hair that is often used for dramatic effect. From this, Nökel's interview partner concluded that hair in 'the West' was certainly considered part of female sexuality, and therefore it was clear that it would fall under the Islamic requirement to cover up (Nökel 2002, p. 93).

Another reference can be found in the Surah *Al-Aḥzāb* (the Clans), which makes it clear that Muslim women should wear a veil in order to mark them as such and set them apart from the slaves; this is why wearing the veil was considered a privilege for a very long time.

> 33.59, *Al-Aḥzāb* "*O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to bring down over themselves [part] of their outer garments. That is more suitable that they will be known and not be abused. And ever is Allah Forgiving and Merciful*" (Khoury 2009).

The same Surah also contains the hijab verse, in which the Prophet hung a curtain in his house because the number of visitors was too much for him (Oestreich 2004, p. 17). This *Āyā* encourages the believers to only approach the wives of the Prophet Muhammad (s) through a veil, the hijab. The intention was to prevent the many people visiting the Prophet from getting too close to his wives.

> 33.53, *Al-Aḥzāb* "*O you who have believed, do not enter the houses of the Prophet except when you are permitted [...] And when you ask [the Prophet's wives] for something, ask them from behind a curtain. That is purer for your hearts*" (Khoury 2009).

This *Āyā* is considered the basis for the division of genders and justification for the isolation of the Prophet's wives, which is seen as a model example for all women.

A person can, therefore, deduce that women should be veiled by using these sources from the Q'uran. However, due to the various potential interpretations, this deduction is neither explicit nor general, which is why I will continue by listing some of the *Ḥadīth* which will further clarify the matter. They also contain the first indications on what legal sources have to say about fashion.

7.3.1. Female clothing in the Ḥadīth

In stories about the life of the Prophet Muhammad (s) and his wives, the main descriptions are of ʿĀʾisha and her clothing. She preferred to wear a yellow, pink or even red dress, known as a *Dirʾ*, and a *Khimār* over that, that is a large veil made or black or sometimes yellow material (Knieps 1993, p. 64).

In regards to the question of the requirement to wear the veil, the *Ḥadīth* do not provide any comprehensive instructions or precise measurements. Often they simply mention, as if it were self-evident, that women wore head coverings, or veils, during the Prophet's lifetime. These women serve at the least as inspiration due to their function as role models.

In my opinion, the *Ḥadīth* that has the most to say on the subject is the following:

> "*Asmāʾ, the daughter of Abu Bakr, entered upon the Prophet and she had on a thin garment. So the Prophet turned away from her and said: 'O Asmāʾ, when a woman comes of age (has reached puberty) it is not proper of her to display more than this and this', and he pointed to his face and hands.* 3643 after ʿĀʾisha (Abū Dāwūd)" (Khoury 2009, pp. 178 sq.).

In another *Ḥadīth* the Prophet Muhammad's favourite wife tells of the first headscarves.

> "May Allah have mercy on the early immigrant women! When (the verse): 'That they should draw their veils over their bosoms' was revealed, they tore their outer garments and made veils from them.' 3632 according to ʿĀʾisha (Abū Dāwūd, Bukhārī)" (Khoury 1999, pp. 178 sq.)

Based on these Q'uran verses and the *Ḥadīth*, many Islamic scholars in a variety of different countries concluded that appropriate clothing, which must not emphasize the body or seem provocative, was compulsory and that, in most cases, this also involved covering the hair. Many Muslim women also conclude, whether they follow the command or not, that there is both a requirement to keep the genders separate and, arising from that, a requirement to cover up, which

urges women to cover their bodies with opaque fabrics that only leave their faces and hands visible. This means that for those women who, through independent study, have determined that there is a command to cover their hair, or for those who have requested a *fatwā*, that is a legal opinion from a scholar, wearing a headscarf is a duty which will be added to the list of bad deeds if ignored. This list contains all those actions for which a Muslim must answer to God on Judgement Day. But everyone must face this moment alone. Thus, according to Islamic law, every person is responsible for their own actions. In regards to clothing, this means, as an example, for my interview partner Suraya, that she always checks to make sure she is not wearing clothing to satisfy her own vanity. This is because she is certain that she will be required to account for all her actions after her death (Suraya 2011-14). If vanity had caused her not to wear the headscarf, even though she should have worn it, she would have to face the consequences of her actions. She said that she knew she would stand before her creator and God would already know everything she had done, that is that she had given in to vanity, but she would still have to account for her actions (TB-FF 2011-13).

But what does *Sharīʿa*[64] say about fashion? Here is one *Ḥadīth*, from Bukhārī's collection. It begins with a verse from the Q'uran, which is clear from the phrase: "God the merciful said" as well as the Arabic character of the Surah, to which I have added the number of the Surah for better comprehension. Bukhārī combined this with a statement from the Prophet and one from the Prophet's companion, Ibn ʿAbbās:

> "*God the merciful said: 'Who is there to make unlawful the beautiful things that God has brought forth for His servants?'* (*Sura al-ʾaʿrāf* – 7,32)
>
> The prophet said: '*Eat, drink, wear clothes and give alms, but do so without extravagance and without conceit.*'

64 Islamic law, but can be understood more as a method of creating laws than as a legal text.

> Ibn ʿAbbās said: '*Eat what you wish and wear what you wish, if you can avoid two things: extravagance and conceit*' 3617 according Ibn ʿAbbās (Bukhārī)" (Khoury 2009, pp. 178 sq.).

This verse clearly states that decoration is not forbidden as such; what counts is the attitude it is worn with. Similarly, the choice of clothing is personal, provided it does not go to extremes.

So the design of the clothing may be chosen relatively freely, but the quality of the material is prescribed, as see-through robes that allow the skin and the hair to show through do not comply with the rules. Therefore, clothing must be opaque. Mālik ibn Anas, one of the founders of the four legal schools and one of the most important collectors of *Ḥadīth* outside of the "Six books", lists the following *Ḥadīth* on the subject:

> "*Ḥafṣa, ʿĀ›ishas niece, went to her and wore a delicate veil. ʿĀ›isha took it, tore it up, and gave Ḥafṣa an opaque veil*" (Knieps 1993, p. 107).

The fact that some *Ḥadīth* mention decorated clothing makes it clear that there is no ban on nice outfits, as in the following verse:

> Umm H̱ālid Bint H̱ālid reports: "*The prophet was brought some clothing, including a small black* H̱amīṣa. *He turned to the people and asked them: 'Who might fit into this* H̱amīṣa*?' When they did not answer he said: 'Bring Umm H̱ālid here!' They came and got me. The Prophet gave me the* H̱amīṣa *and told me to put it on. He said 'May you wear it often and for a long time.' The* H̱amīṣa *had green and yellow patterns on it. When the Prophet saw these decorations he called out 'O Umm H̱ālid, that is* sanāh*!' 'Sanāh' is a word from the Abysinnian language and means 'pretty'*" (Ferchl 1991, p. 413).

At a conference, I was informed that this acceptance of fashionable clothing is often only applied to that clothing that is worn underneath the hijabi robes. I intend to show in this work that this is not the case.

7.3.2. Sources from pre-Islamic writings and later legal schools

Claudia Knieps proved, based on sources from pre-Islamic writings, that various headscarf types still worn today were in fact also common in pre-Islamic times. However, they were worn in different ways: women living in the desert remained unveiled, while city women covered up. The *Quraiš* women from the Prophet's tribe, for example, wore the veil before they converted (Knieps 1993, p. 76). The pre-Islamic writings also describe both men and women covering their hair, and in some cases their face. The descriptions are usually of exceptions to this custom, that is in cases of fear or mourning, because a person was proud of their beauty, or women living apart from the world (ibid., p. 131).

The clothing in question ranged from face coverings, such as *Burquʿ*, *Qināʿ*, *Liṯām* and *Lifām* up to draped garments[65], such as the *Ḥimār*, *Jilbāb*, *Naṣīf* (ibid., p. 76). The *Qināʿ*, is an example of a pre-Islamic veil which could cover the head and face of both men and women and is proven to exist in pre-Islamic writings, but not described in detail (ibid., pp. 92, 94). The *Khimār* and the *Jilbāb* are also often named in early Islamic sources; these are draped garments which are still used today to pull on over regular clothing and cover it in order to go out (ibid., p. 105). These are the only clothing pieces mentioned at all, and they apply specifically to the head (hair) not the face.

Face veils and other types of veil can be proved to have existed in particular because they are described by legal schools, consolidated later on, as not being compatible with the Hajj.[66] These sources also identify specific types of clothing as those worn by the Prophet's wives during prayer: Mālik b. Anas, one of the founders of the legal schools, who died 179 years after the Hijra, reported that ʿĀʾisha and other Prophet's wives clothed themselves appropriately: they wore

65 The toga is another example of a draped garment.

66 Clothing worn during the Hajj is clearly regulated. Women wear loose robes with a headscarf which may not cover the face.

the *Dirʿ*, that is the women's dress, and the *Khimār*, the shawl-like throw which covered their heads (ibid., p. 107).

7.3.3. "But can they do that?"

As a summary, we can say that the legal sources urge women to cover the female body with the exception of their hands and the oval of their face. The design of the clothing remains, according to the legal sources, in the hands of the woman in question. If you ask my interview partner Khadischa, she will tell you that the rules of Islamic fashion are very simple: you can wear anything. It simply cannot be transparent or sit too tightly. The clothing regulations are so broadly formulated that following them is no problem at all (Khadischa 2011-12). The tolerance of ambiguity (cf. the extremely informative book from Thomas Bauer 2011) within Islam, therefore, means that piety and fashion can be easily combined, as there are various levels of sin. Not wearing a headscarf is a relatively small sin. However, wearing it helps women to maintain discipline and serves, among other things, as a constant reminder of their desire to submit to God. This should not be underestimated. The outer expression of faith provides women with the strength they need to maintain their religious discipline.

A variety of legal schools have issued detailed descriptions on appropriate female clothing; they provided very different descriptions which lead, in a variety of cities, to very different fashions. Fashion, therefore, is allowed, provided it remains within self-imposed limits. They can, in fact, do that. To conclude from this that the headscarf is unnecessary, or represents a provocation, is, however, extremely self-referential and does not take into account the meaning of the piece as a personal religious ritual for the women who wear it. In the following section, I will return again to the 'why' of the headscarf, in the context of fashion and the law.

7.3.4. Hijab serves to protect modesty

As already mentioned, and shown by other authors[67], there are many reasons to wear a headscarf:

> "As you know, lots of Muslim women wear hijab for a variety of different reasons, some of them religiously based, or for security or comfort and other times for more political reasons. My reasons literally have nothing to do with how I am perceived by a man" (fat brown hijabis 2013).

Above and beyond the religious reference mentioned above, many young Muslim women use the headscarf to show their families "that they deserve to be trusted" (Beck-Gernsheim 2004, p. 60) and that there is no need to worry about their daughters when they visit study groups or similar in the evenings. By learning about religion and presenting themselves externally as religious and morally pure, the young women earn freedoms, as they are able to use their own moral superiority, which is drawn from their religious superiority, in a discourse on personal freedoms. This may mean that in Germany as many or even more Muslim women begin wearing the headscarf earlier than in countries with a Muslim majority.

For a time, at the beginning of this research, I theorized that banning Muslim women from wearing the headscarf would be like telling 'western' men that they were now free of the requirement to wear trousers, and that they could wear skirts instead, as skirts are much more practical and comfortable. I assumed that the embarrassment that these men would experience without trousers would be equal to the feelings of a woman who was forced to remove her hijab. I introduced this theory in many conversations and interviews, and discovered that the women rejected my reference to embarrassment.

> Suraya denied it vehemently, saying that not wearing a headscarf would not be embarrassing, nothing about it would be embarrassing. She continued that because many women do not wear a headscarf, nobody would even notice if she left the house without one. But not

67 e.g. Klinkhammer (2000), Nökel (2002) and Beck-Gernsheim (2004).

> wearing trousers would be embarrassing for her. The difference was that she was afraid of Allah, not the people on the street. If she was to leave the house without trousers, she would have to explain herself to Allah and the people she saw, but without a headscarf she would only have to provide an explanation to Allah. He was the one she was afraid of; she imagined that he would ask her on Judgement Day why she did not wear a headscarf. He would know why, but he would ask her anyway, and she would have to answer. She said it was a huge difference, which is why the headscarf could not be compared to wearing trousers (Suraya 2011-14, Line 260).

None of my other interview partners explicitly mentioned anything about feeling naked without a headscarf either.

At other points during the interviews, however, it became clear that the original idea, that is that wearing certain clothing produced specific feelings, could not be dismissed out of hand. For example, although Suraya takes off the hijab as soon as she gets home, her mother keeps her hijab clothing on all day, even when she is alone (ibid.). Suraya told me this was because her mother says she feels naked in her heart when she is not wearing a headscarf. And she felt more comfortable with the scarf on: she was simply too cold without the scarf (ibid., verbal clarification).

Which is why the comparison must be modified. Hijab cannot be compared to trousers, or any other type of leg covering, but rather with a specific type of clothing which one must first get used to. The type of clothing which gives a person a sense of security. Once they are used to it, wearing the hijab gives women the same sense of security as, for example, others feel when wearing jeans. After all, comfort in jeans is not self-evident. Jeans, with their hard seams and solid waistband, are in fact initially quite an uncomfortable piece of clothing, requiring a certain figure to wear: Lehnert writes:

> "Once the jeans are broken in, you feel, when wearing them, as secure in your own body as a woman from the 19th century in a corset and sweeping dress may have felt, or a as man feels in a proper suit" (Lehnert 2013, p. 62).

As already explained, fashion and the body meet, from the perspective of the person wearing the clothing, on an affective level; some pieces

of clothing feel 'right' while others feel 'wrong'. Jeans provide a feeling of security to many people, just as hijabi clothing, for Muslim women who prefer the hijab and have worn it for a long time, also provides this feeling of 'rightness': the women feel authentic and secure, which provides an accompanying feeling of being correctly dressed in certain situations. For example, Suraya does not always feel this way about jeans. If she switches contexts, that is countries, then she finds jeans to be fashionably unsuitable (cf. 178).

I would like to point out here, that, as a general rule, the term hijab refers not just to the headscarf; instead, this word refers to the entire outfit and often also the associated behaviour. Most of my interview partners said something to this effect.

> "[Ma:] I find that [the leggings another Muslim woman was wearing] are too... I mean I think, you know, that headscarf just doesn't fit, she might as well just take it off. Really. Because the headscarf, it isn't just the scarf, this piece of fabric, but in general, it's an attitude" (Maryam 2011, Line 665).

The headscarf is, in general, considered part of a total outfit in which the women feel good and which gives them the feeling of being fully dressed. The hijab is also a constant reminder of a behavioural code to be followed. This invisible connection to a behavioural code allows many young women to use the hijab in family arguments in order to earn freedoms for themselves, as already noted by Karakaşoğlu and Boos-Nünning (2005), Höglinger (2002) and Jessen and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (2006) (cf. Section 8.1.1).

This clothing, as foreign as it may still seem to many non-Muslims in Germany, is in fact anything but, as it has developed from the styles that are common in Muslim majority countries into a very specific style that is worn above all in large 'western' cities.

That covers the legal situation regarding the headscarf and fashion in Islam, and the purpose of the headscarf. But what does German law have to say in regards to headscarves? That is the focus of the next section.

7.4. Hijab in Germany

The starting point for collective religious freedom is the individual freedom of religion, which is legally well secured and guaranteed in Germany via a series of non-discrimination regulations (Towfigh 2010, p. 463).

> "The core of German religious laws is a system of regulations situated between guarantee of basic rights for the individual and the institutional state church law for the collective" (ibid., p. 460).

This institutional state church law is explicitly Christian. Secularity in Germany, in addition, does not mean that the state is value-neutral, but rather that it specifies values that the religious communities can adopt and represent (Bodenstein 2010, p. 352).

As mentioned above, the question of the legal status of the headscarf in Germany was largely negotiated around the question of the civil service, and began when the teacher Fereshta Ludin sued for the right to teach in a German school. She had been refused employment because she wore a headscarf, after which she began a legal battle that went all the way to the German Federal Constitutional Court. The court determined that:

If the headscarf is seen as a religious duty, it is subject to Article 4 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law Basic German Law (somewhat equivalent to a constitution) (GG), which guarantees freedom to practice religion. So far so good. In regards to teachers, this individual right is supported by the ban on discrimination in Article 33 Paragraphs 2 and 3 GG, which is intended to guarantee equal access to all public service positions. Therefore, banning teachers from wearing the headscarf would impinge on their freedom of religion, although it is questionable whether teachers can fully apply Basic Law in regards to their employment status, or if this status is subject to limitations (Blumenthal 2009, p. 105).

Here, at the latest, is when the problems begin, because according to Article 6 Paragraph 1 GG, parents have the right to raise their child as they see fit. In general, this is not seen as applying to schools,

as the state takes on responsibility in their place, and the state must take the basic rights of the students into account. One of these basic rights, in turn, is Article 4 Paragraph 1 and 2 GG, already mentioned above, which also covers a dissenting freedom of religion, that is the right to belong to no religion at all and to not be subjected to restrictions when it comes to one's own freedom of religion. Here, too, there is significant debate regarding whether or not a violation of the freedom of religion is taking place simply because it is possible to tell which religion a teacher belongs to based on her clothing. Despite this objection, the conflict is rests on the question as to whether the positive religious rights of teachers who wear the headscarf outweigh the dissenting rights of the students, who have the right to religious freedom.

The German Federal Constitutional Court, in its judgement from 24/09/2003, concluded that there was no substantiated legal basis in Germany for providing a final judgement on the issue. As the German state's scope for action in regards to religious symbols was broader than generally assumed, it was the responsibility of the states and their legislative bodies to create the legal foundations in this case (Blumenthal 2009, p. 104).

7.5. Debate

Once the decision was handed down, a long social debate began, which can be divided into religious and secular arguments. Across all social lines, politicians from different parties argued for solutions that were, in part, very personal. For example Edmund Stoiber, CSU, Angela Merkel, CDU and Roland Pofalla, CDU argued, quite predictably and from a Christian position, for discrimination, that is for banning headscarves, but wanted crosses to be considered a cultural-political statement and therefore an exception. Support for this position also came from more surprising corners, such as Wolfgang Thierse, SPD and Wolfgang Huber, who at the time was

the Bishop of the Protestant church in Berlin Brandenburg EKiBB, as well as Antje Vollmer, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, although it must be said that the latter two represented individual opinions within their organisations (ibid., p. 129). Gerhard Schröder, member of the SPD and Chancellor of Germany at the time, argued for a headscarf ban for secular reasons, as did fellow party member Lale Akgün and other Members of Parliament from various parties. Alice Schwarzer, in particular, represented a civil-political opinion as a representative of feminist views.

Those who spoke out against a ban generally used religious arguments to do so. For example, religiously motivated objections to the ban came from the Protestant and Catholic churches, Johannes Rau, SPD, Rita Süßmuth, CDU, Renate Künast and Claudia Roth, both Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

By the end of 2006, eight German states had issued a legally regulated ban on religious symbols, including Berlin on 20.01.2005. The following section provides a comprehensive discussion on the debate surrounding these laws in Berlin.

7.5.1. State's issues: Berlin

The state of Berlin also took up the debate regarding the relationship between the religion and the government, with the most intensive discussion of all the German states. As part of this debate, the SPD and PDS spoke out equally against treating the headscarf and the cross differently. However, the SPD did have many members who were for a ban for secular reasons, while the PDS largely voted against a ban because of the impracticality of implementing a ban without it turning into practical discrimination for, above all, Muslim women (ibid., p. 235). CDU and FDP, over the course of the debate, supported a ban on religious symbols within schools and, as time went on, from within the public service, but in doing so were explicitly pushing for a headscarf ban and requesting exceptions for Christian and Jewish symbols. The Bündnisgrünen were also in favour of a ban, however

they wanted a ban only in schools and justified their decision by citing the student's freedom of religion.

In the end, the CDU proposed a bill in February of 2004 that contained a ban on religious symbols with an exception for Christian symbols (Blumenthal 2009, p. 238). However, it quickly became clear that all other parties were against this type of discrimination. They decided to include the civilian population in the debate, and in doing so requested responses from basically the entire non-Muslim population: the council of district mayors, the unions, various personnel councils and industry associations, the main staff council, and the "Religious and ideological communities" (ibid., p. 240), that is the Protestant and Catholic churches. At this point, it is important to note how strange it is that not a single Muslim organisation was asked for their opinion.

The bill, which was eventually passed, dealt with the headscarf in schools and the civil service, and included a ban on all religious symbols following the secular arguments for a ban. Based on the constitutional ruling, the Berlin lawmakers concluded that they could either allow the headscarf to be worn, or introduce a general ban. They therefore decided to ban religious symbols in all public locations where people had no way of avoiding them. An exception was made for kindergartens and institutions where adults can earn a high school qualification. One positive note is that Berlin is the only one of the eight states who introduced such a law to explicitly state that there will be no exception for Christian and Jewish symbols. In Bremen and Lower Saxony, there is at least implicitly no clear exception, that is these symbols are not mentioned at all (ibid., pp. 243, 269). However, it must be noted that the City of Berlin does not have any other Christian references in its constitution, there is no reference to God in the preamble and although Sunday is a holiday, there is no mention of religious reasons for this decision. The only reference to religion is that it is protected.

7.5.2. Criticism for the judgement

Objects are not automatically symbolic; instead, they are turned into symbols by people as part of a communication process. This process may be successful, after which the sender and receiver will have similar ideas regarding what is being communicated. Or it may fail, as can be seen in the case of the headscarf. And of course in many cases, the headscarf is not intended as a means of communication at all, as Heide Oestreich (2004) notes. It is only in the eyes of the dominant society, according to many of my interview partners, that the headscarf becomes a symbol, and, with this property, is then compared to the Christian cross (ibid., p. 77). But comparing the headscarf to the Christian cross blocks out the sartorial component of the cloth, and reduces it to its visibility, its symbolism (Amir-Moazami 2007, p. 110). Doing so completely ignores the fact that many Muslim women make the headscarf part of their personality. Banning it as a religious symbol, therefore, is religious discrimination, because it involves unequal treatment. While banning Christian religious symbols simply means a person must take off or hide their symbol, the same ban, for a Muslim woman, violates the boundaries of religious shame (Oestreich 2004, p. 113).

> "A teacher is not a wall, and the headscarf is not a cross that they can simply take down" (ibid., p. 73). "There is a fundamental difference between a Christian taking off her cross, and a Muslim taking off her headscarf" (ibid., p. 77).

The state must remain neutral, which is why a cross on a wall can rightfully be interpreted as an identification of the state with Christianity. But a headscarf worn by an individual teacher points more towards her own attitude than to that of the state (Blumenthal 2009, p. 107). Her function as a role model is only impaired if being religious itself is considered objectionable.

Those against the headscarf are therefore forced to use arguments regarding the political dimension of the headscarf as a means of legitimising the unequal treatment, saying that the headscarf is primarily a political, not a religious symbol. But human rights violations carried

out in the name of Islam should not be confused with the headscarf itself, which is covered by the religious freedom that every person has a right to (cf. Oestreich 2004, p. 93). Meanwhile, there continues to be no proof of the political fundamentalism that is simultaneously ascribed to those who wear the headscarf. This proof cannot be provided because, with the exception of ISIS (Islamic State) members in Iraq and (Greater) Syria, there are very few women Islamic fundamentalists (ibid., p. 186).[68] Treating the headscarf as a purely political symbol is, furthermore, unfair, as there are other potential interpretations and the "objective standpoint" is decisive when it comes to interpretation (Blumenthal 2009, p. 107). Interpretation cannot be used to justify unequal treatment when it comes to the two religious symbols, the headscarf and the cross.

According to Oestreich (2004, p. 47), arbitrating the scarf as a piece of clothing in Germany fails due to the lack of 'international experience' within the judicial system. That there might be such a thing as modest boundaries outside of the lower part of the body, or that space might be divided into more than just the public and private spheres, simply does not make sense in Germany; these types of self-perception and ideas surrounding space are something special, something 'foreign'. Therefore it is not surprising that Christians find it so hard to believe that a scarf may be simply a piece of clothing (ibid., p. 47).

The headscarf bans are, collectively, to be seen as problematic at best, as they are based on an assumed suggestive effect surrounding the cloth, namely that it represents a danger. But this has not been proven. To date, no parent has complained, although there are indeed individual teachers who wear the headscarf (ibid., p. 71). It is also not clear what actual danger to children might result from the scarf. Religion is not being forced on any child (ibid., p. 47). Not wearing a scarf does not protect children from being forced to wear one by their

68 Cf. the statistic on page 81: only 7% of all male and female youth considered it important to differentiate themselves from those with different beliefs that they viewed in a negative light (Khorchide 2010, p. 374) (which, it must be pointed out, does not automatically make them religious fundamentalists).

parents any more than it prevents young women from wearing one of their own free will (ibid., p. 78). The result is continued stigmatisation of a minority. Instead of learning tolerance, children learn that people who look different are dangerous and must be marginalised (ibid., pp. 78 sq.) Both Sigrid Nökel (2002, pp. 105-109) and Heide Oestreich (2004, p. 139) therefore, come to the conclusion that the reaction to the headscarf is usually a bigger problem than the headscarf itself. In terms of the court proceedings surrounding Fereshta Ludin and her views, it seems "to be more about the question of cultural dominance than the emancipation of the woman" (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 124).

7.6. Criticism from within Muslim communities

In the following I will examine criticism of the clothing worn by other women from another perspective, one that I continually heard over the course of my research. Hurriya's experience of how much push-back a woman might receive after deciding to wear less modest clothing seems to be a good example. Hurriya did not go as far, it is true, as taking off her headscarf, but did decide, for fashionable and social reasons, to deviate from a style that she had assumed for religious reasons. However, as her religious style was seen as morally superior, she received a great many questions and negative feedback after this decision. She experienced so much criticism that it can be assumed that her retreat from her circle of friends back to her family was connected to her sartorial decision.

This could very well be why Hurriya is the only woman who did not criticise other women's clothing during her interview, whereas the majority of my interview partners did in fact make one or more remarks regarding other women's styles. I suspect that, when these women criticise other women, they are doing so as a legitimate option for gaining prestige: criticising clothing worn by other women simultaneously establishes their own clothing as the standard. At the same time, this is a justification strategy.

Even men have begun to criticise the clothing worn by Muslim women, and Sheiks regularly pass negative judgements or praise a certain style as being preferable. The frequent criticism is that Muslim women who combine the headscarf with tight clothing supposedly bring everything to do with Muslim women and fashion into disrepute: this is assumed to be true both for the dominant society, who might believe a woman wearing the headscarf and 'sexy' clothing is an example of someone forced to wear the headscarf (due to the contradiction between her clothing and the headscarf), and for other Muslims, in particular critics of fashion that accentuates the figure and view it as a reprehensible display of the body.

Many blogs also take a lot of time to analyse the strong criticism that women's clothing is subjected to. In doing so, they make it clear that in terms of sartorial empowerment, it can be very freeing and empowering to wear a hijab, but that this freedom may become very limiting if the woman does not wear a hijab or particularly if she decides to stop wearing the hijab. It is immediately assumed that she has stopped believing. Nobody questions how close she feels to God, how often she prays or why she took off the headscarf (wood turtle 2012). At the same time, belief is connected only to clothing. Nobody asks whether a man has paid his *Zakāt*[69], or whether his wife also prays five times a day. Both of these actions belong to the five Islamic pillars of belief that are required of every Muslim, whereas the veil represents a more personal decision and is not listed as a direct duty in the Q'uran (cf. Section 7.2 as well as the notes from Rahimi 2014).

Criticism of the criticism: developments in social media

Most people do not want to discuss this critical aspect to wearing the hijab, because, as already shown in this chapter, there are enough discourses discussing coercion in the Islamic faith. As such, some

69 One of the five pillars of Islam is the obligation to pay alms, known as "*Zakāt*" The amount to be given is a set portion of the person's assets or income.

young people have found a way to express their criticism of the criticism in a satirical or literary manner by using the options provided to them by the Web 2.0 and the social media within it. To joke about something sends the message that they will not allow anyone to control their life. I have already mentioned some literary blog examples, and now I would like to introduce a satirical example.

Within the framework of these developments, a new Facebook page that practices social criticism has emerged. The page is called "A Man's Hijab" with the subtitle "What would it be like if men and beards were treated like women and headscarves? NOTE: This page is SATIRE and shows how ridiculous the analogies are." The motto associated with the page is "Hijab4Men: Let's turn the tables and show men how it feels." (N.N. 2014)

The page satirically encourages Muslim men to wear a beard. In doing so, it touches on some interesting elements, in particular images of men wearing little or no clothing in advertising. Identical images are posted side by side, but the second picture has been modified using Photoshop (the modification is often deliberately done badly) to put clothing on the men that matches the rules listed in the Q'uran and stick a long beard on their faces. The page's profile image shows a safety razor inside a prohibition sign that encourages men to stop shaving: "Say no to a razor."

Several blogs reported on the page and sympathised with the woman who created it.[70] Some men left derogatory comments noting that the images were a terrible comparison, but instead of a response to these comments, they were answered with quotes from many *āyāt* and *Ḥadīth* which encouraged men to grow a beard in order to protect their modesty and keep women from looking at them too often. Other statements consist of short counter-narratives. These took on motifs regarding expectations for women and their hijab from stories or jokes that are regularly circulated on the internet, on Facebook and so on, in various different forms. The origin of these is a series of advertising posters that apparently appear at regular intervals in the Middle East.

70 For example: Bonessi (2014) or Mustefa (2014).

Figure 7.1.: Typical internet advertisement for more modest clothing, source: (N.N. 2014).



Figure 7.2.: Satirical response to Image 7.1: criticism on the display of the male body. (N.N. 2014).

Examples can be seen in Images 7.1 and 7.3. The latter refers to a story that is often told as below or in a similar form by Muslims and is also regularly spread through the "Imam Internet" (wood turtle 2011):

> A Christian asks a Muslim why Muslim women have to cover themselves. As an answer, the Muslim takes out two lozenges, removes one from its packaging, and throws both of them onto the ground. Then he asks the Christian which of the two he would prefer to eat. When the Christian points to the lozenge still in its packaging, the Muslim laughs and explains that the same is true for Muslim women (vgl. Mustefa 2014).

The British journalist Zab Mustefa notes how objectifying it is that women are compared to sweets, of all things (vgl. ibid.). A counter-narrative is being shared on the Facebook satire page as an answer to this type of story. It goes as follows:

> "A Catholic priest once met with a Shaykh and asked him: 'Why are your men required to have beards?' The Shaykh smiled and took out two kiwis from his pocket (he likes to carry kiwis around with him). He peeled the hairy skin from one of them, and left the hairy skin on the other. He then threw both of the kiwis on the ground and asked the priest: 'Which one are you willing to eat?' The priest said 'Of course the one with the hairy skin still on it!' The Shaykh again smiled and said: 'It is the same with our men!'" (N.N. 2014)

This story is used to highlight how ridiculous it is to compare women wearing a hijab to an inanimate object.

During the course of my doctoral research, I was often asked if Muslim women were even allowed to wear fashionable clothing. At the beginning of this chapter, I dealt with this question from a theoretical perspective, but here I want to examine it from an empirical one. I consider this question proof that the discourse regarding what "proper" Muslim clothing should look like has also been heard in the dominant society. There are even some studies which attempt to present ideas from different Muslim groups in numbers (cf. Image 7.4[71]). I always

71 Over the course of my research I received many links and tips regarding my topic, but this one was offered only by non-Muslims.

had trouble answering this question, because it seemed that there was no simple or clear-cut answer. But the satirical criticism helped me find an answer to this question, the question I heard so often during my research.

The answer, perhaps formulated a little sharply, is as follows: "What business is it of yours?" It is for the women in question to decide, indeed they are solely responsible for the decision, because the matter is between them and God. They are independent thinking beings who, naturally, have the sole right to decide what clothing they wear. Asking "but can they do that?" is like asking if a person is ever allowed to clothe themselves based on their own ideas. It may be in poor taste, but as long as the person in question does not violate the laws that apply to their situation regarding clothing, they are free to wear what they want. Which is exactly what people all around the world do, even in countries in which women are legally required to wear certain clothing. Within the framework of the legal possibilities, they select fashionable outfits which project the image of an individual and creative person, and to signal their association with certain social groups. By criticising the criticism, the makers of this satire defend the establishment of Muslim fashion. This fashion is, on their part, to be viewed as a strategy against discrimination, and is intended to show that Muslim fashion represents an integrated part of western society with Muslim beliefs.

This satirical page also criticizes internal Muslim criticism regarding different ways of wearing the headscarf as extremely hypocritical., It condemns the fact that women, both in the non-western and western world, are often confronted with merciless beauty ideals. At the same time, however, those who equate the hijab with perfect freedom from sin forbid women from meeting these beauty ideals. Men are not subject to the same intrusive demands to wear certain clothing; they do not have to master the difficult task of wearing clothing that is acceptable to God and yet still fulfilling the unbelievable and practically impossible to meet demand for female beauty. After all, it is not just Europe and the western world that makes these demands, as noted by the journalist Emily Dische-Becker in her blog piece on

Figure 7.3.: Demand that women cover themselves, objectifying comparison to sweets. Photo: Twitter/Gautam Trivedi, Arabic subtitle: Hijab honours the lady. English subtitle: Veil is security (Bonessi 2014).



Figure 7.4.: The 'west' begins to be interested in 'proper' Islamic clothing and starts a survey. From the report "The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions of Tunisians" (Moaddel 2013, p. 54).

faz.net:

> "In the Arabic Levant, just like everywhere else, the norms of female beauty are a much larger burden than the veil. [...] In Lebanon it is easier to get a loan for plastic surgery than it is to get one to buy a house or start a small business. As Maher Mezher from the First National Bank, which grants immediate loans of $ 5000 for these operations, explains: 'People who don't look good cannot find a job in Lebanon and are socially ostracised'" (Dische-Becker 2014).

Criticising the criticism is a way for these women to emancipate their own sartorial development from the negative discourses that come from Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It demonstrates their determination to maintain their own style. The biggest challenge for these young women is clearly found not just within the dominant society, where, as Muslims, they are in the minority, and in fact often began wearing the headscarf in the first place as a way of distinguishing themselves from the majority. The development of an empowerment strategy has provided an affective antidote to the confrontations and hierarchical degradations that Muslim women experience again and again within the dominant society. Now the time has come to deal with Muslim critics, and to ensure that they can no longer be "shamed into or out of" the hijab (cf.. Rahimi 2014).

7.7. Summary of Part One

The first section of this work dealt with the theoretical questions posed by the title. In order to understand the headscarf debate, it is necessary to understand the underlying discourses. These involve not just cultural conflicts of all sorts, but also clear economic parameters. As detailed in Chapter 8.2.1, the headscarf debate is a lower-class discourse applied to Muslim women from families with an immigration background. By referring again and again, within the discourse surrounding Islam, to how traditional and backwards this religion is, women who wear the headscarf are pigeon-holed into this discourse and

their qualifications are automatically downgraded. It is this figuration that the women, who are often extremely well integrated, have to work through. The headscarf debate served, within the framework of changes to the law and the citizenship debate, as a welcome subject "for suggesting consensus within the 'majority society'" (Amir-Moazami 2007, p. 26). It can be understood as a technique for maintaining power in which structures and practices are used to hide the reproduction of the balance of power (Fournier and Yurdakul 2010, p. 103). And as soon as women belonging to the minority demand the same rights as those with power, the rules of the game change and new laws are created. The fact that these laws include exceptions for the church are an even clearer sign that the real object was hegemonial power and securing of privileges (Oestreich 2004, p. 80).

Because the women are continually reminded that they are foreign by various ascriptions from their migrant reference population, from the dominant society, and in their own family home, the women do not have many identity offers available to them. Assigning a national description to themselves, as their parents are likely still able to thanks to their own migration experience, is difficult because these descriptions often do not fit. At the latest when on holiday in their parent's country it will become clear that this type of identification is not acceptable to the people living in that country. Positioning themselves as German Muslims, therefore, offers adequate identification potential with those elements that appear important to the women.

But establishing the hijab as the symbol for an entire religion is problematic, as there is no such thing as the hijab which functions as a religious symbol: various hijabi practices highlight very different reference points to religion. Muslim women who wear the headscarf do so, for example, in order to underline their serious commitment to their relationship with God. In light of the headscarf's association to the negative discourses listed above, people are unable to understand why anyone would freely choose to wear a social marker of exclusion. What these people fail to see is the many layered meanings inscribed on the hijab that go above and beyond this negative discourse. Indeed, the hijab has many more layers than just that of a religious symbol. It

is a marker for class, generation/age, social status, gender, background, Islamic legal school, interest in fashion and more.

Hijabi fashion, therefore, in accordance with the statements made in the chapter on fashion, is decorative clothing for the articulation of the social body that remains, on the one hand, largely the same in order to allow for social ascription. On the other hand, this clothing changes cyclically, but only in the details, for example with various accessories or similar, allowing individual artistic arrangements to emphasize the wearer's individuality.

For many non-Muslims, however, the headscarf is not a simple piece of clothing designed to protect the wearer from the weather, or worn as a fashion object, but rather it is an object that is the site of negotiation for the modern, civilization, civil rights, as well as questions regarding religion and secularisation. It appears to be the site of the conflict between the nation-state and the personal autonomy of the family (Brown 2001, p. 107).

The section that follows is an evaluation of this work. I will solidify the theories listed at the beginning of the book and show how the initial theories developed and which ideas were added. Finally, I will make my conclusions accessible for both migration and fashion research as part of my final theoretical considerations.

Part II.

Summary analysis

8. Thesis Discussion: The Circuit of Hijab Clothing

This section will, on the one hand, return to the thesis proposed at the beginning of this book, and also concentrate on final theoretical considerations and a summary of the results of this work. I will begin with the development of Muslim fashion in Germany and retrace how the development of creative Hijabi fashion can be explained and understood in light of general sartorial developments. Then, with reference to Chapter 3, I will discuss forms of representation, how socially excluding discourses have fanned fashion development, and finally, as part of my thesis, I will discuss how those women I interviewed who have not experienced migration, in particular, use their clothing as a strategy of sartorial empowerment. This section will reveal another clue as to why, in the last few decades, there has once again been an increase in the visibility of Muslim clothing.

I will close this section with a few thoughts on fashion and migration theory discussed as they relate to my thesis as well as to the theoretical section of this work.

In doing so, I will refer not just to the interview partners I have introduced. Instead, my analysis will also reference selected impressions from the many spontaneous interviews that I carried out as part of my image research, as well as from my extensive field research in a transnational clothing store.

8.1. Integration is already here: 'Berlin Style'

Chapter 4, on fashion, determined that sartorial objects, when in use, are never neutral. Instead, they represent a social process that is embedded within social structures. People use fashion to position themselves as a subject and integrate with existing groups. On the one hand, individuals can express their connection and social adaptation to a desired social group, and on the other they can differentiate themselves from different groups (cf. Rohr 2012, p. 83; and Svendsen 2006, p. 113). They generally remain true to the style they aspire to, even taking into account short-term aesthetic changes, often called 'fashion', which are intended to maintain sartorial stability within the group. This clothing style has already been described in the theory chapter on fashion as a type of 'basic dress code'.

Lehnert (2013, p. 18) provided the initial idea for this work, that is that a deeper analysis of a society, including knowledge regarding its standards of taste and the social hierarchies reflected therein, are part of symbolic and cultural capital. Conformance with and deliberate breaches of the standards are part of a sartorial calling card which emphasises not just aesthetic competence but also education. Reading and in particular composing a style or a fashion is thus a type of cultural competence, and this also includes, consciously or unconsciously, analysis of current law and familiarity with dominant discussions regarding presentation and meaning. Which is where the ability to adapt in terms of fashion comes from.

As previously discussed, the women interviewed prefer to purchase clothing such as shirts, Cardigans or skirts in shops such as *C&A*, *Orsay* or *H&M*, and then visit transnational small businesses to find complementary clothing in matching colours (TB 2011-13). During my time as a retail assistant in one of these small businesses in Neukölln, I was able to observe multiple women visiting the smaller shop with shirts from one of the larger chains, in order to look for headscarfs or underscarfs in exactly the same colour. In almost all cases, the colour they were looking for was not available, as colours change quickly in popular fashion. The smaller businesses, however, import their goods

from the previous season from Turkey or Lebanon, and therefore often do not have the more current colours available, and can only supply them a season too late. This is likely the reason that almost all the interview partners agreed that there was in fact development of Muslim fashion within Germany, but that all described it as slow.

They unanimously declared that Muslim fashion in Germany progressed only slowly. Amina, who obviously paid very close attention to Muslim fashion in Germany, said of the small transnational clothing stores:

> [Am:] "But in regards to fashion I think it is more advanced, especially in Aleppo and in Syria. If you walk around the market you will see that all the shops have the same things. And most women buy exactly the same things. Fashion develops much faster than it does here. In the shops here you find a lot of old fashions, they aren't available there. Here you can see older items, the distributors bring them here and sell them in the shops. I mean, I have bought clothing here and then when I wore it in Syria I realised that it was already way out of fashion there. When people saw me, they told me my clothing wasn't fashionable anymore. People here in Germany wear lots of old-fashioned clothing" (Amina 2011-10, pp. 200-220).

Amina, who prefers a practical approach to fashion for herself, is certainly able to read fashion in her surroundings. According to her, the fashion worn by Muslim women here in Germany is sometimes up to two years behind. In her opinion, this is because there are no trends in Muslim clothing as such in Germany, as the shops hang up clothing from the latest and from older seasons next to one another; older seasons are not winnowed out. In an Arabic Souk, however, an area of a city that sells clothing in particular, there are multiple clothing stores located next to one another. All of them offer the latest fashion and none of them would offer things from the previous season in their shop.

> [Am:] "If it goes out of fashion, it doesn't stay on the market. They only offer new things. In Syria the distributors pay attention to the large fashion shops, they look at what is new and that's what they buy. The things that arrive in Germany are similar things. But you can also find a lot of older fashions. For example, this chequered

> jacket. It is very old fashioned, this was popular a long time ago. Nobody could buy this in Syria, because if you bought it everyone would say it was an old model. And that's true for most things" (Amina 2011-10, pp. 200-220).

It seems, therefore, that Muslim fashion in Germany can keep up with the pace of fashion trends only with difficulty. I asked Maryam, who grew up in Germany, why that might be. After all, at various points in her life she attempted to bring trends from Lebanon back to Germany.

> [Ma:] "Well, I think it's more difficult because in Lebanon, if there is a new fashion, then all the girls have it. And then you feel that peer pressure, that group pressure, everyone has it now. And then you wear it and it really isn't a problem for you, even if it looks weird, because everyone is wearing it. But here in Germany, it's already hard wearing the headscarf and then you add those striking colours or a showy pattern. [...] The thing is, you don't want to stand out too much, I mean, you already stand out enough with the headscarf. And then you also bring something back from there, those weird colours or this weird pattern and everything, that they wear there, that are acceptable there. Here in Germany it usually isn't so in, because it's all way too colourful" (Maryam 2011, Lines 1195-1210).

The question as to how fashion changes is strongly influenced by these observations, because developing a fashion trend requires a certain number of trend setters that adopt a specific style at the same time. Many women come back from an overseas stay in Lebanon or Egypt with new trends, which, in those countries, are suitable for followers, but here in Germany they are trends suitable for fashion pioneers and therefore unsuitable for many women, as they do not want to stand out as Muslims or want to place themselves in the foreground (cf. Chapter 9.1). Maryam, after receiving criticism for her clothing, then puts the fashions away again and swears off trend-setting, while Hurriya follows her own path but withdraws from her friendship groups. Suraya, on the other hand, pushes the date for translating the new fashion (to Libya) back to a time that seems suitable based on a biographical break in her life (e.g. her wedding). Amina simply wears the clothes she wants to, and only adopts trends when she can do so without too much effort.

The answer to the question as to why Muslim fashion changes so slowly in Germany can be used to derive a contribution to general fashion theory, as observing Muslim women's fashion reveals the answer to a question that has not yet been satisfactorily explained: that is the question of why fashion changes at all. I will thoroughly examine this question in the final theoretical considerations in Chapter 9.1.

8.1.1. Muslim Fashion in Germany: changes in spatial structure as an engine for new fashion

Even in light of various difficulties, a modest Muslim fashion has developed in Germany. For many women, this development represents a substantial adjustment to the fact that their space is no longer divided into four categories as described in Section 6.1, at least from a fashionable perspective. Instead, the clothing required is reduced to two spheres: the public and the private. This means that fashion for Muslim women no longer stops when they enter the house (Amina uses this model), because the fashion does not necessarily have anything to do with avoiding attention from men (cf. Yaqin 2007, p. 184). This fact has played a significant part in developing Muslim fashion in Germany. Three of my interview partners adhere to the principle of two spatial spheres, and select clothing styles that they find affectively appropriate for every context in Germany. Suraya and Hurriya do this based on their fundamental interest in fashion, and Maryam does it because she grew up in Germany. Only Amina, who does not like experimenting with fashion, but who lacks the opportunities to do so here in Germany anyway, remains true to a non-European dress code that she developed while living in Syria.

The style I have observed is characterised by jeans and by colours and fabrics also worn by non-Muslim women, or those that can be found in fashion magazines. This perception was strengthened by verbal confirmation of the fact that the clothing was purchased in stores that are not considered 'traditional', but rather western, such as

Orsay (Maryam), or dedicated German brands such as *Gabor* (Suraya). The clothing cuts for the coat, jeans or blouses are also based on European fashion, not on the clothing described in Chapter 5 such as the Abaya or the *Khimār*. When more traditional clothing is worn, it is used as a contrasting style element, such as the Abaya in Image 8.1, which has been combined with a denim jacket. Both pieces of clothing are very fashionable, particularly when combined with one another and the headscarf, which is wrapped according to current fashion with an additional lace scarf, accompanied by matching bracelets, and create a very specific mix of styles, which virtually cries out to be understood as a statement on integration. But where does this development come from?

The conversion of western clothing into hijabi clothing in a non-Muslim environment with 'private' and 'public' spaces instead of a four-part division (Section 6.1) has changed, over time, the fashion of Muslim clothing, as the same clothing is worn in all spheres, whether semi-private or semi-public, and thus must work for every situation, more or less. This, in my opinion, is where the specific integration efforts carried out by young Muslim women in Germany shine. They have developed a style that can take on all kinds of forms, that is not structured by the division of space into four categories nor is it limited by division into two categories, as in the example of Amina and her coats. Instead, this style functions in all contexts and spatial spheres, and can be worn all day. And since special clothing is needed for special events, in my opinion a special type of hijabi celebratory fashion has developed in non-Muslim dominant societies. Special headscarf designers are used instead of hair-dos for events in which the women want to appear particularly dressed up and elegant.

These designers create evening-wear including headscarf designs for these young women, who, for example, often celebrate their wedding with a mixed gender ceremony and party. This allows the element of sartorial extravagance seen in the women's-only public space to be displayed in the western reality of the mixed public. Maryam confirmed this:

> *[J:] Would you say that it has changed in the last 10 years, that there are more girls that start aged 14 or 15?* [Ma:] "Before their wedding, definitely. And lots of them even dream of a wedding wearing the headscarf, and it does really look very good. I can show you on Facebook, I have so many... yes, on Facebook, there are so many beautiful brides with the headscarf and so on and it just looks really pretty. And that is really this fashion..." (Maryam 2011, Line 1335).

Here, the age of the women when they marry is secondary, and even the age at which they began wearing the headscarf plays a secondary role. The only important thing in this case is that there are more mixed-gender wedding parties, and that evening wear, including a hijab, is required for them.

I believe that these special fashions worn for special events do not remain solely within the realm of special events, but rather, bit by bit, creep into regular daily use. Khadischa, from the transnational clothing store that I worked in as a retail assistant as part of my research, told me during my time in her shop that in Germany, too, the large Muslim weddings and events serve as regional stages in which current event fashion, the fashions that will be popular in the next year, can be observed (25.01.2012 TB-FF 2011-13).

This special-event style, in turn, is not limited to the global west, but rather can also be observed in other countries, such as in Turkey, Libya and Egypt, where young women also wear these styles and continue, for their part, to develop the predominant fashion (cf. also Image 6.9). As such, it is not entirely clear from where these fashions spread. It seems, however, that with the opportunities introduced by the internet, even more than those from the beginning of globalization, have allowed this fashionable style to become established as a respectable option for Muslim clothing. For example, one of my interview partners, Khadischa, a sales woman in the clothing store, told me about a new style in Egypt currently preferred by her nieces and their friends. Her niece and other women the same age jokingly refer to it as Krunb, that is cabbage head, because the hijab, made of a cotton-linen mix which creates a fluffy material, is wound like a ball around the head (cf. also Image 5.7 and 8.3). Although 'western'

fashions have been available in dominant Muslim countries for many years, the developments described above towards a cosmopolitan day-to-day fashion, consisting of western fashion combined with a headscarf, worn even by older women, can only be observed over the past few years, as reported by the interview partners with a migratory background (Amina 2011-10; Suraya 2011-14; Khadischa 2011-12).

These thoughts on the development of Muslim fashion in Germany and in other non-Muslim dominant societies also provide a clue as to why some children of migrant women assume their mother is not interested in fashion at all.[72] The fact that there are no women's spaces in which these women can experiment with fashion as they are used to means that there are fewer contexts and opportunities for wearing certain styles of clothing. And this means that, in total, they require less fashionable clothing (cf. Suraya 2011-14, Lines 55-66). This, in my opinion, is exactly the situation in which Amina finds herself.

The basic dress code of my interview partners can, therefore, based on the fact that it has been adjusted to fit the binary structure of public and private space, be labelled 'integrated'. Not in the sense of the imperative to integrate, but rather because it integrates different styles within itself. The women I interviewed refer to it more often as "modern" (Suraya 2011-14, Line 365; and Hurriya 2011, Line 450) or "western" (Maryam 2011, Line 1230). They use these terms to differentiate it from clothing that they describe as 'traditional' and that is, at most, worn to special occasions. They do also wear traditional clothing from countries with an Islamic majority, but usually only to special occasions or parties where they are 'amongst themselves' and do not have to worry about getting weird looks (cf. Seng and Wass 1995, p. 227).

Very diverse clothing elements are integrated into the 'western' basic dress code. For example, Maryam, Hurriya and Suraya prefer stores that belong to large clothing chains, as already mentioned in

72 I asked a lot of my interview partners about their mothers, and almost all of them replied that it would be no use for me to interview their mother, as she was not interested in fashion.

this work. There, Maryam buys what she calls 'normal' fashion which she Islamises using a long-sleeved shirt and a headscarf; you could say she enhances it.

> "These clothes that I buy, most of the time, this is from *Orsay* (points at her clothing) so from a normal store, and I think, I feel good in it and at the same time it doesn't stand out so much. A woman without a headscarf could wear it too, and she wouldn't stand out at all" (Maryam 2011, Line 1220).

The basic dress code is transformed by the women into an individual creation, using artistic design that establishes and integrates a variety of current fashion. For example, the women follow fashion from countries with a Muslim majority just as much as they add central European trends to their wardrobes. There are style elements that are predominant nationally and regionally, with which those women interested in fashion experiment (cf. Maryam on p. 165). In doing so, they look for inspiration from a variety of different platforms. In part, the women look to their role models, for example friends or media presenters. They also look at magazines and fashion catalogues, sometimes also the internet. The internet has provided a larger audience interested in Muslim clothing, which, according to Sarah Elanany, a British designer for integrated modest fashion, has really only existed for a short time. "In the past five years it's started" (Rumbelow 2014). National styles, which up until recently were clearly very different from one another, have begun to mix. Just a few years ago, it was easy to tell if a woman had a Turkish or Arabic background based on the style of clothing she wore, but this is no longer possible without additional information. Arabic speaking women have adopted the style in which a small cap is created with the headscarf, often enforced using a small plastic strip. Women with a Turkish background, on the other hand, have begun to wear more than square silk headscarfs; they now also use long pashmina shawls combined with underscarfs in contrasting colours (TB 2011-13, p. 8). This combination of different styles into a coherent style with various citation options allows me to discuss the development of a Muslim

fashion in Germany, which I named the 'Berlin style' very early in my research.

This development, however, is not limited to Germany at all. Internationally, this style was the subject of much discussion in online media in the Spring of 2014. The media hype centred around two videos from the end of 2013 about "Hijabistas" who, in the discourse that followed, were increasingly named after the title of the second video, that is "Mipsterz", or Muslim hipsters (Rattani and Yazdi 2013). The second video, in particular, caused a real stir. Several newspapers reported on it. The video shows a series of young women filmed during daily life or staged scenes, while the song "Somewhere in America" by rapper Shawn Corey Knowles-Carter, better known as "Jay-Z", plays in the background. The women laugh, ride skateboards in high heels, fence, ride motorbikes. They create staged images of how they spend their time, in the woods or in a parking lot, on the street or on the roof of a building and are, above all completely fashionable, up-to-date with non-Muslim hipster fashion in every way. This fashion implies a specific type of social critique: take, for example, the young woman with the Marilyn Munroe t-shirt and hijab. Annoyed by the attitude of shame displayed by many Muslims post 9/11, the women in the video present a completely different, more self-assured image. An image in which women are still on the street after dark, even if this is frowned upon in some circles. The association with Hip Hop, created by the choice of music, is also interesting. Jonathan Wilson, professor of Islamic Marketing at the University of Greenwich, noted:

> "Post 9/11, Muslims were identified as backward, not cool, not integrationist, terrorist potential. Women were meek, delicate little flowers. People got sick of being stereotyped. This mirrors what happened after the Civil Rights Movement: an explosion in black culture, a great sense of creating a scene. It's interesting that the Mipsterz used a Jay-Z soundtrack, for hip-hop is a massive influence on the Muslim world" (Rumbelow 2014).

This development is a reflection, as already noted, of the development of fashion here in Germany, even though the internet scene is not as robust here. The fashion arising from the mix of styles displayed

by young women who grew up in Germany integrates, quotes and rearticulates elements from a variety of societies and sub-groups within these societies. It amalgamates them on the 'fashion body' into a series of stand-alone fashions that can be summarised with the description 'modern Muslim woman'. This amalgamation can only be implemented via a deep understanding of the various societies, an understanding that, regardless of which discursive definition of integration is in use, is revealed by their clothing. From this, I draw the conclusion that my central question regarding integration statements can be answered as follows: integration is already here, and this can be read in the development of clothing styles used by Muslim women.

This fashion is, then, in my view, an expression of adjustment, aka 'integration', but it is also much more. As previously stated, this style can be viewed not just as an adjustment to a new environment, but also as an expression of classification. Therefore, I want to expand my original thesis. It is not just that these women have long since integrated, they actually identify Germany as their home. However, this perception is not mutual, but rather very one-sided, as the feeling of belonging is constantly being thwarted by public discourse regarding integration, terrorism and Islamophobia, as described in Chapter 3. This is made very obvious by various quotes, such as the following from Maryam:

> "We really just feel lost here. You never really feel comfortable, even though you belong here, you grew up here, but somehow you are in the minority here and you are always being harassed just because you look the way you look. And there, you are happy and you feel good, but you also don't feel like you fit in. There are things that you miss when you're there: I miss how smoothly things run here... I mean, if you want to get an ID, either you find someone that you can bribe so that it happens really quickly, or I don't even know. If you don't have any money, or you don't know anyone, then it takes three, four months before it's done. Yeah, the way things run, all the principles that I like here, I miss them when I'm there. Or if you want to go visit someone, you have to ask a thousand questions because there aren't any real streets. I think it's all well and good on holiday, but I can't really live properly there, and I want to live here, but I'm not accepted here" (Maryam 2011, Lines 1540-1555).

Fashion is clearly visible external proof of this affective classification, as it is only those who have really taken the time to examine the cultural elements of a society that are able to follow its rules of fashion appropriately, rules which of course are also culturally acquired. Which is why many women wonder

> "often with incomprehension [...], how much more they have to integrate [...][in regards to Mosque communities in the DITIB]" (Beilschmidt 2016).

There is, of course, a method to the discursive rearticulation of the supposed lack of integration, because most discourses surrounding integration are used to successfully hide social inequalities. The following chapter will connect the ideas already expressed above to the interview partners.

8.2. Exclusionary Discourses Serve to Secure Privilege

Women who wear the hijab are confronted, in their day to day lives and in media discourse, with two stereotyping orientalisms in particular; thus, the narrative regarding hijab clothing is often very similar. In both my research into the literature and my own personal research, women emphasised that their clothing was chosen freely as a means of external identification with a lifestyle that was just as freely chosen. They view this lifestyle as completely compatible with basic democratic principles and day to day life in Germany. And yet, the narrative shows that these women's own experiences are often negated by clichés (Höglinger 2002, p. 114). The cliché consists of two accusations. One is that the headscarf is worn as a sign, flag or symbol of Islamist beliefs. The wearer is able to somewhat easily distance themselves from this accusation by ensuring they are aware of the difference between Islamic and Islamist ideas, although of course this is a challenge for daily life because it is impossible to explain to every glaring passer-by what it is that drives a personal decision to wear a specific type of

clothing. The other accusation is not as easy to deconstruct. That is because this accusation is the general suspicion that Hijabi women are passive victims of patriarchal dominance (ibid., p. 103). As they live in Europe, so the thought goes, this is their own fault, as they are exposed to other models on a daily basis. The increased number of women wearing the headscarf cannot, therefore, according to this theory, be ascribed to the strengthening of a Muslim-feminine identity, but rather, in contrast, represents general subjugation. And this can be proven using extreme examples from Afghanistan or Iran (ibid., p. 107). In the following two sections, I will deconstruct this image of superior western emancipation as related to identity construction and orientalist ideas, and instead provide alternative interpretations of the hijab.

8.2.1. Western emancipation and the neo-colonial Other

> "Wearing the headscarf appears to be tolerated, but it is secretly sanctioned" (Kandil 2010, p. 553).

The sanction mentioned in this quote can be equated with a de facto refusal to allow for social integration, even though social integration is an absolute requirement if all parties are going to live together successfully. Because western emancipation ideals are applied without reflection, hijabis who wish to wear the headscarf and also have a career are discriminated against. Employers justify this by referencing the hijabi woman's anticipated lack of participation. To use a Muslim women's clothing as a basis for judging her degree of freedom, degree of modernity, or even her social or professional skills is a form of religiously motivated discrimination.

The assumption is that those who wear a headscarf remain trapped in traditional thought patterns, in which helpless women stand in stark contrast to superior men. However, hijabi clothing in Germany cannot be compared to the clothing worn outside of Europe. On the one hand, the women here are in the minority, and on the other they

live in a lay and/or secular state, in which, at least formally, there is legitimate and democratic freedom of religion (Klinkhammer 2000, p. 272). For example, in the case of the woman who wanted to be a teacher, we must consider the contextuality of the hijab on the one hand, and its character on the other. The clothing worn by Muslim women in the Middle East is different on a fundamental level from that of the trainee teacher, as demonstrated in the previous section. The argument that the hijab cannot be permitted because it stands for a backwards tradition and religion makes no sense in a German context, because the young women recontextualise this piece of clothing for themselves, and, via active appropriation, change its meaning. This is clear in the way they wear the fashion (cf. Rommelspacher 2009, p. 404). However, looking at various media reports it is clear that this is not widely understood, as these reports allege that these women are openly dressing in opposition to the female image in Europe. As this image purportedly stands for enlightenment, democratic principles and participation in the capitalist economic system, it seems that women wearing the hijab are automatically assumed to be against these ideas. The assumption is that they are trapped in the religious dark ages, do not believe democracy is all that important and also rely on the welfare state instead of contributing to the good of the capitalist society.

The idea that Muslim women who wear the headscarf do not fulfil the requirements for economic or administrative leadership positions is projected by the conservative western gender model, which emancipated western women believe they have overcome, (ibid., p. 397) onto Hijabi clothing and ignores, in its Eurocentrism, the idea that patriarchal relationships, and emancipation from same, can take on a variety of forms (cf. Mahmood 2005). In particular, the forms may vary significantly from those in Europe. It must be clear that the western idea of emancipation makes sense only in the context of western life. This context includes a high degree of individuality within society, in which societal members are potentially able to support themselves with gainful employment. It includes, for example, a housing situation that assumes a life divided into smaller parts and

offers cheap one-room apartments for rent. In this type of individualised society, women can strive for a specific type of equality with men and enjoy the associated recognition practices (Rommelspacher 2002, pp. 121-123). On the other hand, in societies where this type of life is not preferred even by men, the judgement of women who do not seek western-style emancipation is absurd. Autonomy can only be demanded and lived by those who are able, on their own, to muster various resources such as income and education, and this is only possible in an individualised society with all its advantages and disadvantages. An example is the fact that the German norm of moving out of the family home sometime between the 18th and 21st birthday is considered by most other societies, even after migration to Europe, to be strange. Often members of a household live together until they start their own families, or live together in small spaces; this cannot be explained solely using financial reasons or the idea that family members must be kept under control.

By associating emancipatory progress with specific criteria, such as the gap between western women and migrants instead of western women and western men, western gender relations can be unburdened and idealised. In this way, conflicts that continue to exist are outsourced and understood as problems of 'the other'. Of course, equality is certainly not a done deal here in Germany.

> "Modern 'femininity' is in constant danger. [...] To encourage cohesion, this femininity requires a mirror universe, a clear profile used to assure itself of its own progress" (Lutz 1999, p. 48).

Women continue to earn, on average, around 30% less than men in the same position, and the government has been fighting since 2012 regarding the best way to assure equal opportunity when it comes to women in leadership positions. Despite this, many women believe that emancipation has brought them many opportunities in the past, but that they no longer require any help.

> "On an international stage, Germany is falling more and more behind when it comes to the percentage of women in upper management teams and supervisory bodies. In 2011, the percentage of women on

> the executive board of 160 companies listed on the stock exchange was at 3.37%. Women are represented on supervisory boards with a percentage of 12.76%. In terms of employees in upper management, women are represented at 20.26%" (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 2012).

The term 'glass ceiling', which had massive political significance in the 1980s, is no longer well known in Germany, even though the number of women in boardrooms was so low that, to correct the imbalance, a law was passed in 2016 stating that all publicly listed companies and all those in which workers participate in corporate governance must ensure that at least 30% of supervisory board members are women. All other companies must set their own targets, and the number of women on the board cannot fall below its current level. Since then, the numbers for supervisory boards have improved, but there is still a major imbalance when it comes to women in leadership positions.

So, instead of using concrete numbers as the basis for the determination of how much progress has been made in terms of gender equality, people can simply point to the supposedly much larger problems in migrant communities and use the social position of migrants as proof that women in the western world are emancipated. And in comparison, most women from the dominant society do pretty well, if you look at the type of work they do, their income and their social status. In this case, women are still worse off than men, but, the opinion goes, that is not due to unequal distribution between genders, but rather due to personal skill and assets of the individual (Rommelspacher 2009, pp. 398, 401). This view also matches the western self-image which was postulated as early as Weber's "Protestant Ethic".

The professional emancipation of 'western' women, is, however not a sign of successful parity between men and women in Germany, but instead an expression of the fact that "Migrant women have taken over the poorly paid and subordinate jobs" (Rommelspacher 2002, p. 128). The fact that a woman's success is not primarily a result of her individual performance, but instead is based on the ethnic division of labour, is veiled by the intensity of the debate surrounding the headscarf or other religious issues (ibid., p. 124). And if we were to analyse western clothing in regards to women and

their emancipation, we would see that culturally determined male dominance is also at play here. After all, to conform with standards and make use of ready-to-wear clothing, the female body must be subjected to strict conditioning. It is no accident that the standard of female beauty consists of gaunt, androgynous women, whose body looks more like that of pre-adolescent children and thin men than that of child-bearing women. This shifts the sexuality of the woman inwards, which is its own type of disciplining of the female body and veiling of female attraction. Western women's clothing, that consists largely of nudity, is therefore in no way an expression of greater autonomy or emancipation than any other type of clothing (cf. von Braun and Mathes 2007).

Very early on in my research, it became clear that the division into 'Muslim' and 'fashionable' was produced artificially via discourse and therefore is a product of society (cf. Ceylan 2010, p. 345). This discourse was described extensively in chapter 3. The fact that the difference between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' is manufactured has been general knowledge at the latest since the work of Edward Said (2009 [1978]). Muslim clothing is often associated with an ensemble of negative projections, and not just in Germany. There is an entire paper from The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration that deals with this subject and concludes that

> "although the second generation of Muslim immigrants born in Germany is much better integrated than the first generation, the political and media debates are increasingly confined to the 'failed integration of Muslims'" (Schneider, Fincke and Will 2013).

In day to day discourse, this is evidenced by an image caption on the website *Spiegel online*, the title of which is blatant and largely disconnected from the subject matter: "Hijabi Women: the majority of victims of forced marriage come from Muslim families" (Reimann 2011). The image, as indicated by the caption, is of a woman wearing a headscarf, even though Hijabi clothing itself does not, in fact, have anything to do with the issue being discussed.

This single piece of clothing has come to be, via media discourse within the dominant society, a synonym for Muslims and *the* symbol

of Islam, despite the fact that Islamic praxis is much more than a simple presentation of symbols. It ignores the fact that there are many more meaningful Islamic symbols in use. One example is the *Hand of Fatima* (see image 8.4).[73]

Nevertheless, it is the headscarf above all that carries negative associations, such as terrorism, coercion and backwardness, even though these issues are widespread and not limited to the Muslim community, and also apply only to a very small percentage of the German Muslim population. In chapter 3, I described the connection between negative media reports and safeguarding the social hierarchy. More recently, a new aspect has been added to the debate, which is once again heating up: incited by the elections in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Berlin in 2016, the negative discourse surrounding the burka and the headscarf serve as a strategy for justifying European isolationist policies (Randeria and Römhild 2013, p. 24). In this discourse, Europe is, as already described above, a picture of alleged joint achievements such as modernity, democracy and capitalism. This can also be observed in other issues, for example, typically, the developments in the Eastern expansion of the EU. This expansion has not made Europe more eastern; instead, these regions are practically colonised and viewed as a substandard addition to the "west" (ibid., p. 21).

The problem of a substitute debate has already been discussed as part of criticism regarding the discourse surrounding integration. Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner write:

73 Germans also bring home many of these symbols from their holidays. Often, the eye, or Nazar amulet, which is most often depicted in the palm of a hand, is worn by people or used as interior decoration by those who classify themselves as part of the discursive "Orient" but do not wish to project this on their clothing. This symbol is considered a protective spell and therefore forbidden in Islam, because as a spell it is considered a form of polytheism; God is the only one allowed to protect people from harm. Nevertheless, it is used by many people as a symbol or as jewellery. As a symbol for Islam, it is about as suitable or unsuitable as the headscarf, as a square metre of fabric can hardly make a statement regarding the piety or religious dedication of the wearer.

> "It is this demand for assimilation, inscribed in practically every daily situation and experience of the 'multicultural' society which inflames the culture war. It is based on a cultural gap, a paradigm of civilisation which places labour migrants and their 'occidentally' socialised and integrated children on the lower end of the social order. It is connected to forced collectivisation which does not do justice to the reality of the individual, the people" (Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner 1999, p. 24).

Dealing with social hierarchies and privileges, existing economic resources and cultural dominance is, of course, not limited to societies with a non-Muslim majority. The headscarf debate in Turkey, for example, is not solely the debate of a country that is trying to curb Islam and emancipate itself for the modern world via laicism. On the contrary, it is based on class struggles to restore the hierarchy, similar to what can be observed in Germany. Barbara Pusch has proven that it is, above all, Anatolian women who are the first in their family to attend University that are challenging the hierarchy of the elite in Kemalist cities (Pusch 1999, p. 164). They wear headscarfs in order to cope with the unfamiliar situation, in which they are living independently in the city without family role models and coming into contact with men. The fact that the Turkish discourse surrounding whether or not to ban the headscarf in public buildings has nothing to do with protecting democracy is easy to recognise once it becomes clear that banning Muslim head wear in public buildings is not based on any legal foundation or other facts, but rather has to do with the assessments and interpretations of various courts - courts that, in turn, are filled with staff belonging to the Kemalist elite (ibid., p. 165). The division between intellectual on the one hand and Muslim on the other has also been described by Werner (1999, p. 255) in reference to Egypt. According to Werner, the upper middle class in Egypt also degrades women wearing the headscarf, with the assumption that all of them belong to the lower classes. The distinction from the Muslim other serves, in this case, to prove their own superiority, to secure power and guarantee privileges. These discourses are reproduced in Germany, for the same reasons.

Those belonging to the German dominant society like to point at the headscarf debate in Turkey, thereby completely missing the fact that it uses exactly the same mechanisms as that in Germany. Hurriya mentioned one such incident:

> [Hu:] "I was with my mother in Stuttgart at Königsstraße[74], and my clothes were really modern, because it's a rich area and I always dress well when I go there. And when I'm on holiday I always wear heels, not really very sporty, I mean, I don't have to do anything strenuous. And I was standing with my mother and waiting for my sister. We were standing in front of the shop window, it had a really old ship in it and really old decorations. And then a really unsteady old Oma said to me: 'Old fashioned!' And I said: 'Yes, it is a really old-fashioned boat, right?' 'No no no, you look old fashioned.' And I said: 'Me? I definitely do not look old fashioned.' 'But you do, the way you look is very old fashioned.' And I said: 'What do you mean?' 'Yeah, just take a look at you, what you look like.' Then I said: 'What do I look like then?' And she waved her cane around: 'Well, that thing on your head.' Then I said 'That's a headscarf, it's not so bad, after all it's a modern headscarf' 'Yes, and you wouldn't be allowed to wear it in your country. In your country you wouldn't be allowed to wear it and go to university.'[75] And I said: 'But I'm not Turkish!' 'Of course you are, you all come from there...' What are you going to say to an old Oma, do you understand? But sadly they all think like that" (Hurriya 2011, Lines 285-300).

This interview segment demonstrates many of the issues already discussed in this work. A woman wearing a headscarf is in an area in which the dominant society is suddenly confronted with visible members of the Muslim community. This changes the optical, normative image of being German in areas that were previously reserved for elite classes. Hurriya was dressed for the environment, and considers herself fashionable and 'modern', but her style, despite the 'western' basic dress code is not perceived as such, or even acknowledged. A passer-by was even threatened and felt the need to draw attention to Hurriya's lack of belonging. And the passer-by was convinced that Hurriya does

74 This is the main shopping promenade in Stuttgart.

75 This statement refers to the ban on headscarfs in public and government buildings that has been in place for a long time in Turkey.

not belong not just in Germany, but also in Turkey, which is a country perceived as Islamic. Turkey, in this situation, serves as a reference point for judging modest dress as being old fashioned. The fact that similar hierarchies and protective strategies are in play when it comes to banning the headscarf from public buildings in Turkey remains unnoticed by both women, and leaves Hurriya in a situation in which she does not have the right words, and can only respond to a verbal attack by the woman with a shrug of her shoulders and a reference to the age of the attacker. The disparaging way in which the women used the informal 'you'[76] so casually to address Hurriya, and the fact that she was comfortable at all making negative comments about her clothing is one of the more obvious ways of reproducing hierarchies.

And this is not an isolated incident. Maryam reported a similar experience with discrimination, in which the ascription to a country considered Islamic played a role.

> [Ma:] "I was in Tempelhof with my friend and there was a woman standing on the other side of the street and she stared at us the whole time. [...] And then I crossed the street and my friend went in the other direction, and this woman came chasing after me: 'I think you are lost. You are lost. You don't belong here at all, you belong back in Afghanistan, just look at what you look like'" (Maryam 2011, Line 90).

In both cases, the same mechanisms are at play: women, due to their Hijabi clothing, are stereotyped and ascribed a specific background associated with a dominant Muslim society. The fact that people in Egypt as well as in Turkey are involved in similar hierarchical struggles is not generally known in Germany, and so people continue to refer to Turkey when the goal is banning the headscarf in public places, while completely failing to recognise the inherent irony at play.

All interview partners experience this expulsion to 'the cheap seats in society' clearly and deeply. The perception of Muslims in

76 Translator's note: German uses a formal you (Sie) and an informal you (du). Adults who do not know each other generally use the formal you to address one another, while the informal you is used for close friends, family, and children. For a stranger on the street to address Hurriya using the informal you is thus both impolite and infantilizing.

Germany is unanimously negative, which often causes uncomfortable incidents in their day to day life. These incidents, for example, prevent Maryam from wearing the coat that she would like to wear as part of her outfit.

> [Ma:] "You always get noticed right away. I mean, if they already look at the headscarf and think you don't want to live in a democracy, you want to live in a caliphate and so on, what are they going to think if I wear a coat? 'You can just forget about that, that's completely foreign here' (Maryam 2011, Line 1225). [At another point in the conversation about the same topic, wearing the coat in Germany] Sometimes I think then people would look at me more, but I mean, they look at me anyway!" (ibid., Line 220).

And this is the real problem: the one-sided reporting and perception within the social discourse sets in motion a dynamic in which many women begin to think about Islam because they see Islam as a positive alternative for mutual recognition, opposed to the repeated disparagement they experience from the dominant society (cf. Ezli, Kimmich and Werberger 2009, p. 121). This is reflected in their choice of clothing; the more a group is excluded from society, or excludes itself, the greater/more visible the visual difference between an imagined 'them' and an equally imaginary 'us'. Exclusion due to perceived membership in a 'different' reference population encourages people subsequently, as a strategy for defending themselves from this discrimination, to adjust their outer appearance to more strongly match the reference group than that of the discriminating parties. Barker (2001, pp. 61-63) proved this in the Mormon community, but her conclusions can also be applied to Muslims in a non-Muslim dominant society (cf. also Klinkhammer 2000, p. 252). I will discuss this strategy, which I call the "sartorial empowerment strategy", in the next section.

8.3. Strategies of Sartorial Empowerment

During my research, I was often asked why more headscarves were apparently being worn now as compared to in the past. I already

addressed this topic in terms of the Muslimisation of actors in Section 3.3; I intend to expand this question about headscarves to include a sartorial dimension.

In the following, I will describe one of the positive interpretive strategies used to combat daily discriminatory experiences. I was able to observe this strategy over the course of my research, and the phenomenon was also confirmed by some of my interview partners when I asked them about it. Not only that, it has already been described in a similar manner by Bendixsen (2013) and Werner (1999). When a person wears something new, it can lead to criticism, compliments or questions about the new piece of clothing, all of which provide the wearer with an idea of their own position within the group. The reaction from their surroundings shows a person how actions deviating from the norm are assessed. The negative or positive interactions with individual group members create, as described in the chapter on fashion, the social process of fashion. This process is part of socialisation within a group and is used to negotiate the status of its members as leaders or outsiders. Acknowledgement of clothing choices by observers, whether on a personal level though friends and acquaintances or the general reception within German society, was therefore a theme that I was able to observe throughout all of my research. The desire for this acknowledgement led me to the hypothesis that acknowledgement by observers is very important in judging clothing, and that entire group structures are negotiated in this manner.[77]

As already shown, most daily encounters with members of the German dominant society are not positive interactions, but rather more negative ones. Suraya described an encounter from the early days of her time in Germany, in which her mother bumped against an older woman on the underground when the train started up. Her mother was wearing a *Jilbāb*, which is a wide dress. The woman made an ugly gesture, as if to wipe something off her shoulder. Both Suraya

77 This, in turn, provided a clue as to why fashion changes, a question that barely anyone since Barthes has dared to answer from a theoretical perspective. I will examine this this theoretical question of fashion more closely in Chapter 9.1.

and her mother were very indignant, but Suraya wanted to prove she was the better person by simply leading her mother to a different spot on the train. It is this rejection that causes the women to believe it does not matter at all what they are wearing, they will only ever get negative feedback. Maryam noted:

> [Ma:] "I always think, when they ask me, 'these are things I got here!' Why are you looking at me so idiotically, these are things that you could wear too. Only maybe you would wear it without sleeves, and I wear a long sleeve shirt underneath it. Or maybe you might wear it without trousers, but I wear trousers under it, so what's the problem?" (Maryam 2011, Lines 1230-40).

In order to come to terms with their permanent position at the bottom of the pecking order within the dominant society's hierarchy, then, these women create their own hierarchy, an internal group hierarchy, in which the seriousness of religious clothing serves as a unit of measurement. This hierarchical social framework, structured based on religious clothing, is of course nothing new. It has existed for a long time in countries in which the dominant society is Muslim, and was brought to those countries along with migrating Muslims, but in Germany, this hierarchy gains an additional, positive social component for the women. It offers a counter-hierarchy, sartorial empowerment, that is a mutual mode of classification and acknowledgement based on the religious sincerity of clothing. This sartorial empowerment strategy is established due to the severe pressure exercised by the dominant society; after all, these women are made to feel 'foreign' from the moment they decide to wear the headscarf. It is the aesthetics of their outward appearance to which they attach the racism they experience.

"The young women belonging to the second generation of migrant workers, that, despite obvious 'integration' remain 'foreign', the 'others' [...]" (Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner 1999, p. 17), and therefore develop their own politics of recognition based on Islam, and make creative use of the wiggle room that fashion allows them. I cannot emphasise enough this does not represent detachment from society,

but rather the management and embedding of modest artefacts in the 'western' style using interpretive strategies or recontextualisation.

The women in the Islamic reference populations develop the aesthetic of their outward appearance further into a differentiated fashion code that contains, simultaneously, mutual recognition and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1981). Within the Islamic sartorial hierarchy, a woman's reputation increases within her Islamic environment the more modestly she clothes herself in situations where she will encounter men that are not part of her Mahram. The 'Berlin style' has a relatively low rank in the hierarchy, and the coat in combination with the headscarf is ranked quite highly. Werner (1999, p. 260) created quite precise categories within this spectrum based on the levels she observed: women who do not cover up receive little recognition, followed by "Hijab wearers, i.e. students that wear a headscarf", then those who wear *Khimār*, that is women who hide the shape of their body with the help of a very large scarf that covers their hair and shoulders completely. Finally, at the upper end of the spectrum are *Niqāb* wearers, who add a facial covering to the *Khimār*. This is a very intensive form of clothing which also comes with a very strict code of behaviour[78], intended to reflect the dedication of the woman to her religion and the sacrifices she is prepared to make in regards to her lifestyle. Thus, the *Niqāb* is not considered a requirement, but rather an expression of the highest religious ambitions within Islamic groups. The *Khimār* is the piece of clothing recognised by the orthodoxy, while the Hijab is considered a beginner's piece of clothing (cf. ibid., p. 260).

Bendixsen (2013, p. 282) also observed this phenomenon, which I have dubbed an empowerment strategy, over the course of her research. She observed an interaction in the part of Berlin surrounding Kottbusser Tor, which has a strong Turkish influence, between two young Muslim women. One of the women spoke Turkish, did not wear the headscarf and worked in a store where alcohol was sold. In

78 Women who wear the *Niqāb* often strictly follow the rules of gender separation. As a man, it is considered polite not to look at them directly, and physical contact must be avoided as much as possible.

a roundabout way, her customer, an Arabic speaking young woman wearing the hijab, gave hinted criticism regarding the fact that the woman not wearing the hijab was selling alcohol. As part of this interaction, both women negotiated their social position. The customer, in the course of this interaction, clearly drew on positive self-esteem arising from her clothing, which correctly adhered to Islamic law. In response, the store employee began justifying her actions, stating that selling alcohol was difficult for her and that she was also a Muslim, thus recognising the morally superior position of the hijab wearer. In her next breath, she positioned herself as coming from Turkey, and therefore territorially superior to the Arabic speaking women in the predominantly Turkish Kreuzberg. The customer acknowledged this with gestures and facial expressions. The distinctive feature, therefore, is that religious hijabi clothing and national heritage had, in this negotiation, equal bargaining power when it came to establishing social position.[79]

The Muslim sartorial hierarchy described by me, that is the development of a strategy for increased differentiation between the wearer and the secular identity, which reveals the secular identity as only supposedly superior, is not just limited to Germany and Europe, but is instead an international phenomenon, analogue to the social hierarchical struggles that also take place in other countries. Other social classes in other nations also differentiate themselves using religious clothing. This is because, in many cities over the 20th century, secular elites have emerged that orient themselves on western consumer behaviour. Thus, Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner describe the

> "urban metropolises in countries with a majority Islamic population,

79 This may be the reason that national styles are currently being combined. According to Bendixsen, the Berlin district of Kreuzberg is "firmly in Turkish hands" (Bendixsen 2013, p. 288). Kreuzberg is an example of a location that has transformed in terms of meaning: from dominated by those 'not part of dominant society' to, instead 'dominated by the Turkish'. I was able to observe non-Turkish Muslim women that oriented their style on Turkish standards, potentially because this allowed them to gain prestige.

> in which rapid social change and large-scale communicative and social concentration sets clear accents for the reconstitution of Islamic identity and in particular the debate surrounding cultural authority" (Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner 1999, p. 16)

In dominant Islamic societies, it is the middle social classes in particular in which struggles have emerged between 'Islamist' and 'secular' women. As part of this, the secular elite project general oriental ideas directly onto Muslims. This allows people who do not associate themselves with Islam to distance themselves from these oriental images and to stigmatise 'the others' as backwards and traditional.

The hierarchisation within German society, which comes from the dominant culture, in which upwardly mobile Muslim groups are put in their place, is therefore also used in Germany by some women with a similar migratory background as a way to feel as though they belong on a higher level within the total social hierarchy. This upward move is simple; they do not wear a headscarf. Hurriya said:

> "I recognise women from Turkey by their clothing. But I also recognise modern Turks. Those are people from Turkey the 'modern' ones, who hate hijabi women!" (Hurriya 2011, Line 995).

But because, as described in chapter 3.4 on constructed Muslim identity, a person's own voice regarding their association with Islam can be strengthened by the public, we find such oxymoronic constructions as that used by Necla Kelek, who describes herself as a secular Muslim (cf. Attia 2010, p. 124).

As an alternative to 'western' models of socialisation, then, discourses have developed that, in the style of Arjun Appadurai (1996) can be named Religioscapes. These are inhabited by people who position themselves in opposition to a modern identity empty of meaning. Here I am referring to Appadurai's terminology of religious social space, or the space of religious social relationships, which he calls a 'Religioscape'. Similarly, Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner (1999, p. 13) use the term 'Islamscape', which, both autonomous and interwoven with other social relationships, can be described as a "specific economy of symbolic signals." One of these symbolic signs is, without

a doubt, clothing and its varied levels of modesty, which, at the same time, is intended to signal interdependencies with 'the west'.

Within the strategy of Muslim sartorial hierarchy, clothing and the degree of sartorial production of modesty are used as currency when negotiating social positions.

8.3.1. Belonging and difference: Negotiation under Muslims

The existence of a Muslim sartorial hierarchy that is largely independent of 'the west' is also suggested in the interviews I carried out. For example, Maryam reports:

> "I have a friend who really pays attention to what she wears. Sometimes she even wears clothes that are one or two sizes too big, so that you really can't see her at all. I totally respect everything she does, she's really careful not to wear anything too tight, she really looks like a headscarf wearing woman, you know, how she should look. I think that's important. And her clothing is practical and therefore also pretty" (Maryam 2011, Line 1065).

Suraya confirmed this thesis when asked. For her, women in a headscarf and tight pants are not hijabi, just women who are wearing a headscarf. She said that was their own business, but it would be better not to wear tight pants.

These considerations explain a particularity that I observed during my research. Here we return to an observation from section 7.6, that is the demands some Muslims make on their fellow believers. My interview partners explained to me, frequently, that they believed that women who do not follow "the code" (ibid., 1375-1380, cf. also P. 167).) also leave Germans with a bad impression.

> [Ma:] "Lots of Muslims don't follow it. But really, as a proper Muslim man or woman, nobody should see your feet, you shouldn't wear sandals. Really. [...] There is trendy clothing available for headscarf wearers. For respectable headscarf wearers. And honestly, the Germans hold them in higher regard" (ibid., Lines 705, 1000).

I found this idea, which I often encountered, very interesting. It was explained to me that women who combine fashionable clothing with

the headscarf are simply fuelling the German prejudice that they are forced to wear the hijab. In general, there is a widespread view that tight, provocative clothing combined with the headscarf is not appropriate, as the hijab is a whole-body concept and not simply limited to the headscarf itself.

> [Ma:] "They really aren't being forced to wear one, but sometimes I can understand that some Germans think that the girls are being forced to wear the headscarf. Know why? They are wearing the hijab, but they are also wearing really tight clothing, totally sexy and tonnes of make-up, and then you have to ask why bother with the headscarf? I can understand why someone would say, OK, she was forced to wear the headscarf, because, I mean you notice, she isn't conforming with the spirit of the thing. For example, if she was wearing it for religious reasons, then she wouldn't... I mean I think, you know, that headscarf just doesn't fit, she might as well just take it off. Because come on. Because the headscarf, it isn't just the scarf, this piece of fabric, but in general, it's an attitude" (ibid., Lines 645-675).

The theory is that Germans in the dominant society will look at women with fashionable clothing and then think badly of Muslims in Germany and assume that these women were forced to wear the headscarf, because the rest of their clothing is so revealing that they might as well leave off the headscarf. For me, this idea was surprising, as my own thesis viewed fashionable headscarfs as a little more integrated.

From this repeated criticism we can conclude that hijabi women in tight clothing assume a lower rank in the Muslim social hierarchy, as sartorial religious engagement is understood as an expression of "the highest religious ambition" (Werner 1999, p. 260). The idea that sartorial engagement with integration might play a larger role when judging the person in question from the point of view of a German in the dominant society was as much a surprise to Maryam as her ideas were to me.

Maryam, in particular, who was born and raised in Germany, and affectively feels as if she belongs there, attempts to use sartorial rank within the Muslim sartorial hierarchy to solve the conflict in which

her permanent classification as belonging to the lower end of German society is in stark contrast to her degree of education. This is not the creation of a modern alternative, or even the disassociation of women from the dominant society, but rather a reinterpretation of the social position. However, that is not always easy and does not always work to the degree that she wishes it would. Although Maryam would like to wear a coat, she does not, because she is unable to afford the extra cost and because she fears an even more negative reception from non-hijabi circles.

> [Ma:] "I would really like to wear it [the coat] and I wish I could, but at the moment... sometimes I think, maybe they will stare at you more, but then I get over it, they stare at me anyway, but my main problem is money. The coat, it's a little more expensive. Good coats, these days they start at 70 - 80 € , and of course you can't just buy one, you need to buy a few and then the matching headscarf." *[J:] "You mean you can't wear them interchangeably? Once you have started, you always have to wear the coat?"* [Ma:] "That's what most people do. I did think about it, thought maybe I wouldn't have to always wear a coat, but what sort of impression would that make? I don't know." (Maryam 2011, Lines 285- 285).

This quote makes it clear that she would only receive the positive feedback from her Muslim community if the switch to wearing the coat was permanent. The positive feedback would then automatically balance out the increased daily negative feedback she would get from the non-Muslim community. At the same time, wearing the coat is also a financial investment that not every woman can afford. In this way, the coat becomes a prestige object.

In light of this, it also becomes clear why religious sartorial engagement is expected of Hurriya, and why many of her friends demand that she dress herself in a certain way. She has already worn clothing such as the *Khimār*, *Abaya* and sometimes even the *Niqāb* because she was on the Hajj[80], and because she adjusted to the sartorial customs in Abu Dhabi when she lived there for a long period

80 She did not wear a *Niqāb* during the Hajj. On the Hajj, wearing a *Niqāb* is not allowed according to the *Fiqh as-Saum*, the Islamic Law regarding, for example, fasting and the Hajj.

as an expat. However, after her return to Germany, this clothing no longer functioned as fashion. And Hurriya feels good when people recognise her fashion skills, and does not really care if her clothes make her a religious role model or not. And so she returned to a style that can be read by more than just a small section of the Muslim community, and in which she is not at risk, or at least less at risk of being viewed as old fashioned or 'belonging in Afghanistan' (Hurriya 2011, Line 165). Because she had no interest in the resulting continuing criticism of her daily clothing by her environment, she retreated, limiting her social interaction to her family who accept her decision to not always wear an *Abaya*.

I find it noteworthy that both women who grew up in Germany focus on recognition from others, whether positive or negative. While Maryam finds positive emotions in the recognition of her religiosity, which she still manages to combine with fashionable elements, Hurriya is often approached negatively about her clothing. There appear to be two reasons for the latter. On the one hand, Hurriya is older, and in many countries, not just those with a dominant Muslim society, it is considered indecent when women above a certain age wear fashionable clothing and brighter colours. Older women in Germany who wear tight trousers and have long hair are also subject to ridicule.[81] On the other hand, because she has been on the Hajj and has lived in Abu Dhabi, people think she should wear particularly dignified clothing, as a change in position along the Muslim sartorial hierarchy towards 'less religious' often appears to be unthinkable.

It is noteworthy that neither Amina nor Suraya talk much about recognition from other people, it simply does not come up in the interviews. From this, I conclude that both women, who both have their own migration experience, are subject to different expectations or perhaps socialisation, and without any permanent external pressure, are less vulnerable to criticism. Neither of them is overly confronted with an expectation to adapt their fashion smoothly for both contexts.

81 Described e.g. in the expression of a cougar (older women who dress younger and chase after younger men)

In contrast, it seems that women who grew up in Germany are subject to a great deal of pressure to implement fashion and clothing in a specific 'western' way, and be able to reliably negotiate the demands of religion and fashion.

Figure 8.1.: High contrast: Abaya with denim jacket and dark-red, fashionably wrapped headscarf. Berlin Friedrichstraße, 2012.

Figure 8.2.: Left: woman in a café. The style is inspired by special events with the hijab, but Maryam said that she would not wear it as it was too liberal. Berlin, October 2011. Source: JK. Right: Wedding dress of a woman from South Africa as an example for newer types of party hijab. Cape Town, April 2009. Source: Peter Poon.

Figure 8.3.: *Krunb* headscarf fashion. Egypt, 2011. Source: Khadischa.

Figure 8.4.: Protective symbols in popular Islam: hand of Fatima and a Nazar amulet. Sources, left to right: Robyn Nomadical, Laura Ortiz, Luxery Charms, lovecoturex3, all from *flikr*. Lower left: Focal-Point, *Wikipedia*. Viewed 2013.

9. Final Theoretical Considerations

The final chapter of this book is dedicated to applying the results of my research both to fashion and to migration theories, as promised at the beginning of the work. I will begin by providing a supplement to fashion theory by describing why fashion changes, and end by introducing the Cosmo Islamic Style as part of critical migration theory.

9.1. How Fashion Changes

There have been hardly any new developments regarding the question as to how fashion changes since Barthes. While Flügel (1986) still assumed that fashion changed with the desire to identify oneself with a specific higher class, the most popular theory as to why fashion changes at the moment (for example McRobbie 1999; Entwistle 2000; or Svendsen 2006) is based on the assumption that people enjoy consuming and accept as fashion that presented to them by the fashion industry. Just like a specific foodstuff may be a particular favourite for someone for a period of time, and then they suddenly stop eating it, the theory goes that aesthetic patterns are simply subject to temporary popularity.

This thesis, however, fails to explain where the fashion industry gets its trends from, and also fails to explain why some products start

as a trend and then become fashion while others do not. Which is why I have derived the following considerations on the development of fashion from my research into Muslim women's fashion in Germany.

1. Basic dress codes change as a marker of biographical breaks in life.
2. Aesthetic designs (fashions) are switched as a marker of dynamic group hierarchies.

9.1.1. Changes to basic dress codes represent biographical breaks

Breaks in the biography are a deciding impulse for changing clothing and changes to a basic dress code. Personal changes, new groups, a different status, migration and more can contribute to someone picking up a new form of clothing and integrating it with their basic dress code.

In this context, Suraya had an interesting observation regarding Muslim women's clothing styles. She said she was able to observe that all women change their basic dress code after marriage, as if they were preparing for their new self-positioning as a married woman. However, the developments are not all the same. Some women wear less religious clothing after the wedding, while some wear more religious clothing. The women often use the increased financial capital available for the wedding to implement a change in their clothing style. For herself, she said that she would use the opportunity to transfer the style she had established for herself in Germany to Libya.

If we accept this observation, then the reason that clothing changes for those people who are not at all interested in fashion is that people change their clothing when their life changes, adjusting it to match their new self-image. This makes sense inasmuch as that people cannot simply change the way they dress without their decision being questioned intensely by those around them. A change in clothing creates the impression that the person wants to change their social position. After all, an identity construct is not known as an identity

construct without reason; it must make sense. If a person changes the construct every day, it will no longer work, unless it has variability as a subject. I believe, therefore, that people sometimes consider changing the style of their basic dress code for some time before implementing the change, and wait for a particular point in time to make the change. This point may be the availability of money, or perhaps a deciding event which can be referred to when the person is asked why they have made the change, or which triggers the change itself. In changing their dress code, they must continue to maintain the balance between a development that is too creative and an adjustment in style. If a person changes their style, they do not do so without context, but rather with a subtle grasp of the developments that can be observed in their environment.

9.1.2. Trends as a marker of group hierarchies

The fact that Muslim fashion changes slowly in Germany suggested to me that trends, as part of aesthetic forms, are also an expression of social hierarchies. Trends and fashions are initially received by groups, for example friends, work colleagues, etc. There are hierarchies in these groups, structured using many different types of capital, which, according to Bourdieu (1981), may be categorised in many different ways, that is the capital may be social, economic or of some other nature. People who lead the group, or who take on an informal leadership role, also validate this leadership role using their clothing, regardless of the additional hierarchies within the context. Once the followers in the group have transmitted a group trend to outsiders, the time has come, at the latest, for the leaders to make a new fashion statement in order to differentiate themselves from others.

The statement itself is chosen more or less randomly. Just like music, it is not particularly tasteful qualities that start a fashion trend, but rather pure coincidence (cf. Sullivan 2013). Therefore, if enough group leaders in a variety of groups start using a specific fashionable trend, it becomes a social phenomenon, and a fashion is born.

This observation provides clues as to how sartorial group dynamics come to be; why, for example, there are outsiders in schools, and what the connection is between clothing and group dynamics. If those with a leadership role follow a trend, they confirm their role within the group hierarchy; similarly, because they are the leader of the group, they receive positive feedback for adopting the trend. If, however, a follower, that is someone who is generally not accepted as a group leader, wears clothing that differentiates them from the others, he or she is staking claim to a sartorial leadership role within the group. If, however, there is no interpersonal basis for this claim, this 'deviant' clothing will be ostracised within the group: the person wearing it will be subject to ridicule, not admiration.

This view is supported by the fact that fashions are important in particular in environments with lots of young people. This is because group creation and hierarchical negotiation are much more prevalent during adolescence. Not only that, compared to the rest of a person's life, there are more dramatic transition phases and biographical breaks during adolescence. In the context of Muslim clothing, these observations explain the translation difficulties my interview partners experienced when attempting to wear fashions from various countries with a dominant Muslim society in Germany. In Germany, these clothes are seen merely as an attempt to set a trend, as no-one else is wearing them. As Muslim women in Germany are situated on the lower end of the overarching social hierarchy, by both their own and external ascription, fashionable trends for Muslim women are rarely rewarded with praise and recognition. Therefore, a trend from a country with a dominant Muslim society can become fashion in Germany only with difficulty, and thus Muslim fashion in Germany is slow to change. As a result, instead of following fashion trends, some Muslim women place more value on modest clothing, because this brings with it mutual recognition within the framework of their reference group. The Muslim sartorial hierarchy has nothing to do with western trends, but instead is based on who is able to show the most religious engagement. This explains the increase in the number of headscarf wearers over the past few years. The trend

being adopted, it seems, is not a specific design, a colour or a cut, but rather the hijab itself.

These theoretical considerations regarding why fashion changes suggest that fashion is not only transferred from upper social classes to lower classes. Class does not appear to be the engine driving fashion, nor has it ever been. Instead, what drives fashion is internal group dynamics, the social hierarchical framework. Within a society there are groups with very different hierarchies. These diverse groups have very different means of achieving cohesion, and are based on very different types of capital; this promotes fashion dynamics. I will even go a step further and say that it may only have been a very short period of time, that is the beginning of the 20th century, in which there was permeability between classes and aspiration to the next-highest class was itself a fashion, a unique set of circumstances that can be observed neither before or after that time. Observations of pre-modern and non-European fashions hardly allow for any other conclusion: there have always been fashions and trends outside of the European class system, and the research available on Europe's late middle ages is research of the elite, as there is much less material available on the lower classes can be used to make statements regarding fashionable developments. Indeed, we must ask why it would make sense in a feudal system, in which there is barely any movement between classes, to base your fashion on that of the next-highest class?

The fact that fashion does in fact develop in different classes is confirmed by the fact that the lower classes have a great deal fewer fashionable restrictions than other classes, and thus have more developmental freedom. They are able to start more trends than the middle class, in which business clothing was the dominant factor in wardrobes for a very long time. This view is confirmed by trends that have developed not in the elite classes, but in classes with much less privilege. These trends can become popular, and even experience success outside of the class they originated from. Hip-hop fashion is an example in which it is not just the music that has asserted itself as a trend with adolescents from the middle classes, but also the clothing style. And the headscarf is also an excellent example of this theory.

Over the course of the 20th century, it was largely women from elite classes that removed their headscarves, not women from the lower classes. Over time, Muslim families were elevated into the middle class but kept wearing the veil. Now, they are setting new fashionable accents which are also spreading to the upper class, regardless of the country they are in.

We must assume that fashion has existed ever since societies started forming. Fashion has always been negotiated within the smallest social groups, and continues to be so today. This is because hierarchies are always organised within a group and recreated using clothing or simply accents on this clothing. The modern period therefore did not invent fashion as such with popular fashion, but rather allowed for a complete change of aesthetic clothing design using cut and production technologies. The basic dress code remains the same, a pair of jeans remains a pair of jeans, whether it is flared or straight cut.

9.2. From the Point of View of a Fashion-Oriented Migration Perspective: Spatial Awareness, Emancipation and Muslim Fashion

This section will address another premise that forms the basis of this work: it will examine migration theory considerations from the perspective of fashion theory, shedding light on them in the process.

Spaces are not simply empty containers that can be filled, but rather they are a comprehensive concept based on changing contexts, conditions and perceptions. Chapter 6.1 on dividing space into four categories made this very clear. Social practices and unconscious symbolic ascriptions construct spaces as flexible and in principle public structures. They represent flexible areas which may experience shifts in meaning caused by other social practices (Leutner 2012, p. 236). Just as a person may experience multiple ascriptions of meaning or identity constructs, so too can spaces, as they do not have meaning

until it has been assigned by people in different contexts. Instead of imagining spaces, whether streets, businesses or public squares, as surfaces surrounded by borders, "they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations" (Massey 1991, p. 28).

Spaces, therefore, are not simply present, no more than the body is simply present. Instead, both are constructed and placed in a hierarchy by the social actions that take place within them. This also includes sartorial actions. Locations are constructed as the interplay between people, things, perception and movements from symbolic actions. They can only be experienced by the body in movement. Fashion, bodies and spatial environment meet on an affective level, creating moods or atmospheres. When looked at this way, people may be understood as a spatial fashion body, and may consider themselves out of placed when in specific spaces wearing inappropriate fashion, as the ability to recognize inappropriate situations is acquired culturally (Lehnert 2013, p. 124). Businesses make use of this to some extent, and create environments in which some customers are invited to enter based on the atmosphere created, and others are excluded as undesirable. These atmospheres are created by certain customs and the perception of same. Thus, spaces are transformed by spatial experiences into experiential spaces. Spatial fashion bodies enter into interactions in these spaces and locations, which is why one is unthinkable without the other (ibid., p. 126). People's clothing therefore creates an individual spatial structure and engages with it. In turn, the space has an effect on the clothing (Leutner 2012, p. 239). This connection between sartorial objects and human subjects allows very specific spaces to emerge, which can be understood as historically and culturally variable in meaning (Lehnert 2013, p. 15).

In regards to bodily spaces, clothing represents not so much protection as it does an expansion of the manifestation of the body (Svendsen 2006, p. 19). Clothing constitutes minimally variable spaces that can be carried around by people. The moulded body European fashions of the 18th and 19th century, with crinolines that took up a great deal of space and corsets that created space are one example, but there are also examples to be found outside of Europe, for example

in Japan. The body-hugging fashions of the post-modern are yet another example. These fashions shape the body just as much as the older fashions do, and turn it into a human sculpture (Lehnert 2012a, p. 13). This is particularly true for the women's skirt. The skirt is the space in which female power and powerlessness begins. Skirts are part of the gender hierarchy in western society, as they require a gender specific type of movement. For a long time, they were considered the appropriate piece of clothing for women, were implemented as part of the patriarchal family and confirmed using visual controls.

> "Body movements, visual checks and spatial marking create [...] a unit which generates space and simultaneously 'prepares' the body by anticipating the foreign gaze" (Leutner 2012, p. 237).

Defining and commanding public space was and is largely reserved for men. In contrast, the skirt removes the female body from the power of the gaze.[82] It is an expansion of the body-self; skirts give the human body a closed shape and expand the female space (ibid., pp. 241-43). At the same time, it represents a symbolic empowerment of the person. The space beneath the skirt is reserved for the woman alone, which is why 'reaching up her skirt' is considered such a violation. However, over the last few years the perception of the skirt has changed in 'the west', analogue to the current image of women. As part of the equal rights campaign, women fought for and won the right to consider trousers an appropriate sartorial form of expression, along with many other rights. The result is that the female space must correspond to the male space in order to be considered 'modern'. This includes, on the one hand, the boyish figure representing the ideal female body, and on the other the new norm of trousers as appropriate clothing.

82 The gaze, already mentioned above in connection with the 'male gaze' is created by the gaze resting for longer on one person as opposed to another. Generally, it rests on the person who is perceived to be inferior or sexualised, for example young women, but also strangers. The gaze reserved for strangers, which is also disparaging, is a reminder that the subject of the gaze is in the minority and therefore in an inferior position. Inappropriate clothing on women is also observed by this gaze. Visual checks are therefore a way of exercising power, in which men simultaneously secure sovereignty over the space and exercise control over the habitus of the women.

In this context it becomes clear why the clothing worn by Muslim women is considered insubordinate. It is the space that is taken up by it. Muslim women in European space call social hierarchies into question, among other reasons, because they question the sovereignty of definition for the space, and continually overstep the boundaries of the space assigned to women within public view. The bodily intervention 'Hijabi clothing', simultaneously symbolic and real, is an increase in the volume of the body that draws attention, as the space underneath a Muslim woman's clothing is defined simply as "*Haram*" and therefore as "*Mahram*" (cf. ibid., p. 238). But it is not just the space under the clothing that is influenced by this; the space also changes in meaning as part of the retroactive effect of the sartorial coding. Wearing specialized clothing such as the hijab creates, in this instance, symbolic boundaries and safeguards that challenge the socially differentiated gaze in those spaces where German dominant culture is predominant (cf. ibid., p. 237). The appropriation of public space thus begins to change, as the actors perceived to be migrants are no longer only present in the districts conceded to them, but also in those spaces that were previously thought to be reserved for locals. And they are present not just on the way to and from a precarious job, but rather also, thanks to their 'islamised western fashions' clearly recognizable as belonging to the established class. By moving through the streets and the city, by wearing burkinis to visit expensive beaches and spas, and by being visible in those regions that were previously reserved for members of the dominant society, Muslim women who are recognizable as such are slowly but surely changing the hierarchy of the city, the society and the social space. This hierarchical question seems to be the reason for the continued fierce discussion surrounding the headscarf or the face veil, as the self-assured visibility of the women wearing them underlines the changing balance of power.

By transforming the space surrounding their bodies into a "Mobile Home", as Lila Abu-Lughod (2002, p. 285) so accurately put it, it is Muslim women in particular who remind us that it is not just the male gender who are able to take up space and define it. Not only that, they are a painful reminder that the social development of

equal rights for women has largely stagnated, as even today women are not easily able to determine or define space (cf. Leutner 2012, p. 238). An effect of and, at the same time, a clue to the correctness of this statement is the fact that women are still unable to move freely, as they have to fear being attacked, either physically or visually (Massey 1991, p. 24). It is thus perceived as even more appalling that this symbolic questioning of the gender hierarchy is achieved, in part perhaps unwillingly, by Muslim 'migrant women', who themselves do not have a very high position within the social hierarchy.

9.3. The 'Cosmo Islamic Style'

The sartorial empowerment strategy used by Muslim women to combat discrimination, that is to look instead to internal Islamic hierarchies (Section 8.3) as opposed to those exhibited by the German dominant society, is simply one option out of many that has in fact already been described, but not analysed in terms of its ultimate consequences. Wearing a coat is a method of positioning within the Muslim sartorial hierarchy, and its relationship to the modern and to the German society is predominantly created by activities such as attending University or networking within society. The relationship is made visible by integrating fashionable elements, such as 'islamised western clothing', decorative hijab pins, that do more than just keep the scarf in place, or shoes that represent a break in style. Conscious sartorial integration statements are made by wearing, for example, *Converse* shoes combined with a coat or Abaya, or by showing tight jeans peeking out from beneath a long black dress. In this respect, I have to expand my initial thesis. It is not just that integration has already arrived in Germany; in fact, it has arrived across the entire world. Muslims and others integrate stylistic elements from various cultures into their clothing on a daily basis, and their fashion sense proves that they have a profound understanding of the various societies. Usually, those who do not understand this are people who feel that fashion is rooted in the

discursive ‘west’, and, with great certainty, presuppose that their own fashion style and their own morals are universally applicable. This applies whether these people are Germans belonging to the dominant society or ISIS followers.

As the children of migrants, those who were born and grew up in Germany cannot use the intention to go back as a defence strategy against exclusion (cf. Beck-Gernsheim 2004, p. 22), and so some of them choose to turn to Islam as an escape from the discriminatory situation they find themselves in (cf. Nökel 2002). However, as space in Germany is divided into two spheres only, they must use other strategies for mastering the sartorial challenges arising from Islamic precepts. An integrative style has developed that initially seemed to be a phenomenon belonging to migration societies. In many places with a dominant Muslim society, the options available within the women’s public spaces mean that the majority of fashion takes place below the outer clothing visible to everyone. This outer clothing is also subject to fashionable changes (cf. Moors 2007), but unlike the styles of women who grew up in the ‘west’, the style of the outer clothing in dominant Muslim societies does accompany the women through every part of their day, and is therefore not designed to appear appropriate for every situation a woman might encounter. At the beginning of my research I called this integrative style the ‘Berlin Style’, and, because it sounds nicer that ‘Integration Style’ or ‘Migration Style’, I held onto this term for a long time over the course of my research, even though I observed the style in other parts of Germany and the world. This ‘Berlin Style’ is marked by many fashionable elements that incorporate style impulses both from western and hijabi clothing, merging them all into a harmonic whole. This development in Muslim fashion has not simply remained in the west, but rather has found its way back to countries with a dominant Muslim society. Amina, Khadischa and Suraya told me, and I was able to observe during my time in Syria and my interviews with women there, that the ‘Berlin Style’ has developed more strongly in these countries over the past few years. This development, in my opinion, can be traced back to the increased use of the internet by Muslim women around the world,

in which they exchange information on the fashion options available to modest dressers. In light of this research, and the realisation that this development of style is not limited to Berlin, I am renaming the style, which can be found here in Berlin but also in many other places around the world, as the 'Cosmo Islamic Style'.

10. Postscript: The Hijab as a Calling Card

> "Everything that hijabi women project points towards 'integration'. But the society they want to integrate with refuses to cooperate" (Oestreich 2004, p. 155).

I began this work in 2011, when the subject 'Muslim women and fashion' had not even appeared on the radar in most mediums. This has changed as the years went on, in particular because more and more people are actively engaged with the subject, whether designers, bloggers or those women who spectacularly implement the newly available styles. At the very latest it was the Mipsterz, the *YouTube* Video featuring Muslim hipsters, that proved rather impressively that 'being Muslim' and 'being interested in fashion' are not contradictions (Rattani and Yazdi 2013). Plenty of blogs (Rumbelow 2014) and even a few German daily newspapers reported (Röhlig 2013) on how the makers of the video wanted to inspire a new way of looking at young Muslim men and women. The social critique expressed in this display of clothing and everyday situations is not necessarily commonplace. None of my interview partners selects their clothing in order to make a critical statement regarding society. Quite the opposite, in fact: my work shows that the women are more often attempting to find a way to fulfil the various demands made on their clothing and themselves.

For myself, the research question arose from the continued double negative discourse surrounding the headscarf. For some people, for example conservative Muslims that filled the comments on the Mipsterz video, hijabi clothing can never be long or covering enough,

while others, for example German employers, would apparently prefer to ban it from their sight entirely. These discourses take on specific configurations that must be processed by those women wearing the headscarf in Germany and Europe, regardless of how religious or well-integrated they perceive themselves to be, and independent of how educated or well networked they are. All sorts of demands are made on the women: from the question of whether or not the headscarf is even necessary to the issue of whether or not the thigh coverage they wear could be less revealing. The women are trapped between integration and modesty discourses, constantly needing to justify their position.

Over the last few years, fuelled by these discourses, multiple papers have been written that focus on young Muslims and, usually as an aside, also deal with their clothing choices (Klinkhammer 2000; Nökel 2004; Höglinger 2014; Bendixsen 2013). These papers, however, have not yet observed how Muslim clothing changes, which, unintentionally, implies that Muslim women's sartorial practices are static or fixed. Frequently, therefore, they describe the current state of things, or make an attempt to understand hijabi clothing as is. According to the results from these papers, there are four different reasons for wearing the headscarf. The first reason for wearing the hijab is a form of tradition. It is worn because it has always been worn. This is the style that young Muslim women in Germany claim, and often also criticize, as belonging to their mothers. In contrast, these young women state that they wear hijabi clothing because of their spiritual beliefs, which is the second reason for wearing hijabi clothing. The third style can be seen, for example, over the course of the Iranian revolution, as women viewed wearing the headscarf together with the chador as a political act. This is the rationale that is often projected onto the headscarf in Germany. Finally, over the last ten years, researchers have discovered another reason for wearing the headscarf: wearing the headscarf as an identifying characteristic as part of a performative, micropolitical act of resistance against cultural devaluation of the place of origin and against exclusion (vgl. Nökel 2004). These four reasons overlap and at any given time may have a larger or smaller

part to play when it comes to selecting clothing. Svendsen (2006) has expressed, in this regard, the idea that people often have no problem consolidating their various roles and motivations instead of, as is often the assumption, acting on them individually or ending up confused by them. Applied to Muslims in Germany, this means that Muslim women also mix fashion, religion and micropolitics together and this is reflected in their clothing styles and clothing biographies. Biographical experiences, in particular, often influence clothing styles more than political or religious motivations (Tarlo and Moors 2007, p. 144).

It is these preliminary considerations that informed the main thesis of this work, which is that Muslim women, just like all other people, use their clothing as a calling card. I have shown that this calling card integrates all sorts of things, for example social and religious influences, just as much as it depicts personal interests. In the current work, integration is understood as a practice that affects not just a specific social group, but instead describes a general human method of dealing with the various challenges presented by daily life. The analysis of cultural influence and the associated translation work performed represent the actual integration effort. In this context, the hijabi clothing worn by Muslim women can be referred to as an integrative calling card.

The idea was less to describe Muslim religiosity in the form of clothing, and much more to understand fashion and migration in general by observing a supposedly foreign style. Which is why I did not create a typology and then verify its classification with many interview partners, but rather spent more time and energy explaining, against the background of existing knowledge, what defines the fashion styles of these women and how these meanings are to be classified contextually.

My research has shown that deciding factors when selecting clothing are the context, the spatial sphere and the occasion, although the context is the most important factor, as it structures all additional sartorial choices. What is worn changes based on the country the person is in, whether they are in a city or in a more rural area and of

course what laws there are regarding clothing. These contexts influence and structure the space in advance. One of my most important realisations is therefore related to the space in which fashion takes place, and the discerning way my interview partners deal with spatial structures: there are culturally determined differences when it comes to perception of public, semi-private and private spaces. This idea grew out of my confusion as to the type of party clothing my interview partner Amina owned; at weddings, she wore half see-through robes, even though her normal street clothing consisted of very modest coats and the hijab. It reminded me of Syria, where many of my interview partners preferred weddings divided by gender, as they did not wish to wear the hijab at their wedding. In countries with a dominant Muslim society, I discovered, there are therefore completely different opportunities for clothing design, as the clothing is directly adapted to match the relevant spatial sphere, by which I mean can be adapted at all. A Muslim woman can therefore attend a party in similar clothing and make-up to that of an American actress on the red carpet, no hijab or coat in sight, as long as she covers up on the way to the party. In Germany, for example, this is not possible. As part of my research it became clear that the women's spaces required for wearing half see-through Muslim party clothing are a simply unknown concept in Germany. Of course, for example, the women of some of the more liberal political parties may throw one or two women-only events, but even at those there is no guarantee that the religious needs of Muslim women not to be seen by non-*Mahrams* in revealing party clothing will be fully met.

The layout options provided by space divided into four spheres, therefore, do not exist for Amina in a European context, as there is no corresponding completely structured public space which meets the need of a Muslim woman for protecting her boundaries. There is only the division between private and public space, with a few grey areas in between. While the generation of migrants, such as Amina, have largely limited themselves to clothing for public spaces, their daughters have developed a style that is not just appropriate for many different occasions, but is also just as fashionable as the clothing belonging to

the dominant society. And this, in my opinion, is connected to the increasing exclusionary discourse described in chapters 3 and 3.4 Many young women have, because of their strategy of turning to Islam as an answer to continued negative discourse, started to wear the hijab earlier, and the hijab itself has become a fashion. This also explains the growing number of headscarf wearers. Many women even begin wearing a headscarf before they are married. A wedding ceremony in Germany, however, is almost always a mixed gender event. As a result, everyday fashions are getting more and more creative, while the party fashions worn at weddings eventually began to have an effect on the everyday fashions worn by Muslim women. Fashionable headscarf creations are now combined with other fashion taking place simultaneously. By adding long tops and other complementary pieces of clothing, 'western' basic dress codes are adjusted, developed and islamised to meet the requirements of Muslim women. By doing this the women ascribe themselves sartorially, as it were, to the 'modern'. These fashions can, if desired, be read just like a calling card.

Muslim women's fashion is no longer something that takes place above all beneath other clothing, or represented very discreetly and only for those in the know on coats and abayas. Muslim fashions, instead, now integrate a large variety of clothing provided it conforms with the basic rules of appropriate Islamic dress, that is it covers the shape of the body. At the same time, the limits of these basic rules are continually being tested. The most notable thing about this is that the women have obviously understood the binary spatial structure and have designed their clothing system to match.

Some wearers I spoke to prefer a style of clothing in which they feel good in a variety of contexts and which appears appropriate and suitable in different situations. I originally called this style the 'Berlin Style', because the name references both a cosmopolitan element and its origins in the global west. But the style applies not just to my interview partners, and so 'Berlin Style' does not adequately cover it. Instead, it is more of a 'Cosmo Islamic' style. The question as to 'imposition' of identity is thus resolved: the women wear multi-functional clothing that both represents an integrated identity

construct and allows this construct to remain true to itself in a wide range of situations, that is to feel coherent. This is the real integration effort achieved by these women and their Muslim-cosmopolitan style. This style is a clear sign of the integration status of Muslim women in Germany, as the sartorial translation and adaptation effort contained within it is only possible after intensive engagement with the cultural rules in the context of Germany and Europe, and shows on the body of the women, above and beyond the religious positioning, an additional ascription to the German discursive space. Judging unenthusiastic integration efforts based on fashion, however, is not feasible. In the theory chapter on fashion I proved that it is not possible, from the outside, to judge, for example, whether a coat is worn because the woman is following fashion or whether she is wearing it because she has not engaged with the country she immigrated to. Only a positive integration statement can be made.

The 'Cosmo Islamic Style', in my opinion, is visual proof of affective ascription. Despite this, in media discourses women with headscarves are named and rearticulated in connection with 'integration difficulties'. There are regular and frequent reports on terrorism, coercion and backwardness, all illustrated using images of headscarves. As a result, many Muslim women report that in their day to day life, despite an increase in education, they have significant difficulties when job searching, searching for apartments, etc. as soon as the headscarf comes into play. Of course, this unequal treatment, discrimination even, effects not just Muslim women, but rather is a general problem arising from a lack of total societal integration. But women wearing the headscarf are particularly affected because of their hyper-visibility. The insufficient ability to integrate displayed by the dominant society supports discrimination against migrants in many instances. Or, as Oestrich put it: "They are just barely allowed to serve the lowest segment of the labour market – without becoming dangerous to the middle classes" (Oestreich 2004, p. 174).

In order to escape this continued lower-class discourse, the women have developed a frame of reference that they can use to obtain personal recognition. As part of this empowerment strategy, what

matters is not how integrated, how educated or how German a woman is; instead, the only thing that is relevant is how religious she is and how much this religiosity is reflected in her clothing. This, however, has taken on a form that in turn has negative consequences for the women. The hyper-visible forms of Islamic religious life are, in regards to judgements made by other Muslims, often considered much more important than the inner connection to God. The 'Cosmo Islamic Style' may be met within Islamic groups with criticism or judged harshly in internet commentary. Which is why, starting in around 2011, these women used the internet to develop a means of defence, creatively making use of the space offered by the anonymity of the net: satire is used to take on calls to wear modest clothing, and the women who demand the right to choose their own clothing style untouched by the unsolicited opinion of outsiders show, using humour, how absurd and impertinent they think this manner of judging Muslim women's clothing is (wood turtle 2011; wood turtle 2012; fat brown hijabis 2013; Mustefa 2014; Bonessi 2014). In doing so, they make it clear that for them, their choice of clothing style is a decision made between them and their conscious, and is nobody else's business.

My research reached its limits, however, at a point in which a more exact classification of individual styles could be very interesting. Which sub-groups are there in the cosmo-islamic style, and what influences them? This classification might be taken on, for example, by the book from Reyhan Şahin[83] which was published in 2014 and, based on its description, may represent a specification of these styles: the exact sartorial semiotic analysis of clothing in regards to the various Muslim trends and their specific possible meanings as part of typology (Şahin 2014).

It was also unfortunately not possible for me to look more closely at the developments started by the 'Mipsterz' on the internet, as this was not the main subject of this work. The development of fashionable discourses within social networks which span the entire globe is an

83 Also known as Lady Bitch Ray. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the book is not available either in stores or in libraries.

immensely exciting subject for a future research project. The further development of the 'Mipsterz' and the market for Muslim fashion will continue to be an interesting topic, not just for academia but also from the point of view of large fashion producers. Here, it would be useful to undertake a more thorough investigation of transnational small companies as touched on in my research.

And finally, there is the question of the changes that will be brought about by the increased media presence of 'hipper' Muslim women within the non-Muslim dominant society. Can fashion and clothing styles together with the relevant discourse change the perception of Muslims in Germany? Will the large fashion houses adjust to meet these developments? Or will the inclusive fashion of the 'cosmo-islamic style' remain a niche product?

In this work, I have continually proven that the headscarf is more than just a political symbol of Islam. It is part of sartorial body practices and part of fashion, and should not, in future legal decisions, be viewed primarily as a political symbol. The non-Muslim dominant society, however, generally takes no notice of the various influences that inform the 'cosmo-islamic style'.

I have also shown that the reasons for the stigmatizing assessment of headscarves can be found in the recent past. Hijabi clothing is not considered to be part of Europe, as Europe is ostensibly of a predominantly non-Muslim persuasion. And as hijabi clothing, unlike a skin colour, is not a fixed part of the body, there is a belief that it is not racist to discriminate based on clothing. In truth, the thinking goes, it is the women who stigmatise themselves. This legitimises the injustices faced by Muslims on the part of the law and during their everyday lives. But in a democracy, structural inequality is never justifiable, and all discourses that attempt to legitimise existing hierarchies are no more than scientifically supported excuses for social discrimination. The idea that migrants and in particular Muslim women can only be well integrated if they wear the basic dress code of the dominant society is, in my opinion, blind to the complex daily experiences that migrants have, and in particular blind to the complex sartorial translation efforts they practise daily. The presence of Muslim

women who wear the hijab is a challenge to a dominant society that believes it has a collective identity; when they see the headscarf, they are shown proof that this belief is an illusion. In this manner, we are constantly reminded that democracy is not a golf club. Which is why those involved in academia, politics and the press must continually work to define how German society wants to live in the future. The headscarf is really just a reminder that the German dominant society has yet to do their part of the work when it comes to integration.

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Glossar

Abaya Long overdress, which reaches from the neck to the feet, often black and made of silky fabrics, with ornamentation on the sleeves and hem. In recent years *Abaya* have become fashionable and spread from India to Europe, even beyond the Arabian Peninsula. In many contexts it is an overgarment to be worn outside, not a real dress.. 103, 122, 152, 213

Al-Amira Al-Amira Two-piece hijab, consisting of a head scarf as a lower layer, which like a headband holds the hair back, and a cover of the same colour, which, pre-stitched, reaches from the top of the head to the chin and leaves the facial oval free, covering the hair and neck up to the collar. It is used most often by children and young women, because it does not need pins and is therefore very easy to put on.. 134, 151

Cardigan This is a cardigan. 145, 188

Hand of Fatima symbol with many meanings, among others from Islamic folklore. It is supposed to provide protection from djinns and the evil eye. Especially the blue eye, called a *Nazar* amulet, as it can be seen in many restaurants even in Germany, is supposed to counteract the evil eye, which always comes from blue eyes.. 203

Haram The pair of terms *haram* and *halal* denote the things that are ritually allowed or forbidden. In Judaism the words *kosher* and *trefe* are used for the same concept.. 116, 262

Hijab The *hijab* is the name for the Muslim headscarf, which is common especially in the Arabic area, in Great Britain and America. In Indonesia the headscarf is called *jilbab*, while in Korea, for example, it is called *Khimār*. For some Muslims, the word hijab refers not only to the scarf, but also to the principle of gender segregation as such, i.e. the associated clothing and lifestyle. In the Qur'an, on the other hand, hijab refers to the veil that is hung up in the house to divide the space between that for women and that for men and is not, in the true sense, an item of clothing. 128, 146, 147, 208, 209

Jilbāb The *Jilbāb* is a word that refers to several garments, depending on the region. While in *Sham*, i.e. the area from Lebanon to Jordan, the Jilbāb is known as a long coat in the style and cut of a trench coat, in Libya it refers to a cotton-woven overgarment with hood, which is similar to the Abaya, but is made of coarser fabrics and can also be coloured. 96, 124, 136, 146, 168, 207, 262

Khimār Hip to thigh long headscarf, which is worn on the head and not on the shoulders, thus hiding the shape of the body very well. It is often worn in combination with a skirt of the same colour, and a bandana under the topmost part to hide the forehead. Fashionable compositions combine it with wide trousers. Since it can be easily thrown over other clothing, it is especially suitable for prayer. XV, 96, 97, 124, 146, 154, 165, 168, 191, 209, 213

Mahram The *Mahram* comprises those family members who, according to the Koran, are not allowed to get married, i.e. the woman's husband and his father, her own children and siblings, as well as the slaves that were customary at that time. The word *Harem*, i.e. the women's sphere, goes back to the same root word, as does the word *Haram*. 116, 122, 129

Manto In Syria, a common name for a trenchcoat-like coat that is often ankle-length. In Lebanon and Korea the same garment is called a *Jilbāb*. See also *Jilbāb*. 122

Niqāb face covering that leaves only the eyes exposed. A recent fashionable development weaves two longer scarves together on a headband. The headband is tied around the head so that both layers hang over the eyes. Then one layer of cloth is folded back over the head. The lower layer of fabric then covers the rest of the face. Between the cloth and the headband there are often, but not always, openings for the eyes. Other forms of face covering exist e.g. in Indonesia and are called *Tschador* Tschador there or in Yemen, where especially the *Burqu* dominates. 95, 96, 107, 209, 213

Surah The term Surah denotes a section of the Koran, the holy scripture of Islam. 164–166

Tschador The *Tschador* denotes in Iran black two-piece garments, which consist of wide trousers or a skirt and a long wide headscarf. In Pakistan, Indonesia and North India a similar garment in bright colours is worn: the *Shalwar Kamiz*, called a *Churidar* in South India. 96, 262

Zakāt The *Zakāt* (Arabic purity, purity, growth) is the obligatory donation of a certain share of the property of Muslims to the needy and other specified groups of people. It forms one of the five pillars of Islam.. 178